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ABSTRACT
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA:
CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS’S ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL
ORIENTATIONS TOWARD DEMOCRACY
Chunlong Lu
Old Dominion University, 2007
Director: Dr. Jie Chen

Does the middle class in China think and act democratically and hence serve as
the harbinger o f democratic development in that country? Little empirical work has been
done to systematically address this crucial question. The primary goals o f this
dissertation are to explore the level o f attitudinal support for democracy among Chinese
middle class individuals, examine their behavioral orientations toward politics, and
provide a comprehensive assessment o f the role o f the Chinese middle class in the
evolution o f the Chinese political system. This dissertation argues that the middle class
in China consists o f the following four occupational groups: self-employed laborers,
managers, professionals, and civil servants. Following this conceptualization, it discusses
the relations between the Chinese party-state and the newly rising middle class, and
makes distinctions between the subgroup o f middle class individuals employed in the
public sector and the subgroup employed in the private sector, and posits three
hypotheses: (1) The private-sector middle class has strong democratic attitudes; on the
other hand, the public-sector middle class has significantly weaker democratic attitudes;
(2) The private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic orientation may lead to their
negative evaluation of the current forms of mass political participation; in turn, this
negative evaluation may cause the private-sector middle class individuals to engage in
non-participatory action as a form of protest against the current system; and (3) The
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public-sector middle class individuals’ undemocratic belief may lead to their positive
evaluation o f the current forms o f mass political participation; in turn, this positive
evaluation may cause the public-sector middle class individuals to engage in participatory
action to express their support o f the current system. The hypothesized causal
relationships are tested via three representative public opinion surveys.
The three hypotheses are strongly supported by the empirical evidence. This
dissertation concludes that the private-sector middle class people are more likely to hold
democratic values and act in ways that promote democracy in China, while the publicsector middle class people tend to hold negative attitudes toward democracy and act in an
undemocratic fashion. Such findings are o f theoretical and practical significance.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the post-Mao reform, the People’s Republic o f China has
undergone a series o f profound socio-political changes, one o f which was the emergence
and growth of the middle class in the country’s urban areas. This development raises an
important question: Does the middle class in a non-democratic, transitional society such
as China think and act democratically and hence serve as the harbinger o f democratic
change in that country? Although there have been some anecdotal observations, China
studies have not yet developed a theoretically complete and in-depth explanation o f the
role o f the middle class in that country’s democratic transition. Moreover, previous
theoretical approaches to the study of the Chinese middle class, despite their
sophistication, failed to provide a conceptual framework to explain and predict the
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the new middle class toward democracy.
This dissertation, therefore, explores a new approach to the study o f the role o f the
middle class in China’s political transition. Unlike traditional approaches, which tend to
neglect the individual-level analysis o f the attitudinal and behavioral orientations o f the
middle class, this new approach focuses on a set o f socio-political characteristics of
middle class individuals, among which their socioeconomic ties with the Chinese state is
the most important. The underlying idea for this new approach is that this set o f socio
political characteristics determines middle class individuals’ attitudes toward democracy
and their political actions. The purpose of this study is to explore, through the use of

This dissertation follows the format requirements o f A M anual fo r Writers o f Term Papers, Theses and
Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
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three public opinion surveys conducted in China, this alternative approach. This chapter
presents the theoretical foundations for the approach and the hypotheses for the data
analysis.

STRUCTURAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS: THE “MODERNIZATION” APPROACH AND
THE “CONTEXTUAL” APPROACH
Before I review the previous studies o f the Chinese middle class, which tend to be
structural-oriented, I will briefly describe the structural- and individual-level approaches
to the analysis of class politics, emphasizing the differences between the two.
The structural-level and individual-level analyses intend to answer different
questions. The structural-level analysis, which is meant to describe a crucial property of
whole societies, emphasizes the impact o f the size o f different social classes as well as
the relationships among these classes on the change and stability o f a political regime.
On the other hand, the individual-level analysis, which defines “a set of ‘locations’ filled
by individuals subjected to a set o f mechanisms that impinge directly on their lives as
they make choices and act in the world”1, focuses on the links between social class status
and individual attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward political affairs. Moreover,
the findings from the analysis on one level can not be used to validate (or invalidate) the
findings from the analysis on the other level.
The previous studies of the political role o f the Chinese middle class tend to
be structural-oriented. One group o f these scholars argues that democratic change in
China is inevitable, because economic development will create a large middle class
1 Erik Olin Wright, “ Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept o f Class Structure,” in Reworking Class, ed.
John R. Hall (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 44.
2 Ibid.
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in the next two decades. According to this argument, the newly emerged Chinese
middle class has quietly become the class carrying the values o f responsive
government and democracy. I will call this argument the “modernization” approach.
For adherents o f this approach, continued economic growth creates an independent
middle class; moreover, the emergence o f a large and growing middle class “bodes
well for the emergence o f democracy,” because the middle class forms “a solid base
-3

for legal democratic politics.”
Another group o f these structural-oriented scholars argues that the middle
class will remain a small minority within Chinese society, and therefore are not
likely to become a democratic force. Moreover, this view suggests that the Chinese
middle class is anti-democratic or undemocratic by nature.4 I will call this argument
the “contextual” approach.
The modernization approach originates in the work of Aristotle, who was the first
to observe the structural relations between a democratic regime and the strength of a
middle class in a society:
“Aristotle observed that where the rich were the most powerful class, they
established exclusionary oligarchies as the form of government, wherein only
those with large property holdings could vote or hold political offices. Where the
poor were very numerous and well organized, they established what Aristotle
called ‘extreme democracy’— extreme because the poor, badly educated, and
tending toward ‘mobrule,’ as Polybius dubbed it, often overrode law in their
assemblies, and more often followed blindly the lead of a charismatic demagogue.
3 Ronald M. Glassman, China in Transition: Communism, Capitalism, and Democracy (New York:
Praeger, 1991), 62.
4 For example, see David G. Goodman, “The New Middle Class,” in The Paradox o f C hina’s Post-Mao
Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick Mac MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1999), 259-61; Margaret M. Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequences o f
Economic Reform (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1997); Jane Duckett, “Bureaucrats in
Business, Chinese Style,” World Development 29 (2001): 23-37; David Zweig, “Undemocratic Capitalism:
China and the Limits o f Economism,” The National Interest 56 (Summer 1999): 63-72; He Li, “Middle
Class: Friends or Foes to Beijing’s New Leadership,” Journal o f Chinese Political Science 8, nos. 1&2
(2003): 87-100.
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Aristotle observed, however, that where the middle class was prosperous and
numerous, they tended to establish a stable form of government based on the rule
of law and founded on the inclusion of the entire population in the participatory
process o f the assembly.”5
The recent empirical studies have echoed Aristotle’s observation that a strong and
unified middle class is a favorable condition for the rise o f democracy and the
stability o f such a political system.
Following Aristotle’s argument, Robert Dahl suggests that a middle classdominant society tends to be less unequal in terms o f the distribution of
socioeconomic resources, which is favorable to the rise and maintenance o f a
democratic system.6 On the other hand, the inequalities in the distribution of
socioeconomic resources in a society without a strong middle class may approximate
the inequalities in the distribution o f political resources, which is not favorable to
competitive politics and polyarchy.7
In addition, Francis Fukuyama suggests that in a middle class-dominant
society, the most important socioeconomic inequalities will be based not on inherited
social position but on education, occupation, and individual achievement. Hence, a
middle class-dominant society will have a high level o f social mobility, which
creates “better environments for fostering liberal democracy than those riven by
o

longstanding class barriers.”

5 Glassman, China in Transition, 3-4.
6 Edward N. Muller, “Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality,” American Sociological
Review 53 (1988): 50-68; and idem, “Economic Determinants o f Democracy,” American Sociological
Review 60 (1995): 805-21; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971).
7 Dahl, Polyarchy.
8 Francis Fukuyama, “Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link,” in Capitalism, Socialism, and
Democracy Revisited, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993), 101-102.
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For example, American democracy occurred in a society “wherein the rich
were relatively weak, the poor [were] easily absorbed into the middle class, and the
middle class [were] burning with desire for democratic and lawful government;”
whereas “in England, where the gentry were all-powerful, and in France, where the
poor swelled to vast proportions and could not gain upward mobility, and where the
feudal classes still held some power, the political ideas of the ... middle classes
could not become institutionalized.”9
The modernization theorists further suggest that with economic development
in a society, the middle class will emerge and gain in size, and, in turn, work as a
causal agent for the establishment of democracy.10 For the modernization theorists,
economic development changes a country’s social structure from the pyramid-shaped
type to the diamond-shaped type, with the majority of the population being middle
class. This structural change tempers the intensity o f a country’s social conflict both
by reducing the proportion of the lower class that is susceptible to anti-democratic
and extremist ideologies and forces and by increasing the proportion o f the middle
class that supports pro-democratic ideologies and forces, which, in turn will facilitate
the rise and stability o f democracy.11 Moreover, modernization theorists assume that
this developmental path— economic development creates an affluent middle class in

9 Ronald M. Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective (Leiden, The
Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 158.
10 For more on this point, please see Seymour M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o f Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959):
69-105; and idem, Political Man: the Social Bases o f Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981).
11 Muller, “Economic Determinants o f Democracy;” Lipset, Political Man.
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a society, which, in turn, leads to a democratic system— is linear and can be
generalized to all countries and regions.

12

Based on the this modernization theory, Ronald Glassman and Henry Rowen
are optimistic about the future of democracy in China, because they believe that
economic development will create a large Chinese middle class in the next two
decades, which, in turn, will act as a causal agent for democracy in that country.

12

Also, Pei Minxin has predicted, “when the proportion o f the middle class [in Chinese
society] is over 60 percent, political openness will be inevitable, and the pressure on
the government will be dramatic.” 14
The contextual approach has a very pessimistic view of the role o f the
Chinese middle class in promoting democracy in that country.15 They do not agree
with the linear model of modernization theory and they assert that the unique
historical experiences o f each country, their distinctive cultures, and their particular
political systems are o f critical importance in understanding the causal relations
among social phenomena.16

12 See Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o f Democracy;” and idem, Political Man', Samuel P. Huntington,
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press
1991); Ronald M. Glassman, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective (New York: St.
M artin’s Press; London: Macmillan Press, 1997); and idem, The Middle Class and D emocracy in SocioHistorical Perspective.
13 Henry S. Rowen, “The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,” The National Interest 45 (1996): 6869; Glassman, China in Transition.
14 Jiang He, “Analysis: The Significance o f the Growing Middle Class in China,” (2004). Available
[Online]:< http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/4-4-27/21061.html> [17 July 2006].
15 For example, see Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Duckett,
“Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese Style;” Zweig, “Undemocratic Capitalism;” Li, “Middle Class.”
16 For a detailed discussion o f the contextual effects o f historical origin and cultural circumstances on the
causal relevance among social phenomenon, please see Charles Ragin and David Zaret, “Theory and
M ethod in Comparative Research: Two Strategies,” Social Forces 61, no. 3 (1983): 731-54; Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); Theda Skocpol, “A Critical Review o f Barrington M oore’s
Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy,” Politics and Society 4, no. 1 (1973): 1-34; and idem, States
and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979). For a detailed discussion o f the role o f the middle class in the democratic changes

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Adherents o f the contextual approach are concerned with the overall Chinese
social structure and the size of the Chinese middle class. Because o f the fact that over 40
percent o f China’s population still lives in rural areas and is poorly educated, there is
little possibility for the middle classes to grow to the same proportion in China as in the
developed countries. Therefore, the middle class will remain a small minority in China,

17

and the Chinese social structure will remain pyramid-shaped, with peasants constituting
the largest social class. Moreover, Chinese society is currently one of the most unequal
societies in the world.18 The widespread social grievances, particularly among desperate
peasants and unemployed workers, has intensified the interest conflicts between the rich
and poor. Thus, given this socioeconomic polarization and potential class antagonism,
the small middle class may choose to align with the bourgeoisie and Party-state, since
“they share the need for repressive state power that if free from the influence or control of
the populace would protect their wealth and ‘noble’ status in the societal hierarchy.” 19
In the studies cited above on the role o f the Chinese middle class in promoting
democracy in that country, no attention is given to the individual-level analysis o f the
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the middle class.
In the view of the modernization approach analysts, the middle class appears to be
a consistent agent for democracy within a society; therefore, democratic change is
inevitable. However, this belief leaves these scholars in a weak position, because, the
in the less developed countries, please see Dale L. Johnson, “Class and Social Development: Toward a
Comparative and Historical Social Science,” in Middle Classes in Dependent Countries, ed. Dale L.
Johnson (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985), 13-19; U lf Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle
Classes: Reflections on Political Development,” Australian Journal o f Politics and History 37 (1991): 10017.
17 An Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” Political
Science Quarterly 117, no. 3 (2002): 401-22.
18 Alvin Y. So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” Journal o f Contemporary
Asia 33, no. 3 (2003): 367.
19 Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 416-17.
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middle class is in fact not a consistent democratic force in the non-democratic,
transitional society. For example, in Singapore, the majority o f the middle class accepts
the undemocratic government as long as the authoritarian regime continues to satisfy
their material needs.

20

In Malaysia, the burgeoning middle class, especially ethnic

Malays, has either actively supported an increasingly authoritarian state or remained
politically apathetic. 21 In Indonesia, the new middle class has stood firmly on the side of
the status quo.22
The contextual approach scholars treat the middle class as an “arbitrary” or
“dependent” variable, which can be predicted by the overall social context. According to
them, the size of the middle class within a society has a dominant impact on its attitudinal
and behavioral orientations. Therefore, the Chinese social context (i.e., a society where
more than half o f the Chinese population are still peasants and the middle class will
remain a small minority) is the decisive factor in determining the nature o f the middle
class and that, given the current social context, that nature will be undemocratic.
Moreover, both approaches (i.e., the modernization and contextual approaches)
are based primarily on theoretical speculation and lack empirical evidence to support
their arguments. Very few representative-sample studies have systematically addressed
the individual-level question: does the middle class in China think and act democratically
and hence serve as the harbinger o f democratic change in that country? To fill this gap,

20 Peng Er Lam, “Singapore: Rich State, Illiberal Regime,” in Driven by Growth: Political Change in the
Asia-Pacific Region, ed. James W. Morley (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Garry Rodan, “The Growth of
Singapore’s M iddle Class and its Political Significance,” in Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political
and Economic Directions in the 1990s, ed. Garry Rodan (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993).
21 Daniel A. Bell, “After the Tsunami: Will Economic Crisis Bring Democracy to Asia,” The New Republic
218 (March 9, 1998): 22-25; David Martin Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle
Class Culture in Pacific Asia,” Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 147-69.
22 Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia;” Bell, “After
the Tsunami.”
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this dissertation focuses on the individual-level analysis and attempts, by using three
public opinion surveys, to explain the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the
Chinese middle class.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE
ROLE OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS IN DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
As Erik Olin Wright has suggested, the framework deployed in the structurallevel analysis has tended to be unsuitable for the concrete, individual-level analysis.23
The basic strategy that I have adopted in this dissertation is to conceptualize middle class
status as a set o f distinctive socioeconomic attributes— owning small properties,
supervising others, and possessing professional expertise— which qualitatively
distinguish the middle class from other social classes. This dissertation identifies these
socioeconomic attributes as the initial and dynamic factors in influencing the middle
class’ political attitudes and behaviors. This study also adds a new attribute—-the
socioeconomic ties with the state— reflecting the uniqueness o f the Chinese middle class,
which divides the Chinese middle class into two sub-groups: private-sector and publicsector.
In its presentation of an individual-level theoretical framework that explains how
these socioeconomic attributes affect the middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors,
this dissertation uses the theoretical insights of the studies of the middle class in the West.
The predominant view, in the individual-level studies of the middle class in the West,
suggests that middle class individuals have strongly supportive attitudes toward
democracy because they realize that democracy is the best system to protect their
23 Wright, “ Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept o f Clasp Structure.”
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individual rights and property. Unlike members o f the upper classes who not only own
much larger properties but usually enjoy formal or informal clientelist ties with the state
power that could be used to protect their properties and other interests, members o f the
middle class generally lack close connections with powerful political patrons.24 Without
these political connections, middle class citizens have to rely on such democratic
institutions as the popular election o f leaders and constitutional limitations on state power
to protect their rights and property from the actions o f powerful intruders (e.g., the
government and its officials).25 The Western literature also contends that middle class
individuals are most likely to act on their democratic beliefs, because they have a high
level o f political efficacy: that is, they are more confident about their role in public affairs
and are more competent to participate in politics than members o f the lower class.

26

•

This

political confidence and competence comes mainly from the experience and intellectual
expertise gained in their occupations and professions. The experience o f running a
business, supervising others, and/or possessing intellectual expertise makes middle class

24 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and idem, The New Middle
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
25 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; Lipset, Political Man.
26 Heinz Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective,” Journal o f Politics 18 (1956): 232-53;
and idem, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (1956):
515-29; Lipset, Political Man', Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get
Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977); Norman H. Nie, G.
Bingham Powell, Jr. and Kenneth Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental
Relationships, Part I,” American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 361-78; and idem, “ Social Structure
and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part II,” American Political Science Review 63
(1969): 808-32; Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem,
The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie,
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1972).

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
people feel competent to participate in all types o f actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise
and/or maintenance o f a democratic system. 27
This Western individual-level theoretical framework may be applied to the
assessment o f the political attitudes and behavior of middle class individuals in urban
China. According to the conceptualization employed in Chapter II, the middle class in
urban China includes four major occupational groups: self-employed laborers (i.e.,
private entrepreneur o f small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context),
managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers
in the Chinese context). Like their counterparts in Western societies, the members o f the
middle class in urban China possesses the following socioeconomic attributes— owning
small properties, supervising others, and possessing professional expertise. For example,
all members o f the Chinese middle class own property, which, while it may not be
extensive, is substantial: all self-employed laborers own their businesses, while most
managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants own at least their apartments. 28 In
Chapters IV and V, I will use this Western individual-level theory to assess the political
attitudes and behavior o f middle class individuals in urban China.
On the other hand, this dissertation also recognizes that the Chinese middle class
is different from its Western counterparts: the rise o f the middle class in China is a
relatively new phenomenon (about 20 years old), and more importantly, a direct
consequence o f the rapid state-led economic development of the past two decades.

27 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and idem, The New Middle
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in
Politics (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959).
28 See, Benjamin L. Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner
Self-Organization in Urban China,” The China Journal 49 (2004): 31-59.
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Therefore, this study adds a new objective factor— the socioeconomic ties with the
state—to modify the application of these general theories.

A. The Relations between the State and the Middle Class
Many empirical studies o f the developing countries suggest that throughout the
developing world the activities o f the state have been a primary source o f the formation
o f the middle class. As Dale Johnson has observed:
“In less developed societies the state tends to grow to the limits o f resources that
can be taxed or otherwise appropriated by government.. ..In part, this
overdevelopment compensates for the presence of weak classes o f local
capitalists, or even their virtual nonexistence: States assume entrepreneurial
functions, giving birth to technocratic, managerial, and technical groupings.”29
As a result, the members of the middle class were the main beneficiaries of state
economic paternalism in the developing world; they were also dependent upon the state
for the advancement o f their careers.
Moreover, many empirical studies tend to suggest that since the state often played
a very active role in creating and shaping the formation of the middle class in the
developing world, the emergence of a unified and distinctive middle class identity was
nearly impossible. These studies further suggest that the political orientations of the
middle classes in the developing world are not unified but fragmented.30
As has been the case in other developing countries, the development o f China’s
middle class was influenced by national politics and government policies. In the past

29 Johnson, “Class and Social Development,” 15.
30 Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle Classes;” Hagen Koo, “The Middle Class in the East Asian
Newly Industrialized Societies: Issues, Preliminary Findings and Further Questions,” in East Asian Middle
Classes in Comparative Perspective, ed. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (Taipei: Institute o f Ethnology,
Academia Sinica, 1999), 83-100; Eui Hang Shin, “Social Change, Political Elections, and the Middle Class
in Korea,” E ast Asia: A n International Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1999): 28-60; Johnson, “Class and Social
Development.”
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fifty years, government policies and the changes in the state institutions determined
[0]the patterns of social stratification in Chinese society. Before the establishment o f the
People’s Republic o f China in 1949, a small middle class including managerial personnel,
professionals, small businessmen, and civil servants constituted approximately 7% o f the
Chinese population.31 In the period beginning in 1949 and ending in 1978, China was a
statist society ruled by a strong Leninist Party; the private economy was gradually
eliminated, and private entrepreneurs, small and medium-size businessmen, as well as
independent professionals, disappeared in Chinese society.32 During this period, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent
IT

middle class into a subservient stratum.
Since 1978, the CCP has gradually legitimized the existence o f the private
economy in Chinese society and has taken genuine measures to encourage its
development.34 The CCP has abandoned their monopolization o f occupational mobility,
allowing ordinary Chinese citizens to have greater freedom to choose their occupations,
35and the CCP has also de-emphasized the importance of political loyalty and activism in

31 Xueyi Lu, ed., D angdai zhongguo shehui liudong (Social Mobility in Contemporary China) (Beijing:
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004).
32 Yanjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social M obility,” Annual Review o f Sociology 28 (2002):
91-116; Deborah S. Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China: Training, Hiring, and Promoting
Urban Professionals and Managers after 1949,” Modern China 26, no. 3 (2000): 251-75; Xueyi Lu, ed.,
Dangdai zhongguo shehuijiecengyanjiu baogao (Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social
Classes) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002); Zeqi Qiu, Dangdai zhongguo shehui fenceng
zhuangkuang de bianqian (The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China) (Hebei, China:
Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2004).
33 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary
C hina’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China; Qiu, The Changes o f Social
Stratification in Contemporary China', Martin King Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” The
China Quarterly 64 (1975): 684-711.
34 Pearson, C h in a ’s New Business Elite', International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private
Enterprises: Prospects fo r the New Century (W ashington D.C.: International Finance Corporation, 2000).
35 Xueguang Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004); Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China.
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educational attainment and occupational advancement.36 The post-Mao reform has
changed the social structure o f China and consequently paved the road for the emergence
o f a middle class. Since the late 1980s, a middle class by Western standards has emerged
in Chinese society.
However, due to the continued importance o f the state institutions in influencing
ordinary Chinese citizens’ life opportunities during the reform era, the formation o f the
middle class in contemporary China follows two separate paths.

77

The first is through the

state institutions, where middle class positions in government and party agencies, stateowned enterprises and public organizations are considered to be “closed” positions, and
access to these positions is subject to screening for political loyalty and party
membership. This sub-group, the middle class employed in the public sector, which
includes managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public
organizations, and staff members in the government and party agencies and public
organizations, is, in varying degrees, still affected by state power.

7Q

The second path is

through the market institutions, where middle class positions in the private sector are
considered to be “open” positions, and the access to these positions is determined by the
workings o f the market institutions. This sub-group, the middle class employed in the
36 Yang Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations: A Comparative Study o f Promotion Determination in
Reforming China,” Social Forces 80, no. 2 (2001): 683-712; Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J.
Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese
Elite, 1949 to 1996,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 2 (2000): 191-209.
37 Chunling Li, “Zhongguo dangdai zhongchan jieceng de gouchengji bili” (The Composition and Size o f
China’s Contemporary Middle Class), Zhongguo renkou kexue (Chinese Population Science) 2003, no. 6:
25-32; Qiang Li, “Zhongguo zhongdeng shouru jieceng de goucheng” (The Composition o f China’s
M iddle-Income Stratum), Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao (Journal o f Hunan Normal University
Social Science) 2003, no. 4: 7-9; Wei Zhang, C hongtuyu bianshu: zhongguo shehui zhongjian jieceng
zhengzhi fe n x i (Conflict and Uncertainty: Political Analysis o f Middle Stratum in Chinese Society)
(Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005); Hangsheng Zheng and Lulu Li, D angdai zhongguo
chengshi shehui jiegou (Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin
daxue chubanshe, 2004); Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
38 Lu, ed., Social M obility in Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in
Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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private sector, which includes managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises,
professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur of
small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context), and white-collar office workers
in the private entities, is much more independent than the first sub-group in terms of its
relationship to state power.39
This unique relationship between the state and the newly-rising middle class in
China makes this class quite different from its counterpart in Western societies.
Therefore, studies analyzing the political attitudes and behaviors o f the middle class in
China must be designed to reflect this difference.

B. The Working Hypotheses fo r the Data Analysis
Rather than treating the newly emerged Chinese middle class as a monolithic
class, I divide this class into two sub-groups: the public-sector sub-group and the privatesector sub-group. It is my expectation that these two sub-groups of the Chinese middle
class will have different attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward democracy.
With regard to the political attitudes and behaviors of the sub-group o f middle
class individuals employed in the public sector, I hypothesize that the middle class
individuals employed in the public sector will not support democracy and thus will act in
an undemocratic way. Because the middle class individuals in the public sector have
close relations with the Communist Party and government, and enjoy many privileges
sanctioned by the Party and government, they have a vested interest in maintaining the

39 Li, “The Composition and Size o f China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Qiu, The Changes o f Social
Stratification in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China;
Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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status quo.40 For example, as David Goodman points out, the managers in the stateowned and collective enterprises, and the professionals in the public sector, in general,
“far from being alienated from the [P]arty-state or seek[ing] their own political voice,
[appear] to be operating in close proximity and through close cooperation” with the
Party-state.41 As a result, they may not demand a transparent, democratic political
system; instead they are concerned that a dramatic change of the current political system
may endanger their interests since they may lose those privileges that they are currently
enjoying by virtue o f their close relationship with the Party-state.
With regard to the political attitudes and behaviors of the sub-group o f middle
class individuals employed in the private sector, I hypothesize that the middle class
individuals employed in the private sector have strongly supportive attitudes toward
democracy and thus will act in a democratic way. The middle class individuals in the
private sector are much more independent from the Communist Party and government.42
Like their Western counterparts, the middle class individuals in the private sector
perceive democracy as the best form o f governance to protect their property 43 Moreover,
they strongly demand the legal-institutional constraints upon the power o f the Communist

40 As Luigi Tomba observed, members o f the Chinese middle classes whose social status is dependent upon
the Party-state (e.g., professionals in the public sector) “are generally supportive o f the present national
leadership and feel that their social status today is largely dependent on the reform policies and the present
program to manage the economy.” See his article, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in
Beijing,” The China Journal 51 (2004): 24.
41 Goodman, “The New Middle Class,” 260-61.
42 The successes o f the middle class individuals in the non-public sector were dependent upon their market
power rather than upon patron-client relations with the Party-state. Please see Zheng and Li, Social
Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
43 In the last five years, incidents related to property rights protection have increased in large and medium
sized cities. Owners o f commercial apartments, most o f which are members o f middle class in the private
sector, have engaged in many activities to protect their properties such as collecting signatures through
Internet online forum, organizing home-owners’ associations, and calling for more democratic decision
making process o f community affairs. For example, see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Yongshun Cai,
“China’s Moderate Middle Class: The Case o f Homeowners’ Resistance,” Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005):
777-99.
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Party to guarantee the proper functioning of the market, to contain the widespread
corruption, and to secure their property and their bourgeois lifestyle.44 Like their
Western counterparts, the middle class individuals in the private sector have acquired
modern values such as those o f equality and negotiation, as well as o f self-independence
as a result o f their experiences in their daily lives and work. Such modern ideas are
closely related to democratic values and can be easily translated into democratic attitudes.
The data used in this dissertation include: 1) Beijing Survey on “Election and
Urban Local Self-Governance” in 2000 (see Appendix A), 2) Beijing Survey on
“Construction of Urban Residential Communities” in 2004 (see Appendix B), and 3) the
national survey of public opinion in China, the World Values Survey (WVS) 2001 (see
Appendix C). This dissertation will mainly rely on these three public opinion surveys to
identify the Chinese middle class and to describe their attitudinal orientations and
behavioral orientations toward democracy. In addition to these three public opinion
surveys, an interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” (see
Appendix D), which was conducted in Beijing in cooperation with Renmin University of
China, will be used to support the arguments presented by this dissertation.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY
On at least three grounds, this study promises to make a significant contribution to
the study o f the role o f the middle class in the evolution of the Chinese political change.

44 For example, An Chen observed that, the top priority o f small entrepreneurs and businessmen (i.e., one
main component o f the middle class in the non-public sector) is to “strive for institutionalization o f and
ideological (or constitutional) justification for capitalism in order to make their businesses and capitalist
way of life politically safe.... [And this priority] has an obvious pro-democratic element as it exerts pressure
on the communist regime for some fundamental economic-political changes.” See his article, “Capitalist
Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 415-16.
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First, it is hoped that this study will act as a bridge between the extremes o f the
modernization approach, which views the middle class as being unvarying supporters of
democracy, and the contextual approach, which views the middle class as being
inevitably undemocratic due to the Chinese social structure, by developing, through the
use of three public opinion surveys, a new approach to the individual-level analysis o f the
middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors. This study makes distinctions between
structural-level and individual-level analysis in the study of the role o f the middle class in
democracy and democratization. It focuses on the individual-level question o f why
middle class individuals think and act democratically and makes an original contribution
to the literature that expands the understanding of this question.
Second, it yields important findings about the Chinese middle class’ political
attitudes and behaviors. It identifies a set of socio-political characteristics o f middle class
individuals to explain their attitudes toward democracy, and shows that the
socioeconomic ties with the Chinese state divides the middle class into two sub-groups
and shapes their attitudes toward democracy. Furthermore, based on my theoretical
model and understanding of the Chinese middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors,
this study will make some reasonable forecasts about the role of the middle class in
China’s democratic transition.
Third, the findings from this study will also have implications for American
policy toward China. American policy makers have expressed the hope that the
formation o f a prosperous and strong middle class will lead to political change and
ultimately democratization. This hope is based on the assumption that the newly rising
middle class would prefer a more democratic political system than the one in which they
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have prospered. So, a better understanding o f the goals and preferences o f the Chinese
middle class is necessary in order to evaluate the prospects for democratic political
change in that country.

OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
Chapter II is designed to answer a critical question: who are the people who
constitute the Chinese middle class? This chapter begins with a general discussion o f an
important methodological issue that guides the measurement o f the Chinese middle class:
assuring comparability o f the measurement. It summarizes the existing literature on the
identification o f China’s middle class and discusses its strengths and weaknesses. In this
dissertation, I operationalize the Chinese middle class by combining four occupational
groups: self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur o f small or medium-sized
business in the Chinese context), managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants
(i.e., white-collar office workers in the Chinese context). Furthermore, I categorize the
Chinese middle class people into two subgroups: public sector and private sector,
depending on the nature o f their employers.
Chapter III examines the evolution of the Chinese middle class since 1949. This
dissertation makes distinctions between the totalitarian society (1950— 1978) and the
transitional society (1978-present), and compares their different state-society relations in
order to provide a background for the proper understanding o f social differentiation and
the emergence o f a middle class in China. The comparative analysis between the
evolution o f China’s middle class and its Western counterparts in this chapter lays the
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ground for formulating a theoretical hypothesis regarding the political attitudes and
behaviors o f China’s middle class.
Chapter IV measures the attitudinal orientations toward democracy among
China’s general population and its middle class in particular in the following three sub
dimensions: support for competitive election, support for equal protection and rights for
all people, and support for sovereignty o f the people’s will. This chapter also determines
that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic within Chinese society in
terms o f the above-referenced dimensions; on the other hand, the public-sector middle
class shares, though to a lesser degree, negative attitudes toward democracy with the
upper class.
Chapter V attempts to answer the research question: does China’s middle class act
in ways that promote democracy? In particular, this chapter focuses on the following two
questions: Do the members of the private-sector middle class, who have democratic
values, act in ways that promote democracy? Do the members of the public-sector
middle class, who hold negative attitudes toward democracy, act in ways that will impede
the transition to democracy? In particular, I explore these two questions by examining
(1) how the two sub-groups of the middle class act in the civic organizations, and (2) how
the two sub-groups o f the middle class act in the urban self-government system. This
chapter finds that the private-sector middle class does act in democratic ways, whereas
the public-sector middle class act in undemocratic ways.
Chapter VI summarizes the empirical findings from this dissertation and then
elucidates the key political and theoretical implications of these findings. Overall, the
findings from this dissertation provide a mixed picture about the role o f the Chinese
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middle class in promoting democracy in that country. On the one hand, the current Partystate can still draw substantial political legitimacy from the public-sector middle class; on
the other hand, the Party-state has to face the rising demands for democracy from the
private-sector middle class.
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CHAPTER II
WHO ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CONSTITUTE THE MIDDLE CLASS IN TODAY’S
CHINA?

This chapter answers the critical question, who are the people who constitute the
middle class in today’s China? I begin with a general discussion o f an important
methodological issue that guides the measurement of the Chinese middle class: assuring
comparability o f the measurement. In particular, I emphasize that the identification of
the middle class in China shall be in agreement with the original concept o f the “middle
class” in the Western literature. I believe that my efforts to assure comparability in the
identification o f the Chinese middle class are of critical importance to this study.
The comparative political studies face a basic methodological issue: how does a
study ensure the comparability o f the measurement of variables? As Stefan Nowak has
asked, in regard to comparative studies: “how do we know we are studying ‘the same
phenomena’ in different contexts; how do we know that our observations and conclusions
do not actually refer to ‘quite different things’, which we unjustifiably include into the
same conceptual categories?”1 These questions point to the importance o f achieving
comparability o f concepts and indices in the comparative political studies.
In this chapter, I will discuss the concept of the middle class in the Western
context because it is in the study o f the Western societies that the concept o f the middle
class was born, and more importantly, it is in the West where the middle class by modern
standards first emerged. In order to ensure comparability, it is necessary that my

1 Stefan Nowak, “Comparative Studies and Social Theory,” in Cross-National Research in Sociology, ed.
Melvin L. Kohn (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 35.
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definition o f the Chinese middle class carry the same socio-political attributes as the
definition o f the Western middle class. Only when this objective is achieved can I
explore the question of whether the Chinese middle class thinks and acts democratically,
and examine whether the mechanisms associated with these socio-political attributes (as
stipulated in Chapter I) can be applied to the Chinese middle class.

MEASUREMENT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN THE WESTERN LITERATURE
In the debate over the conceptualization o f the middle class, Western literature
identifies two dichotomous approaches: the objectivist and the subjectivist.

The

subjective approach suggests that, because a “social class is a psychological attachment
that is part o f an individual’s overall self-concept,” the middle class is identified based
on an individual’s belief or perception that he or she belongs to the middle stratum o f a
certain society.
The origin o f the subjective approach can be attributed to Aristotle. Aristotle
“thought o f classes as subjective rather than objective entities. Membership in a class,
according to his way o f thinking, is not determined by physical characteristics o f any
kind, such as wealth or income, or at least not definitely determined by such
characteristics. Members o f the middle class gain their position therein by thinking of
2 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New
York: John W iley & Sons, Inc., 1960); Richard Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949); Seymour M. Lipset, “Stratification: Social Class,” in International
Encyclopedia o f the Social Science 15 (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1968), 296-316; Sheldon
Kamieniecki and Robert O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Political Behavior 6, no.
1 (1984): 41-59; C. Wright Mills, White Collar: the American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1953); Joseph Alan Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart, 1957);
Milbrath, Political Participation; John J. Ray, “The Questionnaire Measurement o f Social Class,”
Australian and New Zealand Journal o f Sociology 1 (April 1971): 58-64; Katherine Cramer Walsh, M.
Kent Jennings, and Laura Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations
towards Government,” British Journal o f Political Science 34 (2004): 469-95.
3 Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations
towards G overnm ent,” 470.
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themselves as above the lower class and below the upper class.”4 The modern forerunner
o f subjective class measurement— Richard Centers— emphasizes class as “psychological
groupings, something that is essentially subjective in character, dependent upon class
consciousness (i.e., a feeling o f group membership), and class lines o f cleavage [which]
may or may not conform to what seem to social scientists to be logical lines o f cleavage
in the objective or stratification sense.”5
According to subjectivists, the middle class is a socially constructed attribute, thus
identification with the middle class depends on an individual’s awareness o f class
divisions and the salience o f these divisions and also his/her belonging to the middle
class.6 In accordance with this reasoning, Western scholarship often identified
respondents’ class positions based on their answers to questions such as, “There is a lot of
discussion about class these days. Do you ever think o f yourself as belonging to a class?”
and “Do you usually think o f yourself as being part o f the upper class, the upper-middle
class, the middle class, the lower-middle class, or the lower class?”7 Modern researchers
however, prefer to ask their respondents , “Do you usually think of yourself as being part
o f the upper class, the upper-middle class, the middle class, the working class, or the
lower class?” or “Do you usually think of yourself as being part o f the middle class or the
o

working class?”

4 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective,” 236-237.
5 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes, 27.
6 Bernadette C. Hayes, “The Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes: A Comparative Study o f Great Britain,
W est Germany, Australia, and the United State,” European Journal o f Political Research 27 (1995): 69-91;
Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations
towards Government.”
7 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
8 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes', Robert W. Hodge and Donald J. Treiman, “Class
Identification in the United States,” American Journal o f Sociology 73, no. 5 (1968): 535-47; Hayes, “The
Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class
Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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The rationale o f using the “working class” term proposed by the second group of
scholars is that the term “lower class” in a class identification question has a stigma
attached to it that may drive respondents away from this category and thus may squeeze
more respondents into the category o f middle class.9 As suggested by Lester Milbrath,
“almost no one had the lack of pride to call him self lower class.” 10
Using this subjective approach, empirical studies have found that in Western
societies, more than a half o f their population registered identification with the middle
class, about 30 per cent with the working class, and less than 10 per cent with the upper
class.11
The objectivists argue for the importance o f such objective socioeconomic
indicators as income, education, and occupation in the conceptualization o f class
structure.12 Within the objective approach, there are two conceptual branches. One
.

.

.

.

branch emphasizes the quantitative, cumulative property of the objective indicators.

13

This branch, the “quantitative” branch, suggests that the best way to capture an
individual’s class identification is to form a quantitative index of income, education, and
9 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes', Herman M. Case, “Marxian Implications o f Centers’ InterestGroup Theory: A Critical Appraisal,” Social Forces 33, no. 3 (1955): 254-58.
10 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
11 For example, see Hodge and Treiman, “Class Identification in the United States;” Hayes, “The Impact o f
Class on Political Attitudes.”
12 Robert R. Alford, “A Suggested Index o f the Association o f Social Class and Voting,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 26 (1962): 417-25; Val Burris, “The Discovery o f the New Middle Class,” Theory and Society
15, no. 3 (1986): 317-49; Glassman, The M iddle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective',
Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social
Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Darren Sherkat and T. Jean Blocker, “The
Political Development o f Sixties’ Activities: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and Socialization
on Protest Participation,” Social Forces 72, no. 3 (1994): 821-42; Verba and Nie, Participation in America',
Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State (New York: Shocken Books, 1978); and idem, Classes
(London: Verso, 1985); and idem, Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); John F. Zipp, “Social Class and Social Liberalism,” Sociological
Forum 1, no. 2 (1986): 301-29.
13 Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Milbrath, Political
Participation', Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;”
Sherkat and Blocker, “The Political Development o f Sixties’ Activities;” Verba and Nie, Participation in
America.
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occupation, and then to identify the person with a social class according to the person’s
position in the overall scale of the index. As a result, the middle class usually consists of
those who are in the middle range o f the scale. For example, Milbrath has suggested that,
“persons who scored high on all three factors would be placed in the upper class; those
who scored high on two factors but medium or low on one factor would be in the next
rank. Those who scored high on only one factor would be in the next rank, and so
forth.” 14
In a comparative study of five nations (the United States, Britain, West Germany,
Italy, and Mexico), Norman Nie and his associates formed a weighted, quantitative index
of such objective indicators as education, income, and occupation, and determined the
middle class to be those who were in the middle third of the index.15 They found that, in
the United States, about a half o f its population belongs to the middle class; while, in the
less developed Mexico, only 16 per cent o f the population belongs to the middle class.
The other branch, the “qualitative” branch, of the objective approach stresses the
qualitative property o f the various objective indicators o f social class.16 This branch
argues that the middle class is composed o f those who possess a set of certain socio
political attributes, which qualitatively distinguish them from the other social classes. As
Martin Oppenheimer says, “class is not a quantitative measurement along some
mathematical continuum, but a qualitative measurement representing groupings that are
distinct and separate from one another.” 17

14 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
15 Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II.”
16 Burris, “The Discovery o f the New Middle Class;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in
Socio-Historical Perspective', Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State', and idem, Classes; and idem, Class
Counts; Zipp, “Social Class and Social Liberalism.”
17 Martin Oppenheimer, White Collar Politics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985), 7.
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W ithin the qualitative branch o f the objective approach, the neo-Marxist
measurement is the one most often used. The neo-Marxist measurement developed by
Erik Olin Wright employs three sub-dimensions to form class categories: means of
production, position in authority structure (based on managerial and supervisory
responsibilities), and possession o f skills and expertise.18 In the first sub-dimension,
those having means o f production are classified as owners; owners can be further divided
into two categories: bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, depending on the size o f the
means of production. In the second sub-dimension, those who supervise other workers
are classified as managers. In the third sub-dimension, those possessing skills and
expertise are classified as professional. The remaining society will be classified into
working class, peasants, and unemployed depending on whether they are employed or
unemployed, or whether they are employed in industry, service, or agriculture. The
middle class is defined as the petite bourgeoisie, managers and professionals. More
specifically, the petite bourgeoisie is referred to as the “old middle class”, while
managers and professionals are referred to as the “new middle class” .19
Based on this qualitative measurement, Wright found that, after lumping together
the three occupational groups consisting of the petite bourgeoisie (including small
employers), managers and professionals (including skilled workers), over half o f the
American population (about 57 per cent) belongs to the middle class.

20

18 Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State', and idem, Classes', and idem, Class Counts.
19 Burris, “The Discovery o f the New Middle Class;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in
Socio-Historical Perspective', Mills, White Collar, Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism
(London: New Left Books, 1975).
20 Wright, Class Counts.
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THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE THREE MEASUREMENTS
Which measurement is the most valid for the identification o f the middle class?
There is no consensus on this question in the Western literature. Furthermore, empirical
studies have reported that these three measurements can be used interchangeably, because
these measurements are intercorrelated with one another internally.21
In this section, I will discuss the relationship among these measurements,
especially the relationship between the objective and subjective measurements. First, it is
clearly understood why the two branches (quantitative and qualitative) o f the objective
approach are highly correlated. In Western societies, the upper and middle class
individuals qualitatively defined by occupation are more likely to have high-level or
middle-level incomes and attain a higher level o f educational achievement than the
members o f the lower class or working class.22 Thus, there will be a large overlap
between the middle class qualitatively defined by occupation and the middle class
quantitatively identified by the index o f income, education, and occupation.
Second, there is also a correlation between the objective and subjective
approaches. In reality, the subjective identification can not be separated from the
objective characteristics; indeed, the subjective identification has its roots in the objective
characteristics. Moreover, empirical studies have found a strong positive association

21 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes; Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures
Interchangeable?”
22 For example, Erik Olin W right found that mean income increase monotonically from the working class
to the managers and the petty bourgeoisie to the capitalist class, see his article “What is Middle about the
Middle Class?” in Analytical Marxism, ed. John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),
114-40. Richard Centers found that the mean educational attainment o f the middle class, especially the
managers and professionals, is higher than the working class or the lower class, see his book The
Psychology o f Social Classes. For more on this point, please also see Erik Olin W right and Luca Perrone,
“M arxist Class Categories and Income Inequality,” American Sociological Review 42, no. 1 (1977): 32-55;
Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman, “An Interpretation o f the Relation between Objective and
Subjective Social Status,” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 569-82; Eulau, “Identification
with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior.”
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between objective class status and subjective class identity.23 For example, Centers
found that “nearly three-quarters o f all business, professional and white collar workers
identify themselves with the middle or upper classes,” and “an even larger proportion of
all manual workers, 79 per cent, identify, on the other hand, with the working and lower
classes.”24
According to Mary Jackman and Robert Jackman, objective socioeconomic status
is the primary determinant of subjective class identification, with other variables (i.e.,
social contacts) playing a mediating role.25 They believe that objective class status is the
salient factor in dictating “the pattern o f individuals’ social lives,” and they suggest that,
“people mix primarily with others o f the same socioeconomic status.” Thus, they
conclude that “such patterns o f social contact in turn lead to psychological identification
with the relevant (socioeconomic) group.”
According to their argument, the individuals’ subjective perception o f their own
position in the class structure should meet a number o f requirements: first, the individuals
must identify themselves with the class to which they belong according to the objective
definition; second, they must feel united with others in the same objective position; third,
they must feel separated from, or must disidentify with, people in different objective class
positions.27

23 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes', David Coburn and Virginia L. Edwards, “Job Control and
Child-Rearing Values,” Canadian Review o f Sociology and Anthropology 13 (1976): 337-44; Hayes, “The
Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures
Interchangeable?” Milbrath, Political Participation.
24 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes, 85.
25 Jackman and Jackman, “An Interpretation o f the Relation between Objective and Subjective Social
Status.”
26 Ibid., 570-571.
27 Please also see, M orris Rosenberg, “Perceptual Obstacles to Class Consciousness,” Social Forces 32, no.
1 (1953): 22-27.
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Thus, Jackman and Jackman hypothesize that objective class status works through
social contacts to exert impacts on subjective class identification. The empirical studies
o f American respondents supported this hypothesis and found that, first, the status of
one’s social contacts increased substantially with one’s own objective social class
position and, second, the effects o f one’s objective class status on subjective class
identification was channeled through the status o f one’s social contacts.28
On the one hand, subjectivists like Heinz Eulau and Bernadette Hayes admit the
fact that subjective identification is highly correlated with objective class status; on the
other hand, they insist that the subjective identification can not be equated with the
objective class characteristics.

29

As Hayes has said, “subjective class identities can not

be simply reduced to objective class positions.”30 Moreover, they suggest that we should
treat the subjective identification as the intervening variable between objective class
status and political orientations and action.
“It can be successfully argued that meaningful explanation o f the relationship
between people’s objective position in the social structure and their political
behavior requires the introduction of an ‘intervening variable’ in the form o f their
T1
self-identification with a particular social class.”
•

•

•

•

In other words, the objective conditions of socioeconomic status are
necessarily filtered by the process of self-identification. Via this subjective process,
objective conditions, like raw materials, are transformed into perceived conditions,
which, in turn, are the basis of the formation of class identification. This finding has
important theoretical implications for the identification o f the middle class in Chinese

28 Jackman and Jackman, “An Interpretation o f the Relation between Objective and Subjective Social
Status.”
29 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and
Political Role Behavior;” Hayes, “The Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes.”
30 Hayes, “The Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes,” 77.
31 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” 516.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
society. As the following discussion of the Chinese people’s class consciousness
shows, the social differentiation and division since the beginning o f the post-Mao
reform offer the necessary raw material for the formation of class consciousness and
class identification; furthermore, this formation is influenced by the Chinese people’s
perception of this social division.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
The objective social conditions offer the raw materials for the formation o f
class consciousness and class identification in a society. Thus, in order to provide a fuller
understanding o f the class consciousness o f the Chinese people, I will briefly examine the
evolution o f the Chinese social structure during the period in which the CCP has
controlled China.
After the establishment o f the People’s Republic o f China in 1949, the CCP
embarked on a set o f sociopolitical programs to eliminate the economic bases o f the
private economy and also the independence of the urban middle class. In the rural areas
the CCP adopted a land reform program to eradicate the economic basis o f the landlord
class and a collectivization program to eradicate the economic basis o f the rich peasant
class.32 In the urban areas the CCP adopted a nationalization program to eradicate the
economic basis of the capitalist class and a collectivization program to eradicate the
economic basis of the small businessmen, self-employed laborers and independent
intellectuals.33 The CCP also adopted the system of unified job assignment (tongyi fenpei)
and controlled occupational advancement, turning urban managers and professionals into
32 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;” Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in
Contemporary China.
33 Ibid.
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“a stratum o f salaried civil servants who needed to be obedient to CCP superiors.”34
Finally, the CCP initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Cultural Revolution to
increase its control over the urban professionals, intellectuals, and managers
ideologically.

35

As the direct result of such CCP policies, the private economy was gradually
eliminated, and private entrepreneurs, small businessmen, and self-employed laborers
disappeared in Chinese society as legitimate economic actors.36 Meanwhile, the
professionals, intellectuals, and managers “became fundamentally dependent on the
party-state in every sphere of life” and were “reduced to a politically subordinate stratum
o f the salaried civil servants”, whereas before 1949, “there had been more physical and
social space where such professionals and managers could escape state control and
supervision.”37 In conclusion, in the period 1949-1978, the Chinese party-state
successfully transformed China from a strong class-divided society to a statist one in
which “the objective economic bases of antagonistic classes were eroded.”38
During this period, there was no significant objective class difference among
different social segments, and Chinese society was, to some extent, a highly egalitarian
society in socioeconomic terms. The Maoist regime proclaimed that the Chinese
government is led by the workers and peasants and that the government intends to realize

34 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 270.
35 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Richard C. Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese
Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Nan Lin and Wen Xie, “Occupational Prestige in
Urban China,” American Journal o f Sociology 93 (1988): 793-832; Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in
China;” Andrew G. Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” Annual Review o f Sociology 15
(1989): 405-24.
36 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;”
Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China; Lu, ed., Social M obility in
Contemporary China.
37 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 272.
38 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 365.
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a classless and egalitarian society.39 Paradoxically, even though the economic bases of
social classes were eroded during this period, the Maoist regime still “used the terms
‘classes’ and ‘class struggles’ all the time in their political campaigns.”40 The Chinese
people were categorized into several classes “based on the occupation or political
affiliations o f one’s father or grandfather in 1949,” and “former exploiting classes, and
members o f Nationalist party organizations, and relatives of political detainees suffered
systematic discrimination.”41 Overall, the working class was favored by the Maoist
regime and was granted socio-political privileges.
Since 1978 Chinese society has become differentiated and divided. First, the CCP
gradually legitimized the existence o f the private economy in Chinese society and took
measures to encourage its development. The development o f the private economy in
China has experienced three major stages. The first stage (1978-1983) is marked by the
official revival o f private business. However, in this stage the CCP only officially
recognized the individual businesses (getihu).42 For example, Article 11 o f the 1982
Chinese Constitution states that “the individual economy of urban and rural working
people, operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist
public economy.”43 The second stage (1984-1992) is characterized by the rise o f private
enterprises isiying qiye),44 as distinguished from individual businesses. In April 1988,
the National People’s congress revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and allowed
private businesses to hire more than the previously permitted eight non-family employees,

39 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
40 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 364.
41 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” 417-18.
42 The individual businesses are only permitted to employ less than eight non-family employees.
43 Changfu Wang, Gaige kaifang hou de zhongguo siyingjingji (Chinese Private Economy since Reform
and Openness) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1997).
44 The private enterprises are those which employ more than eight non-family employees.
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thus officially recognizing the existence of private enterprises.45 The third stage (1993 to
the present) starts from Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour in September 1992. In
September 1997, private enterprise was recognized by the CCP as an important
component o f the socialist economy and in March 1999, the National People’s congress
revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and incorporated the right o f private ownership.46
As a consequence of these policies, private entrepreneurs and self-employed individual
businesses reemerged within Chinese society, and became the great beneficiary o f the
Dengist reform.47
Secondly, the CCP de-emphasized the importance of political loyalty and
activism in educational opportunity and occupational advancement, and gradually
abandoned the system of unified job assignment and the monopolization o f occupational
advancement. As a consequence o f such policy changes, managerial and professional
strata began attaining more and more autonomy and independence from the Chinese state
and came to be the central players in the rising market economies of urban China.

48

As I

will discuss in Chapter III, four factors contributed to the dramatic growth o f these two
groups: the expansion of the opportunity for college education, the development o f the
private economy, the inflow of foreign direct investment, and the reform o f state-owned
firms.

45 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises', Wang, Chinese Private
Economy since Reform and Openness.
46 Association o f Chinese Private Economy, e<±, Chinese Private Economy Yearbook 2000-2001 (Beijing:
Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 2003).
47 Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: the Party, Private
Entrepreneurs, and Prospects fo r Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
48 For more on this point, please see Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social M obility;” Lu, ed.,
Social M obility in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China',
Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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Thirdly, the working class, as a whole, is losing the privileges that were
guaranteed them under the Maoist regime and is becoming proletarianized.49 As
summarized by Yanjie Bian, in the Maoist regime, the working class was officially and
politically recognized as a ‘leading class’. However, the post-Mao reforms eroded this
status recognition and differentiated the working class as wage labor in the private sector,
unprotected labor in the state sector, layoff labor in search of a job, and deprived migrant
peasant-labor.50
Based on this discussion, it is evident that Chinese society was transformed from
a statist society (1949-1978) to an unequal society (after 1978). As I will discuss in
Chapter III, the Dengist regime (after 1978) regards social inequalities as necessary and
has abandoned the Maoist goal o f establishing an egalitarian socialist China. For
example, Deng Xiaoping has emphasized that in order to build a socialist nation with
Chinese characteristics, “some people in rural areas and cities should be allowed to get
rich before others,” and “to let some people and some regions become prosperous first is
a new policy that is supported by everyone.”51
From this brief examination of the history o f the CCP class policy and the
evolution o f the Chinese social structure, it seems evident that objective class division has
come into being in Chinese society. However, the subjective perception o f class division

49 Martin King Whyte, “The Changing Role o f W orkers,” in The Paradox o f C hina’s Post-Mao Reforms,
ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 173-96;
Timothy Weston, “China’s Labor Woes: Will the Workers Crash the Party?” in China: Beyond the
Headlines, ed. Timothy Weston and Lionel M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000),
245-71; Ching Kwan Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency,” in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and
Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: Routledge, 2000), 41-61.
50 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” 96.
51 Xiaoping Deng, Selected Works o f D eng Xiaoping Volume III (1982-1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1994), 33.
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is different from the objective measurement o f class division. Do the Chinese people
perceive China as an unequal, class-divided society or as a classless society?
It is my belief that since 1978, the Chinese people have gradually come to
perceive China as an unequal society. The recent empirical study conducted by Xin Liu
confirms this belief. In surveying Wuhan residents’ class consciousness, Xin Liu found
that about three quarters of the people surveyed are aware that they live in an unequal
society.52 Chunling Li found in his 2000 study that most Chinese people perceived the
existence o f socioeconomic differences and inequalities.53 In fact, Chinese society has in
the last two decades become one o f the most unequal societies in the world. As Alvin So
has said, “in the early 1980s, China was among the world’s most egalitarian societies. By
the mid-1990s, the inequalities o f income distribution in China not only already exceeded
the inequality found in the transition economies in Eastern Europe and the high-income
countries o f Western Europe and North America, but also those in China’s Asian
neighbors such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.”54 For example, in 2000, the Gini
index55 o f Chinese society was 44.7, which is beyond the international poverty alarm
point o f 40.
However, the consciousness o f social inequalities is not the same thing as class
consciousness. Class consciousness is a quite different concept. According to Centers,

52 Xin Liu, “Zhuanxingqi zhongguo chengshi jum in de jieceng yishi” (The Stratum Consciousness of
Chinese Citizens during the Transitional Period), in Zhongguo shehui fenceng (Social Stratification in
C hina’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004),
207-24.
53 Chunling Li, “Dangqian zhongguoren de shehui fenceng yishi” (The Social Stratum Consciousness o f
Contemporary Chinese People), Hunan shehui kexue (Hunan Social Science) 2003, no.5: 76-79.
54 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 367.
55 Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution o f income (or consumption) among individuals
within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A value o f 0 represents perfect equality and a
value o f 100 represents perfect inequality. Please see United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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class consciousness “implies that a person’s status and role with respect to the economic
processes o f society imposes upon him certain attitudes, values and interests relating to
his role and status in the political and economic sphere. It holds, further, that the status
and role o f the individual in relation to the means o f production and exchange o f goods
and services gives rise in him to a consciousness of membership in some social class
which shares those attitudes, values and interests.”56 In other words, class consciousness
depends on “the extent to which members of the group are aware of the reality o f the
group and o f their own membership in it.”57
Do the Chinese people realize that they are members o f a social class and, if so,
do they cognitively identify with their class? Chunling Li suggests that many Chinese
people still do not acknowledge the appropriateness o f the concept o f class in Chinese
society and only a few o f them have grasped the meaning of social class and the criteria
Co

by which to identify different social classes.

For example, when asked to name some

different social classes in Chinese society, those in the less-educated occupational groups
could only identify three groups: “rich people”, “powerful people”, and “ordinary
people”; those in the well-educated occupational groups could identify some groups in
more specific terms, such as “government or party cadres”, “private entrepreneurs”, and
“professionals”. However, few o f the respondents identified the different social segments
in terms o f “upper class”, “middle class”, and “lower class”.
Several factors contribute to the Chinese people’s lack of class consciousness in
the period after 1978. First, since the beginning o f the Dengist reform, the CCP banned
the discussion of the concept of class. Paradoxically, even though the economic bases of
56 Centers, The Psychology o f Social Classes, 28-29.
57 Ibid., 75.
58 Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness o f Contemporary Chinese People.”
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social classes were eroded during the Maoist period, the Maoist regime still used the
terms ‘classes’ and ‘class struggles’ in the political campaigns and insisted that the class
struggle was the central task o f the CCP.59 After 1978 Deng Xiaoping shifted the focus
o f the CCP’s work from class struggle to economic development and formulated the goal
o f a “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui) and the strategy of allowing certain people to
get rich before others. As a result o f this policy change, the Dengist reform has
reconstructed the economic bases o f social classes. On the other hand, the CCP has given
little attention to the re-emergence o f class differentiation in Chinese society.
For example, it was not until July 1, 2001 that President Jiang Zemin officially
acknowledged the emergence of multiple social strata in Chinese society:
“Since China adopted the policy of reform and opening-up, the composition of
China’s social strata has changed to some extent. There are, among others,
entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by scientific and technical
enterprises o f the non-public sector, managerial and technical staff employed by
foreign-funded enterprises, the self-employed, private entrepreneurs, employees
in intermediaries and freelance professionals. Moreover, many people frequently
move from one ownership, sector or place to another, changing their jobs or
capacity from time to time. This trend of developments will continue.”60
It was in this July 1 speech that the CCP fully recognized the change in social structure
that had occurred since the beginning of the Dengist reform and officially acknowledged
that social strata other than the working class and peasants had emerged.
Second, the older people rejected the application o f the concept o f social classes
to Chinese society because of the tragic memory o f the Cultural Revolution. Before 1978,
especially during the Cultural Revolution, the use of the concept of social classes was
highly politicized. The Maoist regime used the term “class struggle” to launch a
59 Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Lu, ed., Social Mobility in
Contemporary China', So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
60 Please see “Full Text o f Jiang’s Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering,” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily),
2 July 2001.
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nationwide campaign o f discrimination against those people who were labeled as the
“exploiting class” or the “anti-revolutionary class”.61 The tragic memory o f the Cultural
Revolution, especially for those who were discriminated against, made the older
generation sensitive to the use o f the concept o f social classes. For example, when
answering the question “do you agree that class is a valid concept to identify different
social segments?” the reaction o f older people was very cautious and not a few o f them
denied the validity o f the concept o f class in Chinese society.62

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS: WHICH APPROACH
IS THE MOST VALID?

A. Subjective Measurement
Based on the discussion above, it is evident that objective class differentiation
exists in Chinese society; on the other hand, the individuals’ subjective perception of
belonging to a class has not yet emerged. Such a conclusion leads to the proposition that
the subjective approach is not a valid type o f measurement for the identification o f the
middle class in Chinese society.
To test this proposition, I examined several survey results o f the subjective
measurement o f social classes conducted by Chinese scholars.63 These scholars

61 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;” Qiu,
The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China; So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and
Class Conflict in China.”
62 Some interviewees even asked interviewers, “Why do you ask the question o f the validity o f the class
term in Chinese society?” or “Is the CCP going to change its policy?” They were quite cautious and even
refused to answer this question. Please see Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness o f Contemporary
Chinese People.”
63 Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness o f Contemporary Chinese People;” Liping Chou, “Zhiye diwei:
shehui fenceng de zhishiqi” (Occupational Status: The Designation o f Social Stratification), in Zhongguo
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employed the following question to identify the social class of the Chinese respondents:
“There is a lot o f discussion about class these days. Do you think o f yourself as being
part of the upper class, the upper-middle class, the lower-middle class, or the lower
class?” The use of the term “lower class” rather than “working class” in the survey
question can be problematic, but there are two theoretical justifications for the use o f this
term. First, there is no stigma in China associated with the concept o f the lower class.
Instead, according to the CCP’s ideology, the lower class is the “leading class” in China.
Second, the concept o f the working class is quite vague in the Chinese context. In the
Maoist era, it was the position of the CCP that only those people who worked in the stateowned enterprises or collective-owned enterprises belonged to the category of “working
class”. However, during the same period most urban residents who had no objective
working class status also tended to subjectively identify with the working class to avoid
political discrimination. After the commencement o f the reform, the CCP officially did
not make a clear statement on the change in China’s social structure and the composition
o f the working class. As a result, the concept o f working class is quite vague and most
urban residents still claim publicly that they belong to the working class in order to avoid
political problems.
Two important findings from these studies support my argument. First, there is a
very high percentage of “Do not know (DK)” answers among Chinese respondents. For
example, in the early 1990s, surveying the subjective class identifications o f Shanghai
respondents, Hanlong Lu and Yanjie Bian found that about 16 per cent o f Shanghai
residents could not identify their class status, while there were only 0.5 % o f respondents
shehui fen cen g (Social Stratification in C hina’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing:
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 178-206; Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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who could not identify themselves with a class group in American society.64 Such
findings support my conclusion that the Chinese people’s class consciousness has not yet
emerged. In a nationwide survey conducted almost 10 years later (2001), Chunling Li
found that about 9.2% o f China’s respondents still could not register their class status
subjectively, despite the fact that, by 2000, the Chinese people had become much more
conscious about social differentiation and inequalities.65
Second, many studies reported that almost 40% of Chinese respondents
subjectively identified themselves with the middle class. For example, in the early 1990s,
surveying the subjective class identifications of Shanghai respondents, Hanlong Lu and
Yanjie Bian found that around 42 % o f Shanghai residents identified themselves as
middle class.66 Based on a nationwide survey conducted in 2001, Chunling Li found that
about 40 % o f Chinese respondents subjectively identified themselves as middle class.67
The WVS 2001 China survey used the same question as previous China
scholarship has employed to probe the subjective identification of Chinese respondents.
The result is presented in Table 1. There are two major findings: first, about 7 % of
Chinese respondents could not identify their social class position; second, 51 % o f
Chinese respondents subjectively expressed agreement with the category o f middle class.
Such findings are consistent with the previous China scholarship.

64 Hanlong Lu and Yanjie Bian, “Cong shimin diwei guankan gaige yu shehui jingji bupingdeng” (Reform
and Socioeconomic Inequality from the Perspective o f Town-dweller Status), in Zhongguo shehui fenceng
(SocialStratification in C hina’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing: Shehui kexue
wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 160-77.
65 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
66 Lu and Bian, “Reform and Socioeconomic Inequality from the Perspective o f Town-dweller Status.”
67 Li, “The Composition and Size o f China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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Table 1. Distribution of Chinese Respondents’ Self-Identified Social Classes (WVS
2001 China Survey)
Subjective Class Identity
Upper Class
Upper-middle Class
Middle Class
Lower-middle Class
Lower Class
Missing
Total

Frequency
4
27
510
220
174
65
1000

Percent
.4
2.7
51.0
22.0
17.4
6.5
100.0

As I have previously indicated, in the Western settings, the subjective
identification can not be separated from the objective characteristics; furthermore, the
subjective identification has its roots in the objective characteristics. Accordingly, the
subjective identification with middle class depends on an individual’s awareness of
objective class divisions and the salience o f these divisions and also his/her belonging to
middle class.68 However, in Chinese society, the individuals’ subjective perception of
class membership has not yet emerged, even though the objective bases o f class
differences have formed in the period since the beginning of the post-Mao reform. Based
on this argument, my hypothesis was that there would be no correlation between the
objective and subjective measurements. Upon testing the bivariate correlation between
subjective and objective indicators (i.e., the qualitative measurement of the middle class)
from the WVS 2001 China survey, I found that the result supports my expectation: there

68 Hayes, “The Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social
Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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is a very weak positive correlation (Tau-b= 0.072) between these two indicators.69 This
finding is different from the one in the Western settings.
The Crosstab between the subjective and objective measurements from the WVS
2001 China survey presented in Table 2 indicates that those Chinese respondents having
an objective middle class status are more likely to identify themselves as middle class,
while those respondents not having an objective middle class status also tend to identify
themselves as middle class.

Table 2. Crosstab between Subjective and Objective Measurements of Middle Class
in Chinese Settings (WVS 2001 China Survey)
Subjective Measurement

Objective
Measurement

Non-Middle Class

Middle Class

Non-Middle Class

50.4%

49.6%

Middle Class

39.7%

60.3%

Note: Kendall’s Tau-b^ 0.072, Sig. = 0.022.

Why do half o f Chinese respondents having no objective middle class status still
identify themselves as middle class? There are at least two possible explanations. First,
the self-perception o f middle class status may be influenced by other subjective
orientations. For example, when explaining the perceptual obstacles to class
consciousness, Morris Rosenberg argues that false class consciousness may emerge when
“the individual identifies with his future self, e.g., an ambitious young worker who hopes

69 Lu Xueyi and his associates also find the same pattern: there is weak correlation between objective
indicator and subjective evaluation o f social class. Please see Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary
C hina’s Social Classes, 33.
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by diligence and initiative to elevate himself to supervisory capacity or eventually own
his business.”70 Thus, it may be the case that most people in a developing country such
as China are longing to become members o f the middle class and therefore may
subjectively (or wishfully) identify themselves with the middle class, even they do not
have objective middle class characteristics. As Table 2 indicates, over 50% o f Chinese
respondents subjectively identified themselves with the middle class, while only 13% of
them were objectively qualified to be included in the middle class category.
Second, cultural contexts may also become an obstacle to the formation o f class
consciousness in different societies. In the Chinese setting, Confucian culture may exert
a negative influence on the Chinese people’s subjective class identification.71 Influenced
by the traditional Confucian culture, Chinese people tend to be “face-saving” (aimianzi)
and believe in the doctrine o f the mean (zhongyong), and thus Chinese people are more
likely to identify with the “middle class” subjectively. Those who belong to the lower
class objectively may identify with “middle class” subjectively to save face; on the other
hand, those belong to the upper class objectively may identify with the “middle class”
since they believe in the doctrine o f the mean and do not want to be boastful.72

B. Quantitative Branch o f the Objective Approach
Along with the subjective measurement, objective measurements have been
widely used by China scholars to define the middle class of the Chinese population.

70 Rosenberg, “Perceptual Obstacles to Class Consciousness,” 27.
71 Hui Shen, “Zhongchan jieceng de rentong ji qi jiangou” (Middle Class Identity and Structure), in
Zhongguo zhongchan jiecen g diaocha (Survey o f the Chinese Middle Classes), ed. Xiaohong Zhou (Beijing:
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 29-61; Chou, “Occupational Status;” Lu, ed., Research Report on
Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
12 Shen, “Middle Class Identity and Structure;” Chou, “Occupational Status.”
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Among these objective measurements, income is the one most often used. For example,
David Goodman asserts that, as of 1997, in the more developed, coastal parts o f South
and East China, a person with a monthly income o f above 5,000 to 6,000 RMB is
regarded as being a member o f the middle class; whereas, in the less developed parts of
West China, a person with a monthly income o f above 3,500 to 4,500 RMB is regarded
as a being a member of the middle class.73 Alastair Iain Johnston uses monthly
household income to determine middle class status. He says that “the middle class is
constituted by respondents whose monthly household income is 3,000 RMB or more.”74
Hangsheng Zheng and Lulu Li assert that, as of 2000, an urban citizen living outside
Beijing with a monthly income of 1,000 to 10,000 RMB is a member o f the middle class;
while for Beijing residents, a person with a monthly income o f 2,000 to 20,000 RMB is a
member o f the middle class.75
However, this income-based, quantitative measurement o f middle class status has
serious drawbacks in both practice and theory. In practice, it is very hard to achieve any
consensus on the criterion of income when defining middle class, since first, actual
personal income is hard to determine. There tends to be a huge gap between reported (or
nominal) and actual incomes in many occupational groups in China, and the latter is often
kept secret for various reasons, such as tax evasion (which is highly prevalent in China).76
Beyond that, in Chinese society income does not necessarily represent a person’s real
socioeconomic status. To quote Jie Chen: “most private entrepreneurs have much higher

73 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
74 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent
Liberalization?” The China Quarterly 179 (2004): 603-28.
75 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
76 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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incomes than government bureaucrats. [However,].. .members o f both groups may enjoy
very similar living standards (in many cases, bureaucrats may enjoy even higher living
standards than average private entrepreneurs)... .While the entrepreneurs usually use their
monetary resources to maintain such living standards, the bureaucrats in general achieve
these standards through their administrative power and government perks.”77
Secondly, income varies dramatically among geographical areas in a fast
changing society such as China.78 For example, the average monthly income o f residents
in developed areas is 2.5 times higher than the average o f those in underdeveloped areas.
And the average monthly income o f urban residents in China is 2.5 times higher than the
average o f those in rural China. Moreover, the average monthly income o f urban
residents in developed areas is 5.4 times higher than the average o f rural residents in
underdeveloped areas.79 Table 3 documents the income difference among different areas
in contemporary China.

Table 3. The Distribution of Monthly Income in Different Regions
Regions
Developed Urban Area
Less Developed Urban Area
Underdeveloped Urban Area
Developed Rural Area
Less Developed Rural Area
Underdeveloped Rural Area

Mean
1250.02
631.79
741.02
638.28
350.47
233.45

Standard Deviation
1285.99
702.15
1466.10
828.54
1074.02
612.45

Note: Developed regions include Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jinagsu; less
developed regions include Shangdong, HeiTongjiang, and Hebei; underdeveloped regions
include Guizhou, Sichuang, H e’nan, Jiang’xi, andN ei’menggu.
77 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China, 90.
78 Li, “The Composition and Size o f China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Zheng and Li, Social Structure
o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
79 Li, “The Composition and Size o f China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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In theory, as I have discussed, the middle class is not a quantitatively defined
middle layer in a society, but a qualitative category comprising a set o f social-political
characteristics that make the middle class distinctive, that is, owning small properties,
supervising others, possessing professional expertise. The income-based definition of the
middle class offered by China scholars is lacking any theoretical basis upon which to
explain whether such measurement o f the Chinese middle class also includes those
social-political characteristics.
Within the quantitative branch o f objective measurement, education has also been
used by China scholars to define the middle class in China. Zheng and Li assert that an
urban citizen with some university-level education or graduate-level education is a
member o f the middle class.80 The education-based class scheme offered by Zheng and
Li is presented in Table 4. In this table, we can see that in 10 Chinese cities, the middle
class constitutes about 26 % o f the Chinese population.

Table 4. Objective Middle Class by the Education-Based Measurement in 10
Chinese Cities

Objective Class
Identity
Low Class

Middle Class

Highest Education Received
Elementary School and Below
Middle School
High School and Equivalent
Education
Higher Education1

10 Chinese Cities (%)
13.7
24.7
35.6
25.7

Note: l. Higher education includes middle-level and high-level vocational education,
college-level education, and graduate-level education.

80 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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However, this education-based measurement excludes most self-employed
individuals, who do not necessarily possess a higher education. As I will discuss in
Chapter III, most Chinese self-employed individuals are not well-educated, especially
those who started their businesses in the 1980s. However, self-employed individuals
have been regarded as a backbone o f the middle class in Western society. The European
self-employed small business person has, since the seventeenth century, presented
himself as the most steadfast supporter o f democracy, has greatly resented the monarchial
intrusions on his properties and has thus engaged in and political struggles to defend his
economic interest, which eventually contributed to the emergence and rise of lawful
o 1

democracy.

C. Qualitative Branch o f the Objective Approach
On the other hand, in the qualitative branch of the objective approach, Lu Xueyi
and his associates present a comprehensive picture of social stratification in China mainly
by drawing upon the neo-Marxist measurement. In addition to Erik Olin W right’s three
sub-dimensions (means o f production, position in authority structure, and possession o f
skills and expertise), Lu and his associates include the sub-dimension, within or outside
the political system (tizhinei or tizhiwai).

They argue that, unlike Western societies,

political institutions have exerted a tremendous impact on the pattern o f social
stratification in Chinese society.

87

In the Chinese context, those positioned in the core of

81 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical
Perspective', and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
82 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social M obility in
Contemporary China.
83 For example, from 1949 to 1978, the Chinese party-state successfully transformed Chinese society from
a strong class-divided one which characterized before-1949 Chinese society to a statist one in which the
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the political system usually enjoy much more socio-political privileges than those
positioned outside the political system. As I have discussed, government bureaucrats
may not earn more income than private entrepreneurs, but they may nonetheless have
higher living standards by virtue o f their administrative power. Lu and his associates
have distinguished three positions in the political system in China today: the core o f the
political system, the periphery o f the political system, and outside the system.84 The core
of the political system includes most government agencies (zhungfu bumen) within the
party and state apparatus, and some advantaged public organizations (shiye danwei),
which are nonprofit organizations in the public domain. The core o f the political system
monopolizes the power of redistributive benefits and enjoys a large portion of
redistributive benefits. The periphery o f the political system includes disadvantaged
public organizations and enterprises owned by the central government or local
governments (guoyou qiye). The periphery o f the political system has little redistributive
power, enjoys only a small portion of redistributive benefits, and has had to extract
resources from their market activities. Most collective enterprises (jiti qiye), private
enterprises, foreign-related enterprises, self-employed businesses, and peasants are
positioned outside o f the political system and thus enjoy little redistributive benefits.
Lu and his associates identified 10 social classes based on occupational
differences in contemporary Chinese society: (a) administrative personnel o f state affairs
and social affairs, (b) managerial personnel, (c) private entrepreneurs, (d) professionals,
(e) civil servants, (f) self-employed individuals, (g) service workers, (h) industry workers,
(i) peasants, and (j) unemployed and semi-unemployed. Table 5 documents the positions
objective economic bases o f social classes were eroded. I will discuss more in detail how political
institutions influence the pattern o f social stratification within Chinese society in Chapter III.
84 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
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o f each occupational group in the Chinese social structure in terms o f the means of
production, position in authority structure, possession of skills and expertise, and position
in the political system.85
According to Lu and his associates, administrative personnel o f state affairs and
social affairs are bureaucrats in government agencies.86 They are positioned in the core
o f the political system, monopolize the political resources, and enjoy most o f the
•

•

redistributive benefits.

87

Private entrepreneurs are those owners o f enterprises that

employ more than eight non-family employees and that were legitimized as a part o f the
Chinese economy only after 1988. Private entrepreneurs own the large means of
production, and even though they were positioned outside the political system, they were
gradually co-opted by the party-state.88
Managerial personnel include all mangers in state-owned enterprises, private
enterprises, and joint-venture enterprises. They do not own the means of production;
rather, they have the responsibility o f managing the means of production. Most o f them
are well-educated and possess some cultural capital.
Professionals are those occupations that involve specialized training and skills
such as engineers, accountants, lawyers, doctors, university professors, researchers, and
so on. Since the professional occupations require specialized training, most professionals
possess cultural capital.

85 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes; and idem, ed., Social M obility in
Contemporary China.
86 Ibid.
87 In the Chinese bureaucratic system there are four bureaucratic ranks: bu (ministry), ju (bureau), chu
(division), and ke (section). In specific, administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs include
those bureaucrats having bureaucratic ranks higher than chu in the central government or provincial
governments, and those having bureaucratic ranks higher than ke in the local governments.
88 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China.
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Table 5. A Formal Model on Social Class in China offered by Lu Xueyi and His
Associates

Administrative
personnel o f
state affairs
and social
affairs
Managerial
personnel

Position in
Labor
Division
High and
Middle-level
professional
and technical
rank

Position in
Authority
Structure
High and
Middle-level
management

High and
Middle-level
professional
and technical
rank

High and
Middle-level
management

Private
entrepreneurs

Professionals

Civil servants

High-level
management

High and
Middle-level
professional
and technical
rank
M iddle and
low-level
professional
and technical
rank

Self-employed
labors (getihu)

Self-managed
or be managed
(Independent
to some
extent)
Being
managed or
middle and
low-level
management
Management
or self
managed

Commercial
and Service
workers

Skilled, semi
skilled and
unskilled
labors

Being
managed or
low-level
management

Industry
workers

Skilled, semi
skilled and
unskilled
labors

Being
managed or
low-level
management

Peasants

Skilled, semi
skilled and
unskilled
labors

Self-managed

—

—

Unemployed

Means of
Production
Agents (Do
not possess
means of
production,
but control or
dispose)
Employee
(Do not
possess means
o f production,
but control or
dispose)
Employer
(Possess
means of
production)
Employee or
self-employed
(Not possess
means o f
production)
Employee
(Do not
possess means
o f production)
Selfemployed or
employer
(possess
means of
production)
Employee or
self-employed
(Do not
possess means
o f production)
Employee or
self-employed
(Do not
possess means
o f production)
Employee or
self-employed
(possess some
means of
production)
—

Inside/Outside the
Political System
(tizhinei/tizhiwai)
The core o f the
political system

Major
Resources

The periphery o f
the political
system or outside
the system

Cultural or
political

Outside the
political system

Economic

Inside the political
system or outside
the system

Cultural

Inside the political
system or outside
the system

Some cultural
and political

Outside the
political system

Some
economic

Inside the political
system or outside
the system

Some cultural
or political

Inside the political
system or outside
the system

Some cultural
or political

Inside the political
system or outside
the system

Some
economic or
cultural

—
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Civil servants include staff members in the government and party agencies, and
office workers in all types o f enterprises and organizations. They hold white-collar jobs
and most o f them have at least a university-level education.
The self-employed individuals are those owners of businesses that employ less
than eight non-family employees. They own some means of production and manage their
businesses by themselves. Unlike the private entrepreneurs who own a large amount of
economic capital, most self-employed individuals own only a small amount o f economic
capital. In the Chinese context, most self-employed individuals are not well-educated,
especially those who started their businesses in the 1980s.
Service workers are those who work in the wholesale or retail trade, or other
service-related occupations. Industry workers include all types o f workers in all types of
production-related enterprises. In most instances, China scholars will combine service
workers and industry workers into one category as “workers”.89 Peasants are agricultural
workers who live in rural China.90 Generally, peasants possess no means of production
and are not in a position to access government distributive benefits. Unemployed and
semi-unemployed refer to those who do not have a job at all or who do not have a stable
occupation.

89 Most workers are not well educated and have a lower economic status than other social segments such as
administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs, managerial personnel, private entrepreneurs,
professionals, civil servants, and self-employed individuals and they are becoming increasingly
proletarianized. Please, see Whyte, “The Changing Role of W orkers;” Weston, “China’s Labor W oes;”
Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency.”
90 Since the 1950s, the Chinese party-state designed a household registration {hukou) system to divide
China into two parts: rural and urban. The household registration {hukou) system was established by the
Chinese party-state in 1955 as “one o f its procedures for solidifying administrative control” and it
distinguished rural from urban and restricted the migration from rural to urban. Moreover, urban residents
enjoyed certain privileges such as access to education, housing, health care, all but the most menial jobs
and so on. There was little chance for a rural peasant to become an urban resident. Please see Xiaogang
Wu and Donald J. Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China: 19551996,” Demography 41, no. 2 (2004): 363-84.
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This dissertation mainly draws upon the qualitative branch o f the objective
approach to identify the Chinese middle class. This branch o f the objective approach
does not suffer from a significant drawback o f the quantitative branch. This is mainly
because, in contemporary China, occupations are much easier to determine and are more
consistent across regions than personal income, and they tend to present “groupings that
are distinct and separate from one another.”91 Therefore, the occupation-based,
qualitative measurement (of the objective approach) should be a more reliable and useful
indicator o f the middle class in the Chinese setting. In addition, such a measurement
seems to be more suitable for cross-nation comparison, since the modern occupations
used in this measurement (i.e., white-collar professional, private entrepreneur, managerial
personnel, and white-collar office workers) arise largely from the general trends of
modernization and industrialization at the global level, and hence have commonalities
across countries.

92

Furthermore, in the Western literature, the middle class is meant to refer to a
group o f persons who carry a set o f distinctive social-political characteristics (i.e.,
owning small properties, supervising others, and possessing professional expertise).
Thus when I define the middle class in China, it is crucial that my definition o f the
middle class include those same characteristics. Consequently, based on the qualitative
branch o f the objective approach, I operationalize the middle class in China by combining
four occupational groups typically used in the Western settings: self-employed laborers
(i.e., private entrepreneur o f small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context),

91 Oppenheimer, White Collar Politics, 7.
92 Alan M arsh and Max Kaase, “Background o f Political Action,” in Political Action: Mass Participation in
Five Western Democracies, ed. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al. (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), 97136.
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managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers
in the Chinese context).
Based on this qualitative branch, I group the 10 occupational categories presented
by Lu Xueyi and his associates into three social classes: upper class, middle class, and
lower class.

Table 6. Class Scheme Used in Analyzing the Chinese Middle Class
The Original Scheme as used
by Lu Xueyi and his associate
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X

Administrative Personnel o f State
Affairs and Social Affairs
Private Entrepreneurs
Managerial Personnel
Professionals
Self-Employed Laborers (Getihu)
Civil Servants
Service Workers
Industry Workers
Peasants
Unemployed and Semi-Unemployed

Revised Chinese Class Scheme by
this Dissertation
I+II

Upper Class

III+IV+
V+VI

Middle Class

VII+
VIII+
IX+X

Lower Class

I classify four occupational groups as belonging to the category o f the middle
class: self-employed laborers, managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants.
There are several reasons to include civil servants in the category o f “middle class”. First,
in China today, the group of white-collar office workers is composed mainly o f civil
servants that include staff members in the government and party agencies, public
organizations, and office workers in all types of enterprises. Secondly, in the Western
settings, civil servants are often recognized as an integral component o f the middle
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class.

93

•

Lastly, in the Chinese context, as I have just discussed, most civil servants hold

white-collar jobs and possess some cultural, economic, and political capital.
This dissertation draws upon the 2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban
Local Self-Governance” to identify the Chinese middle class objectively according to the
qualitative branch o f objective measurement. The 2000 Beijing survey reports that in
2000 approximately 15% o f Beijing respondents belonged to the objective middle class
category according to the qualitative branch.

Table 7. Distribution of Social Classes among Beijing Residents in Objective Term
Qualitative Class Identity
Upper Class
Middle Class
Lower Class
Total

Frequency
47
138
761
946

Percent
5
14.6
80.4
100.0

Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following chapter, due to the continued
importance o f the state institutions in influencing ordinary Chinese citizens’ life
opportunities during the reform era, the formation o f the middle class in contemporary
China follows two distinct paths.94 The first is through the state institutions, where
middle class positions in government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises and
public organizations are considered to be “closed” positions, and the access to these
positions is subject to screening for political loyalty and party membership. This sub
group o f the middle class includes the managers in the state-owned enterprises,
93 Kahl, The American Class Structure', Mills, White Collar, Wright, Class Counts.
94 Li, “The Composition and Size o f China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Li, “The Composition o f
China’s M iddle-Income Stratum;” Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the
Cities in Contemporary China', Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
professionals in the public organizations, and staff members in the government and party
agencies and public organizations. The second path is through the market institutions,
where middle class positions in the private sector are considered to be “open” positions,
and the access to these positions is determined by the workings o f the market institutions.
This sub-group o f the middle class includes the managers in the private and foreignrelated enterprises, professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers, and whitecollar office workers in the private entities.

Table 8. The Occupational Distribution of the Chinese Middle Class by Sector
Occupations
Managers in the state-owned enterprises
Professionals in the public organizations
Staff members in the government and party agencies and
public organizations
Managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises
Professionals in the private sector
Self-employed laborers
White-collar office workers in the private entities

Sector
Public Sector

Private Sector

Based upon the 2000 Beijing Survey, I calculate the percentage o f these two
subgroups in the Chinese middle class as follows: about 55% of the Chinese middle class
belongs to the first subgroup, which is employed in the public sector, whereas about 45%
o f the Chinese middle class belongs to the second subgroup, which is employed in the
private sector.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter answers the critical question: Who are the people who constitute the
middle class in today’s China? Based on the qualitative branch o f the objective
approach, I operationalize the middle class in China by combining four occupational
groups typically used in Western settings: self-employed laborers (i.e., private
entrepreneur o f small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context), managerial
personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers in the
Chinese context). Moreover, the Chinese middle class can be divided into two subgroups:
public sector and private sector. I find that, as o f 2000, approximately 15% o f Chinese
urban residents belonged to the objective middle class category, with half o f them being
employed in the public sector and the other half being employed in the private sector. I
will now summarize the major points made in this chapter.
First, in Western settings, there are two dichotomous approaches to the
conceptualization o f the middle class: objectivist and subjectivist. Furthermore, within
the objective approach, two branches are recognized: quantitative and qualitative. All
three measurements are valid approaches to the identification of the middle class in
Western settings; furthermore, these three measurements are interchangeable in studying
the effects of social class status on political attitudes and behaviors.
Second, with the commencement of the Dengist reform in 1978, the objective
socio-economic bases o f social class differences have formed in Chinese society, whereas
the individuals’ subjective perception of class membership is still far from coming into
being. Two major factors contribute to the underdevelopment of the Chinese people’s
lack of class consciousness. First, since the beginning of the Dengist reform the CCP
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banned the discussion o f the concept of social class, which tended to blur the Chinese
citizen’s perception of himself/herself as a member o f a social class; second, the tragic
memory o f class struggle in the Cultural Revolution made Chinese citizens abhor the
concept o f social class. The existence o f the Chinese citizen’s lack o f class
consciousness validates my suggestion that objective measurement is the most valid
approach for the identification o f the middle class in the Chinese context.
Third, within the objective approach, the income-based quantitative branch has
been found to have severe drawbacks in the identification of middle class positions. First,
it is very hard to achieve a consensus on the criterion of income when defining middle
class since actual personal income is hard to determine and varies dramatically among
geographical areas in a fast changing society such as China. Second, this income-based
measurement tends to find only a quantitatively-determined middle layer in Chinese
society rather than a true middle class. The education-based quantitative branch also has
been found to have severe drawbacks, as it excludes those self-employed individuals who
do not have higher education.
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CHAPTER III
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS

This chapter discusses the emergence o f the Chinese middle class in the context
o f the evolution o f Chinese social stratification since 1949 and provides a general
framework to explain the relations between the Chinese party-state and the newly rising
middle class. This is important because the unique socio-political background o f the
emergence o f the Chinese middle class has played an important role in shaping the
attitudinal and behavioral orientations o f this class.
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the pyramid-shaped social
structure before 1949 in which a small number o f big bourgeoisie and landlords occupied
the apex, and then turns to a detailed discussion of how the years immediately after 1949
changed the patterns o f social stratification and the social structure that had existed
before 1949. Beginning in 1949, the CCP embarked on a set o f socio-political programs
to eliminate the economic bases o f the private economy and also the independence o f the
urban middle class. Between 1949 and 1978, the CCP successfully transformed China
into a statist society in which the party-state reached into every aspect o f ordinary
citizens’ lives.
The post-Mao reform era that beginning in 1978 represented a rupture in the
political system that had defined the Maoist period (1949-1978), and it changed the
patterns o f social stratification in Chinese society dramatically. During the era o f postMao reform, the emerging market forces have challenged and gradually diminished the
importance o f state influence in the patterns of social stratification through the
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introduction o f new mechanisms o f resource allocation and the alteration o f the
opportunity structure that was monopolized by the Party-state.1 According to market
transition theory, state and market represent two fundamentally different systems o f
resource allocation. Market transition theory suggests the rise o f market institutions in
the era o f post-Mao reform creates alternative sources o f rewards not controlled by the
state institutions, and such a shift reduces dependence on the state.2 Moreover, this
theory suggests that as power— control over resources— shifts progressively from state
institutions to market institutions, there will be a change in the distribution o f rewards
favoring those who hold market rather than state power.3 Based on this theory, one
would expect that the Chinese middle class, the majority of whom hold market power,
will grow more independent and will gain an increasingly larger share o f the distribution
o f rewards.
By contrast, the state-centric model illustrates the continued influence o f state
institutions on ordinary citizens’ lives during the reform era.4 The premise o f the statecentric model is based on an insight from new institutionalism theories that the state plays

1 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China; William L. Parish and Ethan Michelson, “Politics and
Markets: Dual Transformations,” American Journal o f Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 1042-59; Victor Nee,
“A Theory o f Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,” American
Sociological Review 54 (1989): 663-81; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen,
“Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism: the Case o f Urban China, 1949-1993,” Social Forces 74
no. 3 (1996): 759-96.
2 Victor Nee, “Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in
China,” American Sociological Review 56 (1991): 267-82; and idem, “The Emergence o f a M arket Society:
Changing Mechanisms o f Stratification in China,” American Journal o f Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 90849; and idem, “A Theory o f Market Transition;” Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews, “Market Transition
and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism,” Annual Review o f Sociology 22 (1996): 4 0 1 35.
3 Nee, “The Emergence o f a M arket Society;” and idem, “A Theory of Market Transition.”
4 Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence o f Power: The Changing
Stratification System in Urban China,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 5 (1996): 739-58; Nee and
Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Akos RonaTas, “The First Shall Be Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism,”
American Journal o f Sociology 100, no. 1 (1994): 40-69; Xueguang Zhou, “Economic Transformation and
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a crucial role in setting up institutional contexts within which social forces interact.5
Based on this insight, the state-centric model suggests that, “given the historical role of
the state in China, and the prevalence o f vested interests associated with existing
institutions, there is no reason to doubt that the remaking of institutional rules in China’s
economic transformations will be heavily influenced by the vested interests and the
state’s own interests.”6
The state-centric model helps us understand why, despite the societal
transformations wrought by market forces in the post-Mao China, state institutions have
continued to play an important role in determining the patterns o f social stratification, and
it identifies and conceptualizes the unique forms o f China’s market economy, in which all
kinds o f economic agents cultivate relations with political institutions and are involved in
a wide variety of rent-seeking behaviors.7 The state-centric model refines the logic of
China’s economic transformations and suggests that the newly emerging social strata
such as the private entrepreneurs and middle class are still dependent on the state
institutions. In fact, the Chinese party-state has evolved in response to the challenges
posed by market institutions, creating a set o f new institutions— the so-called corporatist
institutions—to regulate the unleashed social forces.8 As Margaret Pearson points out,
China’s new corporatist institutions reflect “the evolution of socialist systems away from
a highly penetrated, Party-dominated Leninist system to one in which a degree of

Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data,” American Journal o f Sociology 105, no. 4
(2000): 1135-74; Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism.”
5 Peter B., Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens,
Capitalist Development and Democracy, Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
6 Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China,” 1141.
7 Parish and Michelson, “Politics and Markets.”
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autonomy for economic interests outside the Party-state structure is deemed by the state
to be necessary for industrialization, at the same time that the state finds it desirable to
prevent the independent organization o f the societal groups that might undermine the
state.”9

THE PRE-1949 CHINESE SOCIETY
The pre-1949 Chinese society may be divided into urban and rural sectors. The
rural social structure was characterized by the dominance of a small number of gentry
and landowners over the large number o f peasants. On the other hand, the urban social
structure was characterized by the dominance o f a small number o f big bourgeoisie and
comprador capitalists over a large number o f the proletariat.
In his “Analysis o f the Various Strata o f Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes
toward Revolution,” Mao Zedong identified eight categories o f persons in rural China:
big landlords, small landlords, owner peasants, semi-owner peasants, semi-hired peasants,
poor peasants, hired peasants and rural handicraft workers, and vagabonds.10 These eight
categories o f persons can be grouped into three classes: landlords and rich peasants,
middle peasants, and poor peasants. Big and small landlords belonged to the upper class
o f landlords and rich peasants and they occupied the apex of the pyramid-shaped social
structure in rural China.11 The landlords and rich peasants, who prior to 1949 owned
more than 70 percent o f the arable land despite constituting less than 10% o f the rural

8 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China; Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, China's New Business
Elite.
9 Pearson, China's New Business Elite, 40.
10 Zedong Mao, “Analysis o f the Various Strata o f Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes toward
Revolution,” in Collected Works o f Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Volumes 1-2 (Arlington, VA: Joint
Publications Research Service), 85-90.
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population (Table 9), relied on the exploitation (e.g., high rents) o f poor peasants for their
living. Owner peasants belonged to the class o f middle peasants and most o f them owned
enough land to be self-sufficient. Semi-owner peasants, semi-hired peasants, poor
peasants, hired peasants and rural handicraft workers, and vagabonds all belonged to the
category o f poor class and they owned little land or no land at all. According to Mao
Zedong, semi-owner peasants were better off than other components o f poor peasants
who owned no land at all.

12

Overall, the semi-hired peasants, poor peasants and hired

peasants were vulnerable to exploitation by the class o f landlords and rich peasants for
whom they worked. The vagabonds referred to those who did not work. Before 1949,
the class o f middle and poor peasants owned less than 30 percent of arable land despite
constituting more than 90 percent o f the rural population (Table 9).
In the urban areas, there were four major categories o f social groups: big
bourgeoisie, middle bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, workers and unemployed.13 The big
bourgeoisie referred to bureaucratic capitalists (guanliao zibenjia) whose capital was tied
to the Nationalist Party (kuomingdang) 14 and comprador capitalists (maiban zibenjia)
whose capital was tied to foreign capitals. The middle bourgeoisie were the so-called
national capitalists (minzu zibenjia) whose capital had nothing to do with the Nationalist
Party and/or foreign capitals.

11 Jonathan Unger, “The Class System in Rural China: A Case Study,” in Class and Social Stratification in
Post-Revolution China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 121-41.
12 Mao, “Analysis o f the Various Strata o f Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes toward Revolution.”
13 Zedong Mao, “Analysis o f the Classes in Chinese Society,” in Collected Works o f M ao Tse-Tung (19171949), Volumes 1-2, 91-99; Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
14 Before 1949, the Nationalist Party (kuomingdang) was the ruling party o f the Republic o f China. After
the civil war (1946-1949), the Communist Party defeated the Nationalist Party and established the People’s
Republic o f China in 1949.
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Table 9. The Ownership o f Lands in Rural China Before and After Land Reform

Before
Land
Reform
After
Land
Reform

Percent of Rural Population
Average Possession o f Arable
Lands per Person { mu)
Percent o f Arable Lands
Percent o f Rural Population
Average Possession o f Arable
Lands per Person {mu1)
Percent of Arable Lands

Landlord and Rich Peasants
Total
East
W est
Middle
China
China
China
<10
4
5.87
5.69
13.87
—
14.26
14.9

Middle Peasants and Poor Peasants
Total
East
West
Middle
China
China
China
>90
--0.6
0.4
0.74

>70

36.49

45.79

37.68

<30

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

2.12

1.52

1.92

---

2.4

2.05

2.15

8

2.76

4.62

4.33

>90

44.29

46.04

42.38

—

18.5

—

14.71

—

13.84

Source: Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 40.
Note: ’. Mu is a traditional unit o f area, and is equal to 6.667 ares or 0.165 acre.
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The petty bourgeoisie included teachers, lawyers, doctors, low-level business and
government employees, small merchants, and handicrafts operators and so on. The
workers mainly consisted o f industrial workers and the so-called urban coolie laborers
(.kuli). There is no reliable data describing the percent o f each group in the urban
population.
The class o f big bourgeoisie and landlords were the ruling class during the period
o f the Republic o f China (1911-1949). Three things should be noted here: first, the social
structure in the cities was also pyramid-shaped, with the class o f big bourgeoisie
occupying the apex and the other social groups at various levels beneath them; second,
over 80 percent o f Chinese population lived in the rural areas and less than 20 percent
lived in the cities; third, with economic development and the gradual industrialization in
the first part of twentieth century, the middle class, including managerial personnel,
professionals, small businessmen, and white-collar office workers, emerged in the cities.
Based on the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates,151 calculated the
percent o f middle class in Chinese society in 1949. If we group managers, civil servants,
professionals and self-employed laborers together, the middle class constituted
approximately 7% of Chinese population (Table 10). This small but gradually rising
middle class had gained some economic and/or political independence under the rule of
the Nationalist Party and had a greater degree o f self-determination in regard to such
matters as their life style and occupational advancement, much like their counterparts in
Western societies.16

15 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
16 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China.”
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Table 10. The Distribution of Social Groups in Chinese Society in 1949
Social Groups
Administrative Personnel o f State Affairs and Social affairs
Capitalists
Managers
Civil Servants1, Professionals •y
Self-employed laborers (getihu)
Service workers
Industry workers
Peasants
Unemployed
Total

Percentage (%)
0.48
0.37
0.37
2.57
3.70
0.45
2.86
88.0
1.29
100.00

Source: Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China, 40.
Note: 1. The group o f civil servants equals the sector of white-collar office workers in the
middle
class.
-y
. The group o f self-employed laborers equals the sector o f medium and small-size
businessmen in the middle class.

MAOIST CHINA (1949-1978): DESTRATIFICATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS

A. The Destratification o f the Maoist Era
The new policies o f the post-1949 Maoist regime represented a major departure
from the policies o f the pre-1949 era: under the Maoist regime, the government was
committed to the elimination o f class differences in order to create a classless and equal
society. The direct consequence o f these policies was the so-called “destratification”, in
which the observed class lines of the prior-1949 era were eliminated.

17

To achieve this goal, the Communist Party first took measures to eliminate the
economic bases o f private economy. The CCP had already begun implementing a policy

17 William L. Parish, “Destratification in China,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution
China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 84-120.
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of land reform in 1946 in the rural areas o f northern China that were under its control and
in 1950-1953 it brought this campaign to the rest o f China. In the land reform campaign,
the Party classified the rural population according to five categories: landlords, rich
peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants and other workers, based
upon Mao Zedong’s analysis o f the various strata o f Chinese peasantry. The Party
confiscated most o f the wealth and land o f the landlord and rich peasant classes and
redistributed them to the poor peasant and hired peasant classes. The direct result o f the
land reform campaign was a dramatic change in the distribution o f land: before the land
reform, the landlord and rich peasant classes owned more than 70 percent o f the arable
land, whereas after the land reform, they owned only 8 percent; the middle and poor
peasant classes occupied less than 30 percent of the arable land before reform, whereas
after the land reform they owned more than 90 percent (Table 9).
During the land reform campaign, the Party also identified two new classes of
people— the so-called “counter-revolutionaries” and “bad element.” These “counter
revolutionary” or “bad element” classes referred to those people who, prior to 1949, had
been members o f the local Nationalist Party political authorities, landlords’ henchmen,
active opponents of the Communist Party, or simply bullies and bandits.18 These
counter-revolutionaries and bad elements together with the landlords and rich peasants
formed the so-called “four bad categories” (sileifenzi) that were the officially designated
enemies o f the middle and poor peasant classes. According to the official policy, the
wealth and land of these “four elements” had to be taken away.19

18 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 699.
19 Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification
in China.”
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Immediately after the land reform, the Party initiated socialist collectivization in
the rural areas. There were three rationales behind this campaign o f agricultural
collectivization: first, the private land owned by the peasants after the land reform was
not compatible with a socialist economy; second, the Party believed that collectivization
was the only means by which the economic inequalities that continued to exist among
peasants in the rural areas after the land reform could be rectified; and, third,
collectivization was designed to mobilize peasant labor for the purpose o f increasing
agricultural growth.20 Beginning in 1952, the Party took measures to set up mutual aid
teams, “lower level” agricultural producers’ cooperatives and “high level” agricultural
producers’ cooperatives. As o f 1952, about 40 percent o f the peasant households
participated in the mutual aid teams, 0.1 percent had joined the “lower level” agricultural
producers’ cooperatives, and less than 0.1 percent had joined the “high level” agricultural
producers’ cooperatives.21 In 1955-1956, the collectivization program was carried to
completion. The “high level” agricultural producers’ cooperatives were widely
established; as of 1957, about 1.2 hundred million peasant households were members of
these “high level” cooperatives (Table 11). In 1958, most of these cooperatives were
transformed into people’s communes (renmin gongshe). After that, almost all of rural
land was owned by the people’s communes collectively and the basis o f the private
economy in the rural areas was eliminated: individuals did not have ownership o f land
and could not buy or sell land.

20 Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao,
“Agricultural Strategies and Rural Social Changes in Communist China since 1949: A Macrosociological
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Table 11. The Development of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives

Number o f Cooperatives (in
ten thousands)
High level Cooperatives
Lower Level Cooperatives
Number o f Peasant
Households in Cooperatives
(in ten thousands)
in High level Cooperatives
in Lower level Cooperatives

1952
0.4

1953
1.5

1954
11.4

1955
63.4

1956
75.2

1956
78.9

0.0001
0.4

0.0002
1.5

0.02
11.4

0.05
63.3

54.4
21.6

75.3
3.6

5.9

27.5

229.7

1692.1

11782.2

12105.2

0.2
0.2
5.1____ 27.3

1.2
228.5

4.0
1688.1

10742.2
1040.1

11945.0
160.2

Source-. Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 44.

In the urban areas, by 1950, the Party had nationalized the enterprises owned by
the bureaucratic and comprador capitalists. Over time, most o f these enterprises evolved
into state-owned enterprises under the direct administration o f the central government. In
1950, the government began to make efforts to reduce the control o f national capitalists
over their enterprises. In the same period, the number o f these private enterprises and
their output increased, reaching a peak in 1954 (Table 12). During this same period, the
government also launched a program o f collectivization o f the industrial and commercial
enterprises owned by the petite bourgeoisie— the so-called handicraft industry (shou
gongye). As a consequence o f these policies, the number of private enterprises declined
to only 869, and their output declined to the value o f 2.9 million Chinese yuan (Table 12)
Most o f the self-employed small merchants and handicrafts operators joined the
handicraft cooperatives: as o f 1956, about 92 percent of the self-employed small
merchants and handicrafts operators had joined the handicraft cooperatives, with about 8

A ssessment,” in Power and Policy in the PRC, ed. Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1985), 266-81.
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percent maintaining the status o f self-employment.22 Over time, most o f these jointly
managed enterprises and handicraft cooperatives evolved into collective enterprises under
the administration of local government.23
After 1958, national capitalists “became ordinary employees in their enterprises if
they continued to work, but they were eligible to draw interest on the much reduced
official valuation o f their previous capital investment.”24 Most o f the small merchants
and handicrafts operators became ordinary salaried employees in the handicraft
cooperatives.

Table 12. The Socialization of Capitalist Industry (ziben zhuyi gongye)
Year

Number

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

123165
133018
147650
149571
150275
133962
88809
869

Employees
(in 10,000)
164.4
181.6
202.3
205.7
223.1
179.6
131.0
1.6

Gross output
(in hundred million yuan)
68.28
72.78
101.08
105.26
131.90
103.41
72.66
0.29

Source: Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 47.

In the cities, the Party informally classified the urban population according to five
categories: bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, petite
bourgeoisie, workers and unemployed, based upon Mao Zedong’s analysis o f the classes

21 Hsiao, “Agricultural Strategies and Rural Social Changes in Communist China since 1949,” 270.
22 Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 49.
23 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
24 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 704.
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♦

in Chinese society.

9^

The “counter-revolutionary” or “bad element” class designations

were used in the cities to refer to those who had ties with the Nationalist Party or foreign
capitals and who were active opponents o f the Communist Party before 1949. These
counter-revolutionaries and bad elements together with the bureaucratic and comprador
bourgeoisie constituted the officially designated enemies in the cities.26
The result o f the land reform campaign in the rural regions and the socialization
o f industry and commerce in the urban areas was that the basis o f the private economy
was eliminated. Almost no Chinese citizens enjoyed the private ownership o f productive
assets (i.e., land or capital or enterprises); there was no concept o f private property in the
1954 Chinese Constitution.

In conclusion, by 1958, the economic foundations o f class

differentiation were almost completely eliminated from Chinese society.
Second, the Party took measures to control occupational mobility and
occupational advancement in urban China. Almost all urban citizens were assigned to
various types o f work units (danwei), on which they were dependent for their salary, food,
housing, education, welfare and other necessities. According to the official definition,
the work unit is “an independent accounting unit with three characteristics: (1)
administratively, it is an independent organization; (2) fiscally, it has an independent
budget and produces its own accounting tables o f earnings and deficits; (3) financially, it

25 Mao, “Analysis o f the Classes in Chinese Society.”
26 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
27 The Chinese constitution has been changed four times due to the change o f national politics. The 1954
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated by the National People’s Congress on
September 20, 1954. The 1954 Constitution was replaced in the midst of the Cultural Revolution by the
1975 Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f China to reflect the politics o f the Cultural Revolution. This
Constitution was superseded in 1978 by the 1978 Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f China. Both the
1975 Constitution and the 1978 Constitution suffered from the Cultural Revolution. The current
Constitution is the 1982 Constitution o f the People’s Republic of China which was adopted by the National
People’s Congress on December 4, 1982. The 1982 Constitution reflects Deng X iaoping’s determination to
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has independent accounts in banks and has legal rights to sign contracts with government
or business entities.”28
In general, there were four major types o f work units: (1) government and party
agencies (dangzhengjiguan), (2) public organizations (shiye danwei), (3) state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) (guoyou qiye), and (4) collective enterprises (jiti qiye).29 Government
or party agencies represented the state and the Party, and included ministries, bureaus,
and various departments and offices of the Communist Party from the central level down
to the local level. Public organizations were nonprofit institutions in the public arena and
included “education and research institutions, and organizations in the medical,
publishing, broadcasting, and entertainment sectors.”30 Most o f these public
organizations were, in varying degrees, administered by the government and the Party.
State-owned enterprises were enterprises in the service and production arena that
generated profits and were owned by the central government. Most state-owned
enterprises were administered by the central government directly; other state-owned
enterprises were administered by the local governments o f the areas in which they were
located. Collective enterprises were not owned by the central government and
consequently were not administered by the central government directly. Collective
enterprises were financially sponsored and administered by the local governments o f the
areas in which they were located.

lay a lasting institutional foundation for China’s modernization and it downplays the importance o f class
struggle and places top priority on development.
28 Xiaogang Wu, “W ork Units and Income Inequality. The Effect of Market Transition in Urban China,”
Social Forces 80, no. 3 (2002): 1073.
29 Wu, “W ork Units and Income Inequality;” Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
30 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China, 57.
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The work units not only fulfilled their administrative or production
responsibilities, but also assumed important social responsibilities, including that of
providing employees with housing, education, and social welfare.

31

Thus, in the cities

during the Maoist period, it was difficult to survive unless one was associated with a
work unit “because housing, food, and other social services were hardly available through
the market.”

32

However, the urban citizens’ living standards and the services received

from the work units depended upon the position o f his/her work unit in the socialist
hierarchy. Usually, the higher the position o f the work unit in the hierarchy, the more
resources it would have to redistribute to its employees.

33

Under the socialist system,

government and party agencies are distributors and all enterprises have to submit their
products and profits to government or party agencies for distribution. Thus, government
and party agencies have greater access to resources than public organizations and
enterprises. And the socialist system “tended to favor state-owned work units because
they were considered the base o f the communist regime. State-owned work units had
priority when acquiring resources from the government from which to provide housing
and [other social services] to their employees.”34
At the end o f the 1950s, after the failure o f the Great Leap Forward,

3c

the CCP

launched a rigid registration (hukou) system that assigned all members o f Chinese society
to one of two categories: urban or rural. According to this registration system, “all

31 Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the Changing Social Contract
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
32 Wu and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China.”
33 Wu, “W ork Units and Income Inequality;” Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
34 Wu, “W ork Units and Income Inequality,” 1074.
35 In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward campaign under the new “General Line for Socialist
Construction”. The Great Leap Forward was aimed at accomplishing the economic modernization in China
at a vastly faster pace. In urban China, this campaign focused on steel production through collectivization
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Chinese households were registered in the locale where they resided and also were
categorized as either agricultural or non-agricultural households.”36 The agricultural or
non-agricultural status was determined at birth, based on the mother’s status, and was
fixed for life.37 The rural peasants were assigned to different people’s communes based
on their current residence and worked in the agricultural production o f the people’s
communes in order to receive food rations for their households. Generally, the peasants
were underprivileged: they had no access to the education, housing, and health care that
were enjoyed by most urban employees in work units.
The direct result o f the work unit program in the cities was that Chinese society
became “work unit dependent”. Through the work unit program, the CCP controlled the
occupational mobility and advancement o f urban citizens. It was the CCP and
government that assigned every citizen to the various work units; after these assignments
were made, the opportunities for inter-work unit mobility were very few. For example,
under the work-unit control of labor, “only half the workers could change jobs in lifetime
or l% -2% per year.”38
Moreover, the occupational advancement was determined by the CCP and
government. Tife chances under the Maoist regime were, according to many studies,
primarily determined by one’s exhibited or presumed political loyalties to the CCP.

In

addition, “political criteria are systematically incorporated and enforced in the allocation

and mass labor. In rural China, this campaign focused on the creation of a new political-economic
system— the people’s communes. However, the Great Leap Forward ended with economic failure in 1959.
36 W u and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China.”
37 W u and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China;” Kam Wing
Chan and Li Zhang, “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes,”
The China Quarterly 160 (1999): 818-55.
38 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” 93.
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o f opportunities for higher education, better jobs, and more power and privilege.”40
According to Susan Shirk, the emphasis on political loyalties “contributes to the
processes o f political consolidation.,Al The system o f reward according to political
loyalties is much more amenable to political control than is a system o f reward according
to merit. And the definition of political loyalty is very flexible, which allows the CCP
elites to exploit it to promote their loyal supporters.
Generally, the Maoist period saw the transformation o f Chinese society into a
relatively egalitarian one in which there were no observable class differences within the
Chinese society and the CCP controlled all aspects o f ordinary citizens’ life. However,
this does not mean that the CCP had completely eliminated inequality. New systemic
patterns emerged in the Maoist society. First, economic inequalities between the rural
and urban regions grew significantly, rather than shrinking. As has been mentioned, rural
peasants, who were fixed to their communes, were separated from access to social
welfare resources. In the Maoist period, “the urban-rural income gap grew from
approximately 2:1 in the 1950s to anywhere from 3:1 to 6 :l.”42 Second, economic
inequalities among different work units in the urban areas became significant. The quality
and availability o f social welfare resources such as housing, health care, and other
services varied significantly according to the type and hierarchical status o f the work
units.

39 Yang Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations;” Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China;” and
idem, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60 (1995):
309-28.
40 Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations,” 687.
41 Susan L. Shirk, “The Decline o f Virtuocracy in China,” in Class and Social Stratification in PostRevolution China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 59.
42 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” 415.
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Even the economic bases o f social classes were eroded; the Maoist regime still
constantly emphasized the importance o f “class struggles”. In the early period o f the
regime, the family class background was adopted as the main indicator o f a class enemy.
In the rural areas, the families belonging to the so-called “four bad categories” were
heavily struggled against and discriminated against during the whole Maoist period. For
example, “the systematic discrimination against former landlords and rich peasants in
rural areas was so severe that it was almost impossible for males o f this status to
marry.”43 In the urban areas, the families belonging to the bureaucratic and comprador
bourgeoisie together with the counter-revolutionaries and bad elements suffered
systematic discrimination. In both the rural and the urban areas, the Maoist policies did
not seem to “have encouraged the pre-1949 elites and their offspring to blend into the rest
o f society.”44 In the 1960s, this ascriptive definition was de-emphasized, as Mao Zedong
shifted toward greater reliance on behavioral manifestations of political attitudes to
define class enemies. During the Cultural Revolution, many government and Party
cadres were “struggled against” as the agency of capitalists within the Party based on
their behavioral manifestations.45 According to Mao Zedong, there were two exploiting
classes within the country: one was the old exploiting class remaining from the pre-1949
society; the other was a new exploiting class that had emerged from within the Party.46

43 Ibid., 418.
44 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 705.
45 Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China;” Stuart R. Schram, “Classes, Old and New, Mao
Zedong’s Thought, 1949-1976,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China, ed. James L.
Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 29-55.
46 Schram, “Classes, Old and New, Mao Zedong’s Thought, 1949-1976.”
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B. The Elimination o f the Middle Class
In the period prior to 1949, when there was a greater amount o f “physical and
social space where such [class] could escape state control and supervision,” a small
middle class had emerged and gained some economic and/or political independence. In
the Maoist era, however, this class was transformed into one that was “fundamentally
dependent on the party-state in every sphere o f life,” and was “reduced to a politically
subordinate stratum o f the salaried civil servants [or workers].”47
There were several aspects to this transformation. First, the land reform campaign
in the rural region and the socialization o f industry and commerce in the urban region
eliminated the private economy. As a result, most o f the self-employed small merchants
and handicrafts operators lost control o f their businesses and became ordinary employees
o f handicraft cooperatives. Thus, one important element of the middle class— the petite
bourgeoisie— was transformed into a politically subordinate stratum o f salaried workers.
Second, the Party controlled the occupational mobility and advancement o f urban
workers through the system o f work units, assigning managers and professionals to
positions in the various types o f work units and determining their occupational
advancement based on their political loyalties. Additionally, immediately after 1949, the
CCP adopted the system of unified job assignment (tongyi fenpei) and, as a result, college
graduates lost their autonomy in regard to employment. Thus, the remainder o f the
middle class— managers and professionals— was transformed into the politically
subordinate stratum of the salaried civil servants and college-educated students, who had
previously constituted a significant part o f the middle class, were forced into the role o f
salaried civil servants. After the founding of the PRC, the Party announced a national
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policy for allocating jobs for college students graduating in 1950, and by 1953— “the first
year when all university students were post-1949 matriculants— the system was a
standard routine o f university life from which no graduate was exempt.”48
Thirdly, the Party launched political campaigns to strengthen its control over
managers and professionals. The 1958 Hundred Flowers Campaign classified more than
500 thousand managers and professionals as “rightists” and most o f these “rightists” were
sent to rural China to be reeducated by the peasants. In the political campaigns that
followed, these rightist households suffered systematic discrimination. The Maoist
regime overtly discriminated against intellectuals, and their social status declined
dramatically, culminating in the Cultural Revolution. Additionally, many professionals
and managers were “pulled down” from their places and “replaced with new cadres
(workers, peasants, and soldiers) who lacked the education, professional training, and
know-how to manage the specific tasks at hand.”49 During the Cultural Revolution, the
educational system was completely disrupted. Between 1966 and 1969, no new students
were admitted to college. From 1970 to 1977, colleges recruited only those students who
had been recommended by their work units, a decision that was made solely on the basis
o f students’ political loyalties and family backgrounds.50
Finally, the homogenization o f consumption patterns and lifestyles in the Maoist
era eliminated the distinctive lifestyle of the middle class.51 This homogenization of
consumption patterns and lifestyles was primarily caused by two factors: first, the system
of rationing used in the distribution of consumption items, housing, and other social

47 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 272.
48 Ibid., 258.
49 Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China,” 797.
50 Ibid.
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services, could not form the basis for widely differing consumption patterns;52 second,
the distinctive middle class consumption patterns and lifestyles were politically risky.
For example, during the Cultural Revolution, distinctive lifestyles were used as one of the
major indicators o f class enemies. For this reason, well-educated professionals and
managers were careful to adopt, to the extent possible, the lifestyle of the working class.
This need to repress the distinctive lifestyles and cultural consumptions that the pre-1949
Nationalist Party had left relatively unrestricted meant that “the professional and
managerial stratum lost important resources with which to define and reproduce
themselves socially.”53
With the elimination of the ownership o f private property and with the assertion
o f complete control over occupational employment in the urban areas, the CCP
successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent middle class into an obedient stratum.
Furthermore, the CCP banned all middle class civic organizations (such as professional
organizations or recreational clubs), as a result of which the ability o f the members o f the
middle class to interact with each other in significant ways was eliminated.

REFORM CHINA (1978-): DIFFERENTIATION AND THE RISE OF THE NEW
MIDDLE CLASS

A. Social Differentiation in the Reform Era
The post-Mao reform (since 1978) era represented a rupture from the Maoist
period (1949-1978) and it changed the patterns o f social stratification in Chinese society

51 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
52 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 696.
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dramatically: Maoist China was characterized by the so-called “destratification”;
however, post-Mao China was characterized by the return of the pre-1949 social
stratification patterns. Since 1978, Chinese society has become differentiated and
divided and clear class lines have emerged.
First, the CCP gradually legitimized the existence of private economy in Chinese
society and took measures to encourage its development.54 The development o f private
economy in China has experienced three major stages: The first stage (1978-1983) is
marked by the official revival o f private business. However, in this stage the CCP only
officially recognized the individual businesses (getihu).55 For example, Article 11 o f the
1982 Chinese Constitution states that, “the individual economy o f urban and rural
working people, operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the
socialist public economy.” Originally, the sector o f individual businesses was “intended
to play a marginal, stopgap role and to act as a ‘supplement’ to the state and collective
sectors, ‘filling the gaps’ they left in the economy, particularly in the distribution of
consumer goods and services and in employment.”56 And the Chinese government’s
decision to recognize the individual economy was also a reaction to a practical need, that
is, to solve the severe problem o f urban youth unemployment.57 During the Cultural
Revolution, Mao Zedong sent millions o f urban students to rural China to accept re
education from peasants. Since reform, most o f these young people have returned to
urban areas. This put unprecedented pressure on the government and the Party for

53 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 271.
54 Yongnian Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
55 The individual businesses are only permitted to employ less than eight non-family employees.
56 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises, 8.
57 Feng Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform
(SUNY: State University o f New York Press, 1995).
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employment. To absorb such a great influx o f youth labor, the government adopted the
CO

policy o f developing individual economy to absorb these unemployed youths.
The second stage (1984-1992) is characterized by the rise o f the private
enterprises (siying qiye),59 which are distinguished from the individual business. In April
1988, the National People’s Congress revised Article 11 o f the 1982 Chinese Constitution
and allowed private business to hire more than the previously permitted eight non-family
employees, thus officially recognizing the existence o f private enterprises.60 The new
Article 11 states that, “the government allows the private economy to exist and develop
within the limits prescribed by law.” Accordingly, in June 1988, the State Council issued
the “Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises” to govern the activities o f private
firms. According to the “Tentative Stipulations”, private enterprises are profitable
economic organizations that are owned by individuals and employ more than eight
people.61
The individual economy has grown rapidly since the CCP’s new policy of
developing the individual economy. Table 13 indicates that in 1980 the share of the
individual economy in national gross industrial output was almost negligible, while at the
end of 1980s the share o f the individual economy increased to 5.4 percent. In 1978 when
the CCP relaxed control over the individual economy, only 150,000 people in urban areas
were involved in individual businesses; however, by the end o f 1980s this number had
increased to 806,000.62 The striking growth o f the individual economy laid a

58 Ibid.
59 The private enterprises are those who employ more than eight non-family employees.
60 Wang, Chinese Private Economy since Reform and Openness.
61 Wang, Chinese Private Economy since Reform and Openness; International Finance Corporation,
C hina’s Em erging Private Enterprises.
62 Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China.
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considerable amount o f wealth in individual hands. And the accumulation o f capital in
private hands prepared for the emergence o f private enterprises. Some successful
individual economy grew and took on more employees and became private enterprises.
And, “it was estimated that by the end o f 1988, China had 500,000 [individually owned
businesses] that could be called private firms.”63 Meanwhile, some private enterprises
grew out of the leasing o f small and medium state or collective enterprises to individuals.

Table 13. Gross Industrial Output in China, 1980-1998
Year

1980
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

State-owned
enterprises
%
76.0
64.9
54.6
56.2
51.5
47.0
37.3
34.0
33.7
29.8
26.5

Collective-owned
enterprises %
23.5
32.1
35.6
33.0
35.1
34.0
37.7
36.6
36.5
35.9
36.0

Individually
owned
enterprises %
0
1.9
5.4
4.8
5.8
8.0
10.1
12.9
14.4
16.9
16.0

Other types of
enterprises %

Total %

0.5
1.2
4.4
6.0
7.6
11.1
14.8
16.6
15.4
17.4
21.5

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Source: Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China, 66.

It was not until 1988 that Chinese government officially recognized the existence
o f private enterprises. Thus, at this stage, private enterprises had to circumvent the
official prohibitions in two ways: first, they falsely registered as individually owned
business but in practice they employed more than 8 employees. For example, many of

63 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises, 9.
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the specialized rural households (zhuanyehu) were originally registered as individual
economy and became so specialized that there was no difference between their activities
and those of private enterprises.64 Second, they falsely registered as collective
enterprises— the so-called “red hat enterprises”. Individuals usually “obtained collective
registration by arrangement with state or collective enterprises, or with organizations
such as street committees or township and village business corporations” and they paid a
regular “administration fee” to these organizations.65 By doing so, private entrepreneurs
were able to circumvent the official limits set by the government, and also to take
advantage o f benefits enjoyed by state-owned or collective enterprises such as tax
concessions in the first few years o f operation.
The third stage (1993 to the present) starts from Deng Xiaoping’s famous
southern tour in September 1992. In this famous southern tour, Deng Xiaoping called for
a continued reform o f China’s economy and determined China’s future transition to a
market economy. In the following Fourteenth CCP Congress in 1993, the socialist
market economy was first endorsed as China’s goal of reform.66 After Deng Xiaoping
called for further market oriented reforms in 1992, attitudes toward private economy
changed. The government made genuine measures to encourage the development of
private economy. As a result the social status o f private entrepreneurs and individual
businesses were increased in Chinese society. All these changes and the greater profits
generated by private economy attracted more Chinese citizens, and even party cadres and
government officials became involved in the sector o f private economy. After Deng’s

64 Susan Young, “Private Entrepreneurs and Evolutionary Change in China,” in C hina’s Quiet Revolution:
New Interactions between State and Society, ed. David G. Goodman and Beverley Hooper (Melbourne:
Longman Cheshire; New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1994), 105-25.
65 Ibid., 110.
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southern tour in 1992, party cadres and government officials were allowed, even
encouraged to become involved in the activities o f private economy— the so-called
“plunging into the sea o f commerce” (xiahai). At the end of 1992 party cadres and
government officials was the second largest group in the private economy sector, but by
the mid-1990s they had become the largest group among private entrepreneurs.

ft 7

In September 1997, the Fifteenth CCP Congress recognized the sector o f non
state economy as an important component o f the socialist economy. And in March 1999,
the National People’s Congress revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and legalized the
status of non-state economy and private ownership.68 The reform o f SOEs since 1995
accelerated the pace of privatization of the state economy. As I will discuss later, in 1995
the central government formulated a policy— the so-called “keep the large ones and let
the smaller ones go” (zhuada fangxiao) to reform SOEs. The direct result o f such policy
was that most o f the small and medium state-owned enterprises or collective enterprises
were privatized.69 And in March 1998, the government issued a directive requiring all
the red hat enterprises to take off the red hat to show their private ownership. Private
entrepreneurs no longer needed the red hat to do their business.
As a consequence o f these policies, private entrepreneurs and self-employed
individual businesses expanded rapidly in the 1990s and became the greatest beneficiary
o f the Dengist reform.70 Table 13 indicates that the gross industrial output from the stateowned enterprises declined from 55 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1998, while that by

66 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises.
67 Yongnian Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change (London: Eastern
Universities Press, 2004), 264.
68 Association o f Chinese Private Economy, ed., Chinese Private Economy Yearbook 2000-2001.
69 Lowell Dittmer and Lance Gore, “China Builds A Market Culture,” East Asia 19, no. 3 (2001): 9-50;
International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises.
70 Pearson, C h in a ’s New Business Elite', Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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individually owned enterprises increased from 5 percent to 16 percent during the same
period. And the other types of enterprises, comprising private enterprises and joint
venture enterprises, increased to 22 percent.
Second, the importance o f work units in urban citizens’ life declined. The postMao period represents “a fundamental break from the state socialist redistributive system
in the Mao era.”

71

♦

The Chinese government has initiated administrative reform since the

1980s to restructure the state apparatus to suit market oriented reform and has reduced the
scope o f state participation in the economy.72 By 1998, most industrial ministries o f the
State Council had been abolished, and these ministries were transformed into enterprises,
or trade associations (hangye xiehui) or macro-regulatory agencies.73 The Chinese
government also pushed most public organizations to become enterprise entities and
expelled them from the state ranks. Before reform, most people who worked in the
public organizations were classified as state cares and thus lived on the government
payroll. After reform, most public organizations became financially independent and the
government only subsidized a few o f them.74
The reform o f SOEs was the most difficult. Since the early 1980s, the CCP has
taken measures to reform SOEs and gradually granted SOEs greater autonomy. In the
beginning, the government intended to invigorate SOEs by yielding a proportion of
profits to the enterprises.75 In 1987, the government introduced the contract
responsibility system (CRS). According to the CRS, “SOEs were contracted to pay

71 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China, 39.
72 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A M arket Culture;” International Finance Corporation, C hina’s
Emerging Private Enterprises', Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China.
73 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A M arket Culture.”
74 Tao-chiu Lam and Jerry L. Perry, “ Services Organizations in China: Reforms and Institutional
Constraints,” Policy Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2001): 16-35.
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income tax and adjustment tax on a specific level of profit. If they exceeded the
contracted level o f profit, they were taxed at a lower rate on their additional profit.. ..The
CRS aimed to improve enterprise performance by strengthening financial responsibility,
emphasizing profitability, and giving enterprises greater autonomy in decision-making.”76
In the late 1980s, the government realized that SOEs should have greater authority in
planning their production activities and developed a form of “separation o f ownership
rights from operating rights”. Thus, the SOE managers were granted more autonomy
with regard to the management of enterprises. For example, in January 1992, all SOEs
were given freedom to hire and fire staff “without consulting a municipal labour plan or
obtaining the approval of their own bureaucratic superiors as had been general practice
since the late 1950s.”77
Beginning in 1995, the government formulated a new policy— “keep the large
ones and let the smaller ones go”. According to this policy, the government will only
keep under its ownership 500 to 1,000 large state firms, while the smaller SOEs will be
re-organized through a package o f policy measures including mergers, acquisitions,
leasing, and sales. The direct result of such policy was that most o f the small and
medium state enterprises or collective enterprises were privatized. Meanwhile, since
1990, the government has also stripped SOE workers o f their privileges such as life-time
employment, housing, medical care and pensions.

78

By 1997, tens o f millions o f SOE

workers have been “laid o f f ’ (xiagang) as the result of the “keep the large ones and let
the smaller ones go” policy.

75 Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China.
76 Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China, 111.
77 Debora S. Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai: A Research Note,” The China Quarterly 157 (1999):
28.
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The direct result o f the decline o f the role o f work unit in the urban cities was that
the CCP no longer monopolized occupational mobility and ordinary Chinese citizens had
greater freedom to choose their own occupations. Before 1978 Chinese urban citizens
were fixed to work units for lifetime and the opportunities for inter-work units mobility
were very few. With the deepening o f reform, Chinese citizens gradually obtained their
own discretion to determine their own job. In September 1992 the Chinese government
announced that “employees could henceforth move at their own discretion between state,
private and collective enterprises,” which is “a clear blow to the administrative barriers
that has previously obstructed [job mobility].”79 The empirical studies by Deborah Davis
indicated that “between January 1990 and July 1995, 41 per cent [of Shanghai residents]
had changed employer at least once; 5 per cent [of them] had changed three or more
times. Moreover in most cases switching employers simultaneously involved changing to
a different line of work, a pattern that stands in clear contrast with past practice where
many people spent an entire career with one employer.”80
The second result is that the occupational advancement was no longer determined
by the CCP and government. After 1978 more and more Chinese citizens worked outside
o f work units, such as initiating their own business or working in private, foreign and
joint-venture enterprises. Thus, the Party and government could not influence the
occupational advancements o f this part o f the population. As for those who still worked
in work units, the party has gradually de-emphasized the importance o f political loyalties

78 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A M arket Culture.”
79 Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai,” 28-29.
80 Ibid., 34.
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to determine one’s upward advancement.81 Because of the need to promote economic
modernization, the pattern of cadre recruitment and advancement has been changed. For
example “many new middle-level and high-level cadres are professionals because
recruitment in the state bureaucracy now favors university degree holders, professional
training, and other forms o f human capital.”82
Generally speaking, in the post-Mao period, because o f the large-scale
implementation of the self-responsibility system and market-oriented reforms and
processes, the value and prestige of certain occupations changes accordingly.83 There is a
clear trend toward assigning better benefits to those professional and managerial
positions commanding knowledge and education. The status hierarchy that places whitecollar work above blue-collar work has formed: the managerial-professional persons are
better paid than the blue-collar workers and lead a unique lifestyle and consumption
culture from the blue-collar workers.
In sum, during the whole period o f the post-Mao China, Chinese society was
transformed from a relatively equal society before 1978 to a severely unequal one after
1978 in which the CCP relaxed its control of Chinese ordinary citizens’ life chances.
And some clear class differences are observed within Chinese society and analyzing this
emerging class society has been an important theme in the research among Chinese
scholars. As I have mentioned in Chapter II, the latest study on China’s social classes
was done by a research team led by a well-known Chinese sociologist Lu Xueyi at the

81 For more on this point, please see Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations;” Parish and Michelson, “Politics
and Markets;” Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order;” Walder, Li, and Treiman,
“Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.”
82 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 371.
83 Deborah S. Davis, “Skidding: Downward Mobility among Children of the Maoist Middle Class,”
Modern China 18, no. 4 (1992): 410-37; and idem, “Job Mobility in Post-Mao Cities: Increases on the
M argins,” The China Quarterly 84 (1992): 1062-85; Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China.”
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Institute o f Sociology, Chinese Academy o f Social Science. The research team found a
social stratification with ten social strata: a) administrative personnel o f state affairs and
social affairs, (b) managerial personnel, (c) private entrepreneurs, (d) professionals, (e)
civil servants, (f) self-employed individuals, (g) service workers, (h) industry workers, (i)
peasants, and (j) unemployed and semi-unemployed.84

B. The Rise o f New Middle Class
The post-Mao reform changed the social structure and consequently paved the
road for the emergence o f the middle class. As I defined in Chapter II, China’s middle
class includes mainly four occupational groups: private entrepreneur o f small or medium
business (i.e., self-employed laborers in the Chinese context), managerial personnel,
professionals, and white-collar office workers (i.e., civil servants in the Chinese context).
The distribution o f each occupational group in Chinese society is summarized by the
following Table 14.
First, the managerial stratum began attaining more and more autonomy and
independence from the Chinese state and represented the central players in the rising
market economies in urban China.85 There are three sub-types o f the managerial stratum:
the first is the cadres of SOEs and collective enterprises; with the enterprise reform, most
o f them became professional managers o f these enterprises. The second is the managers
o f private enterprises; and the third is the managers of foreign-related enterprises (i.e.,

84 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes’, and idem, ed., Social M obility in
Contemporary China.
85 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary
C hina’s Social Classes’, and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China’, Zheng and Li, Social
Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China’, Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary
China.
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equity joint venture, contractual joint venture, and solely foreign-owned enterprises)— the
so-called sanzi q iy e %6 According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates,
until 2000, the managerial stratum occupied around 1.5 percent in the structure of
Chinese society (Table 14).87

Table 14. The Distribution of Four Middle Class Occupational Groups in Chinese
Society, 1999
The
Occupations
Composition of
the Chinese
Middle Class
Managerial
The cadres o f SOEs and collective enterprises; the
Personnel
managers o f private enterprises; the managers of
foreign-related enterprises
Professionals
Scientific researchers, all kinds o f technicians and
managerial personnel of scientific and technical
work and their assistants, economic and legal
professionals (i.e., accountants, lawyers and so on),
teaching staff and cultural and sports workers.
Civil Servants1 The staff members in the government and party
agencies; the office workers and staff members in
public organizations and all types o f enterprises
Self-Employed Small business owners (having enough capital to
Laborers2
hire less than 8 non-family employees but they
themselves participate in management), self
employers (having enough capital to run a business
but hiring no employees), small share speculators
and share holders and those who live on bank
interest

Percent o f each
occupational
group in Chinese
Society
1.5

5.1

4.8

4.2

Source: Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China's Social Classes, 44.
Note: ’. The group of civil servants refers to the sector o f white-collar office workers in
the middle class in the Chinese context.
2. The group o f self-employed laborers refers to private entrepreneurs o f medium and
small-size businessmen in the middle class in the Chinese context.

86 Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change, 286.
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Second, professionals are those occupations that involve specialized training and
skills. This stratum engaged exclusively in various types of professional and scientific,
technical and service work in various economic entities, including government and party
agencies, public organizations, and state-owned enterprises as well as various types of
nonpublic entities. It mainly includes scientific researchers, all kinds of technicians and
managerial personnel of scientific and technical work and their assistants, economic and
legal professionals (i.e., accountants, lawyers and so on), teaching staff and cultural and
sports workers. This stratum is characterized by the possession o f human capital.
According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the
professional stratum comprised around 5.1 percent of Chinese society (Table 14).88
Third, private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses are those owners of
businesses that employed less than eight non-family employees. This stratum includes
small business owners (having enough capital to hire less than 8 non-family employees
but they themselves participate in management), self-employers (having enough capital
to run a business but hiring no employees), as well as small share speculators and share
holders and those who live on bank interest.89 According to the estimate offered by Lu
Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the group o f private entrepreneurs o f small or
medium business made up around 4.2 percent of Chinese society (Table 14).90
Finally, the group o f white-collar office workers is mainly composed o f civil
servants that include staff members in the government and party agencies, public
organizations, and office workers in all types of enterprises. There are two sub-groups of

87 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
88 Ibid.
89 Chunling Li, “The Class Structure o f China’s Urban Society during the Transitional Period,” Social
Sciences in China 23, no. 1 (2002): 91-99.
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civil servants: one is the so-called gongwuyuan, the staff members in the government and
party agencies; the other is the group o f office workers and staff members in public
organizations and all types of enterprises. In specific, gongwuyuan refers to those staff
members in the government and party agencies whose bureaucratic ranks are lower than
chu in the central government or provincial governments, and whose bureaucratic ranks
are lower than ke in the local governments.91 There are two reasons to include civil
servants in the category o f the middle class. First, in Western settings, civil servants in
most circumstances are recognized as an integral component o f the middle class.92
Second, in the Chinese context, as I have discussed before, most civil servants hold
white-collar jobs and possess some cultural, economic, and organizational capital.
According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the group
o f civil servants comprised around 4.8 percent in the structure o f Chinese society (Table
14).93
Four factors contribute to the dramatic expansion of China’s middle class: the
enlargement o f college education, the development o f private economy, the inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI), and the reform o f enterprises and public organizations.94
First, as I have discussed, since 1978 the government legalized the existence of
the private economy and made efforts to encourage its development and thus, the private
sector re-emerged in Chinese society and grew rapidly. The tremendous growth o f the
private sector created a large population o f private entrepreneurs o f small or medium

90 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
91 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
92 Wright, Class Counts', Mills, White Collar, Kahl, The American Class Structure.
93 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
94 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary
C hina's Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social
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business and created positions for managerial personnel and professionals in big private
enterprises.
Second, in Western society, education is the essential accelerator o f the formation
o f the middle class. Since 1978, the rapid expansion o f higher education has resulted in a
rapid expansion of the size o f the new middle class.95 Table 15 illustrates that there was
only a tiny number o f students in higher education (85.6 ten thousands students) in 1978.
However, since 1978 this number has greatly expanded. University admission rates
increased rapidly after 1998, with 43 percent increase in 1999, and another 20 percent
increase in 2000.96 Table 15 indicates that from 1999 to 2003, the total enrollment in
higher education nearly tripled. These graduates from higher education formed the
backbone o f the formation o f the managerial and professional strata.97 Meanwhile, the
system o f unified job assignment was gradually phased out and graduates from higher
education became gradually autonomous in job-seeking and career pursuit. By 1993, “70
per cent of that year’s graduates had found employment on their own.”98 By 1995, the
old system o f unified job assignment was almost abolished. After that, colleges only
helped students find job offers and students had to compete for jobs on their own. And
increasingly more college graduates found a job through “labor markets” (the so-called
rencai shichang).

Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China', So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in
China.”
95 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes', So, “The Changing Pattern of
Classes and Class Conflict in China;” Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
96 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
97 In post-Mao China the correlation between educational attainment on the one hand and occupational
advancement and income on the other hand re-emerges and becomes apparent, see, Lu, ed., Research
Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
98 Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai,” 30.
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Third, the inflow o f foreign capital created a large population o f managerial
persons and civil servants for China. Since 1978, the FDI flow into China is soaring high:
“ [f]rom 1979 to 1999 China pulled in over $306 billion in utilized FDI, second only to
the United States worldwide. Compared with other socialist or post-socialist economies,
China’s ability to attract FDI has been unprecedented.”99

Table 15. 1978-2004 The Enrollment of Students in 4-Year Colleges and
Universities
Year
1978
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Yearly Enrollment
(in 10,000)
40.2
28.1
61.9
57.2
61.7
67.0
59.7
60.9
62.0
75.4
92.4
90.0
92.6
96.6
100.0
108.4
159.7
220.6
268.3
320.5
382.5

Total Enrollment (in
10,000)
85.6
114.4
170.3
188.0
195.9
206.6
208.2
206.3
204.4
218.4
253.6
279.9
290.6
302.1
317.4
340.9
413.4
556.1
719.1
903.4
1108.6

Yearly Graduate
(in 10,000)
16.5
14.7
31.6
39.3
53.2
55.3
57.6
61.4
61.4
60.4
57.1
63.7
80.5
83.9
82.9
83.0
84.8
95.0
103.6
133.7
187.7

Source: Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, 305-306.

99 Mary E. Gallagher, ‘“ Reform and Openness’ Why China’s Economic Reform have Delayed
Democracy,” World Politics 54 (2002): 346.
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According to the source o f Chinese government, FDI in China is expected to reach
US$100 billion in every year o f the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). More than
US$50 billion foreign direct investment flowed into China in 2002, with the result of
China taking the American place as the world’s largest recipient o f foreign direct
investments.100 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
also predicts that China will overtake the US to become the largest FDI host country in
the world. The inflow o f foreign capital intensified the economic inequalities in Chinese
society: those people who were employed in the sanzi enterprises (i.e., equity joint
venture, contractual joint venture, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises) were better paid
than the rest o f Chinese society. The managers o f the sanzi enterprises were the first
group o f de facto professional managerial workers emerging from the post-Mao China.
Until now, this group o f people has been one o f the major components o f China’s
managerial stratum. As I will discuss in the following Chapters, this group o f people
accepted training from these foreign-related enterprises and learned foreign management
practices and thus were gradually exposed to the influences of foreign culture which
might change their political cultural orientations and attitudes toward political affairs.
Finally, the reform o f enterprises and public organizations stimulated the
formation o f the middle class. The reform o f state-owned enterprises and collective
enterprises made all the managers in these enterprises become a part o f the newlyemerging middle class.101 This group o f managers is the biggest component o f China’s
managerial stratum and it took advantage o f the enterprise reform to gain tremendous

100 “Actually Used FDI in China Exceeds 48 Billion US dlrs,” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 2 January
2003.
101 Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary
China; So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
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personal wealth and outstanding social status.102 The reform o f public organizations
made the previously subordinate professionals become a gradually independent stratum.
Rather than remain dependent on the Party, the professional stratum became more
autonomous in determining their careers and occupational mobility and generally they
have much more say in the management o f public organizations.103

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MIDDLE CLASS
The dramatic change of social structure in the past 50 years tends to suggest the
role of state institutions in influencing the patterns o f social stratification in Chinese
society. What is the relation between the state and the newly-emerging middle class
since the outset o f the Post-Mao reform? The market transition theory suggests that the
Chinese middle class is expected to grow more independently and to occupy a much
more favorable position, since most o f the group holds market power. By contrast the
state-centric framework underscores the continued importance o f the state institutions in
influencing ordinary Chinese citizens’ life chances during the reform era.104 The premise
o f the state-centric model is based on an insight from new institutionalism theories that
the state plays a crucial role in setting up institutional contexts within which social forces
interact.105 Based on this assumption, many scholars suggest that the Chinese middle
class is still far from becoming completely independent; rather this class is dependent

102 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
103 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lam and Perry, “Services Organizations in China.”
104 Bian and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence o f Power;” Nee and Matthews, “Market
Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Rona-Tas, “The First Shall Be
Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism;” Zhou, “Economic
Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics
under State Socialism.”
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upon the state power.106 In the following section, I will discuss the dependence o f the
Chinese middle class from two perspectives: one is the nature o f China’s economic
reform; the other is the development o f corporatist institutions within the Chinese society
since the economic reform.

A. The Nature o f C hina’s Economic Reform
The fundamental characteristic o f China’s economic reform is that it happened
without significant political reform. The party still monopolized the political control over
this country. By asking the question o f why Chinese economic reform could succeed
without political reform, Susan Shirk uses an institutional approach by looking at patterns
of competition among politicians who operate in an institutionalized political setting in
Chinese context to explain the happening o f Chinese economic reform.107 The
fundamental difference between the Soviet and Chinese institutions is that Soviet
economic institutions are more centralized. On the other hand, however, the Chinese
economic institutions are less centralized and the local governments have more autonomy
compared with the Soviet model.

108

Many o f the economic activities in China occurred

outside o f the national plan, which made fewer obstacles in the post-Mao economic
reform. The result o f this institutional difference was that the Soviet Union has to reform

105 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Backin', North, Institutions, Institutional
Change and Economic Performance; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and
Democracy, Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
106 Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Zweig, “Undemocratic
Capitalism;” Gongqin Xiao, “The Rise o f the Technocrats,” Journal o f Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 59-65;
Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China.”
107 Susan L. Shirk, The Logic o f Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1993), 7.
108 Shirk, The Logic o f Economic Reform in China', Andrew G. Walder, “Sociological Dimensions of
China’s Economic Transition: Organization, Stratification, and Social Mobility,” (2003). Stanford
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its centralized economic administrative structure first. The low level o f centralization in
the Chinese institutional setting gives Chinese leaders either at the national level or the
local level more opportunities to initiate economic reforms without political reform, and
encourages the local governments to pursue their own development.109
Starting in 1980, China implemented a fiscal revenue-sharing system between any
two adjacent levels o f governments. The basic idea is that a lower-level regional
government contracts with an upper-level regional government on the total amount (or
share) o f tax and profit revenue to be remitted for the next several years; the lower-level
government keeps the rest.110 These fiscal contracts were fixed so that the division of
revenues among different levels o f governments could be predicted. Rights to flows of
revenues were clarified among different levels of governments. Thus each level of
government was allowed to retain a specified proportion of revenues collected over a
targeted amount and each level o f government had to be responsible for their own
financial budget.111 The importance o f this institutional setting is that it induces a strong
positive relationship between local interests and local economic prosperity at all levels of
governments. This local autonomous system generates considerable pressure on local
*

governments to compete with each other in supporting profit-making enterprises and pro-

University, The W alter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Working Paper, Available [Online]: <
http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/20208/> [28 Feb 2006].
109 Jean C. Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State Corporatism in China,” World
Politics 45, no. 1 (1992): 99-126; and idem, “The Role o f the Local State in C hina’s Transitional
Economy,” The China Quarterly 144 (1995): 1132-49; and idem, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional
Foundations o f Economic Reform (Berkeley: University o f California Press 1999); Shirk, The Logic o f
Economic Reform in China; Andrew G. Walder, “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: an
Organizational Analysis o f China’s Transitional Economy,” American Journal o f Sociology 101, no. 2
(1995): 263-301; and idem, “ Sociological Dimensions o f China’s Economic Transition.”
110 Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political
Basis for Economic Success,” World Politics 48, no. 1 (1996): 50-81.
111 Walder, “Sociological Dimensions o f China’s Economic Transition.”
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growth policies. As argued by Shirk, such a decentralized structure has been the
institutional foundation for rapid economic growth in post-Mao China.112
These financial changes provide for substantial independence o f the local
governments in China, from the provincial to the township, which ensures that
governments in each region assume primary responsibility for economic development in
that region.113 Hence, these governments possess both significant fiscal autonomy from
the central government and considerable independent authority over their economies.
Therefore, the fundamental characteristic o f Chinese economic reforms is that the
intended reform fuses the economy with profit incentives and limited market functions on
a decentralized basis.114 However, this reform produced a hybrid system that still retains
some o f the fundamental features o f a command economy. This halfway place between
planned economy and market economy has the effect of lodging a web o f interests
between local governments and enterprises under their jurisdiction. This web o f interests,
in turn, dictates a pattern of mutually beneficial behavior between these two crucial actors
in the Chinese economy.115
For example, the development o f the sector o f private enterprises in Wenzhou was
the result o f compromise and cooperation between the local society and the agents o f the
local government. Local government and party cadres played a vital role, often colluding
with local society to circumvent those policies adopted in Beijing that might constrain the

112 Shirk, The Logic o f Economic Reform in China.
113 Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success;”
Shirk, The Logic o f Economic Reform in China.
114 Yasheng Huang, “Web o f Interests and Patterns o f Behaviors o f Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies
and Enterprises during Reform,” The China Quarterly 123 (1990): 431-58; Shirk, The Logic o f Economic
Reform in China.
115 Jean Oi termed this collusive pattern between local governments and enterprises under their jurisdiction
“local state corporatism”, see Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State
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growth o f private business.116 In Wenzhou, one o f the widespread forms which private
business took in the 1980s was known as the guahu (the so-called “red hat enterprises”).
Guahu firms attached themselves to an established collective or state unit, trying to avoid
the restrictions of private business. Kristin Parris argues that such new local economic
practices as guahu firms illustrate that even under the existing state institution and
ideology, the local society was able to “work the system” for its own benefit.117 And he
further suggests that in the local level of China there exists the interpenetration o f state
and private business interests, and he calls this close relationship that developed between
them “local state corporatism”.
This collusive pattern of behavior between local bureaucrats and private
enterprise may lead to the formation o f an implicit political coalition between them .118
As a result, “the emerging state-capitalist relation is characterized by the fusion of
political capital of the cadres, [and] the economic capital of the capitalists.” 119 The direct
result o f the de-centralization without political reform is the continued importance of
•

•

state power in the distribution o f resources to different social groups.

n o

As suggested by

Corporatism in China;” and idem, “The Role o f the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and
idem, Rural China Takes Off.
116 Kristin Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform: The Wenzhou Model o f Development,” The
China Quarterly 134 (1993): 242-63.
117 Ibid.
118 Huang, “Web o f Interests and Patterns o f Behaviors o f Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and
Enterprises during Reform;” Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State Corporatism
in China;” and idem, “The Role o f the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural
China Takes Off', Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform.”
119 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 369.
120 For more on this point, please see, Bian and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence o f Power;”
Nee and Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Parish
and Michelson, “Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban
China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism;” Walder, Li, and Treiman,
“Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.” However, on the other hand, the market transition
theory focuses on new market institutions whose advance forges new interests and pushes aside the
importance o f political institutions and emphasizes that the emergence o f a market economy will substitute
the role o f state power in the distribution o f resources within Chinese society, for example see, Nee, “A
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William Parish and Ethan Michelson, the newly-emerged social groups still have a
continuing “need to have linkages with state bureaucrats and state-run enterprises.”121
Figure 1 clearly indicates that the formation o f different social class groups
involves both the role o f state institutions and market institutions. Those people who sit
in the top o f the hierarchy o f both state institutions and market institutions formed the
upper class and it mainly included administrative personnel o f state affairs and social
affairs, and private entrepreneurs. This is an all-powerful hybrid which can be called a
“cadre-capitalist” class. This hybrid state-capitalist class has “monopolized political
capital, economic capital, and social/network capital in the Chinese society”, and its
members are “the beneficiaries o f the existing arrangements o f partial reforms, mixed
economy, and hybrid ownership.”

122

Those people who sit in the bottom o f the hierarchy

o f both state institutions and market institutions form the largest population o f lower class.
The middle class is composed o f those who had medium positions along the hierarchy of
both state institutions and market institutions.
Accordingly, the formation of the middle class in contemporary China follows
two distinct paths. The first is through the state institutions, where middle class positions
in government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises and public organizations are
considered to be “closed” positions, and the access to these positions is subject to
screening for political loyalty and party membership. 123

Theory o f M arket Transition;” and idem, “ Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism;” and idem,
“The Emergence o f a Market Society.”
121 Parish and Michelson, “Politics and M arkets,” 1044.
122 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 369.
123 Walder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.”
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Figure 1. The Two-Track Formation of Middle Class

This sub-group o f the middle class employed in the public sector, which includes the
managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public organizations, and
staff members in the government and party agencies and public organizations, is, in
varying degrees, still affected by state power. The second path is through the market
institutions, where middle class positions in the private sector are considered to be “open”
positions, and the access to these positions is determined by the workings o f the market
institutions. As suggested by Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews: “the shift to markets
opens up alternative sources of rewards not controlled by the redistributive state, and this
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shift thereby reduces dependence on the state.” 124 Thus, this sub-group o f the middle
class employed in the private sector, which includes the managers in the private and
foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers,
and white-collar office workers in the private entities, is much more independent than the
first one in terms o f its relationship to state power.

B. Corporatist Institutions and the Autonomy o f the Middle Class
Philippe Schmitter in his milestone academic work, “Still the Century of
Corporatism?” defines neo-corporatism125 as “a system o f interest representation in which
the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory,
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories,
recognized or licensed by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection o f leaders and articulation o f demands and supports.” 126
With the rise o f neo-corporatism research in developed countries, there is a group
o f scholars who focus on state corporatist practices in the less developed countries. Even

124 Nee and Matthews, “M arket Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism,” 408.
125 It is Philippe Schmitter that first elaborates on the concept o f corporatism and makes distinctions
between two subtypes o f corporatism, societal corporatism and state corporatism. Societal corporatism is
also used as neo-corporatism, liberal corporatism, for example, see, Alan Cawson, Corporatism and
Political Theory (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986); Philippe Schmitter, “Still the Century o f Corporatism?”
Review o f Politics 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-130; Leo Panitch, “The Development o f Corporatism in Liberal
Democracies,” in Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, ed. Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard
Lehmbruch (London: Sage, 1979), 119-46; Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Liberal Corporatism and Party
Government,” Comparative Political Studies 10, no. 1 (1977): 91-126; and idem, “Consociational
Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism,” in Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, ed.
Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (London: Sage, 1979), 53-61. Since neo-corporatism, liberal
corporatism, and societal corporatism refer to the same concept, this study adopts neo-corporatism for the
sake of clarity.
126 Schmitter, “Still the Century o f Corporatism?”
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though both neo-corporatism and state corporatism127 concentrate on the relations
between the state and society, neo-corporatism emphasizes the compromise and
consensus between them, while state corporatism emphasizes state control o f society.
Alan Cawson adopts the measure o f interest contestation to make distinctions among
state corporatism, neo-corporatism, and pluralism.128 The variable underlying this
continuum is the intensity of interest contestation (See Figure 2). Within the framework
o f pluralism, there is complete interest contestation; neo-corporatism stands in the
middle, in which the interest contestation has to be mediated by the corporatist
organizational arrangements; on the other extreme, within the framework o f state
corporatism, there is very limited interest contestation and interest representation is
controlled by the state.

State Corporatism + — ► N eo-Corporatism ^— +■ Pluralism
Interest Contestation

Figure 2. The Relations between State Corporatism, Neo-Corporatism and
Pluralism

127 It is Philippe Schmitter that first elaborates on the concept o f corporatism and makes distinctions
between two subtypes o f corporatism: societal corporatism and state corporatism. State corporatism is also
used as authoritarian corporatism. Since state corporatism and authoritarian corporatism refer to the same
concept, this study adopts state corporatism for the sake o f clarity.
128 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory.
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The theory o f corporatism can explain a) state involvement in the national
economy and b) the dynamics o f interaction between the state and society. When
explaining economic origins o f political decline in the Communist world, scholars
propose that the Communist countries also practice state corporatism to restructure the
state-society relations to promote economic development.129 The Communist countries
practice state corporatism not only for economic development, but also for continued
control o f society. The Communist state creates vertical centralized associations in each
specific sector and places them under strict state control, with the purpose o f pre-empting
any horizontal coalescing o f societal interests resulting from economic development.130
As suggested by David Goodman, the organic theory o f state and society, the
acceptance of “natural” inequalities among people, and the effort to establish corporate
organizations as intermediaries between private entrepreneurs and state agencies are
•

*

evidence o f state corporatism in China.

1^1

Margaret Pearson also emphasizes that the

establishment o f corporatist arrangements in post-Mao China is in the process o f
devolving some of the state’s power to society so as to stimulate economic
development.132 Generally speaking, this process has gone through two stages with
different characters: a) local state corporatism (1978-1992), and b) organized state
corporatism (1992 - now). The period o f local state corporatism is characterized by the
workings o f local government that coordinates economic enterprises in its territory as if it

129 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian M odel,” The Australian
Journal o f Chinese Affairs 33 (1995): 29-53; and idem, ““Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in
an East Asian Context,” in China After Socialism: In the Footsteps o f Eastern Europe or East Asia? ed.
Barrett L. M cCormick and Jonathan Unger (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe), 95-129.
130 Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model.”
131 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
132 Pearson, C h in a ’s New Business Elite.
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was a diversified business corporation.133 As I have discussed, the decentralization
provides incentives and institutional foundations for a strategy o f local state-led
development. This local state corporatism has the effect of lodging a web o f interests
between local state agencies and economic actors under their jurisdiction and thus, in
turn, dictates a pattern of mutually beneficial behaviors between them .134
Since 1992, when Deng Xiaoping campaigned to promote the development o f a
socialist market economy in China, the Chinese government adopted a series o f measures
to restructure the relations between social and economic actors and the state. First, the
Party has made genuine efforts to use corporatist organizations (e.g., Self-Employed
Labourers’ Associations, the Industrial and Commercial Federation, and the Private
Enterprises Association) to link the state with the social and economic actors with the
intention of thereby being able to control. The second measure o f the CCP to connect the
society is to encourage party members to plunge into the sea of business, a step widely
known as xiahai. The third measure of linking the state and society is to recruit the
newly-emerged social groups (e.g., private entrepreneurs, middle class) into the CCP.135
Even the Chinese government does not use the corporatist terminology to describe the
changing relations between the state and society; corporatist structures may exist even in
the absence of an awareness o f corporatism in the state’s doctrine.136
First, these corporatist associations have a dualist nature. On the one hand, the
associations are licensed by the state and under the directives from the state; on the other

133 See Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China;” and idem,
“The Role o f the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural China Takes Off.
134 Huang, “W eb o f Interests and Patterns o f Behaviors o f Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and
Enterprises during Reform;” Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State Corporatism
in China;” and idem, “The Role o f the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural
China Takes Off, Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform.”
135 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China, 107.
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hand, the associations have a limited degree o f delegated self-regulation o f the interests
o f their sectors. According to Bruce Dickson, the associations in China have a dual
function: they are designed to give the state a right to control over organized interests in
society, and also to represent their members’ interests.137 For example, in the sector of
foreign enterprises, the China Association for Enterprises with Foreign Investment
(CAEFI) works as a bridge which links foreign enterprises with the government, in which
the government exerts the control function and foreign enterprises articulate their
interests. Pearson argues that the CAEFI’s role is genuinely Janus-faced and fits the
criteria central to state corporatism: (1) the state sanctioned and established the CAEFI
and its branches; (2) it has granted the CAFEI a de facto monopoly— there is only one
national association in the foreign sector, and each locality has only one branch; (3) a
clear hierarchy exists between the national association and local branches.138
The direct result o f such corporatist institutions is that most middle class persons
are assigned to different corporatist associations, and these associations provide a twoway conduit between the Party-state and the middle class: by top-down transmission of
state directives and control, mobilization of the middle class to register political support
of the Party-state; and by bottom-up transmission o f the interests o f the middle class. As
I will discuss in Chapter V, currently, most formal organizations are corporatist
associations, thus, the sector o f middle class lacks organizational resources to act
collectively to challenge the rule o f the Party-state.

136 Ibid., 61.
137Ibid.
138 M argaret M. Pearson, “The Janus Face o f Business Associations in China: Societalist Corporatism in
Foreign Enterprises,” The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs 3 1 (1994): 25-46.
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Second, because o f the fact that the Party encouraged party members to plunge
into the sea o f business and took efforts to recruit members from the newly-emerged
social groups, the percent o f party memberships in the private sector has increased
dramatically. For example, by the mid-1990s, former party cadres had become the
largest group among private entrepreneurs.139 I have mentioned that the Chinese middle
class can be divided into two sub-groups: public sector and private sector. With the
increase in the percent of party memberships in the private sector, and given the fact that
most managers and staff members in the public sector hold party memberships, one
would expect that the percentage o f party membership within the group o f middle class is
quite high. For example, in a southern city, Shenzhen, around 36 percent of managers
have party credentials, 27 percent o f professionals are party members, and around 14
percent o f small and medium-size private businessmen hold party membership (Table 16).
From Table 16, we see a clear trend: first, the political elites in China— the group of
administrative personnel of state affairs and social affairs all have party credentials;
second, the sector o f the middle class, including managers, professionals, staff members
in the public sector, and small and medium-size private businessmen, ranks second in
terms of the percent o f party membership; third, the traditional leadership class, workers
and peasants, has been made peripheral, and the party membership o f this class has
declined since the beginning of the post-Mao reform. The holding o f party memberships
by middle class individuals indicates the close relations between the group o f middle
class and the Party.

139 Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change.
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Table 16. The Distribution of Party Members in Ten Social Strata in 4 Cities

Administrative Personnel of
State Affairs and Social Affairs
Managerial Personnel
Private Entrepreneurs
Professionals
Civil Servants1
Self-Employed Laborers
(■Getihu) 2
Service Workers
Industry Workers
Peasants
Unemploymed and SemiUnemployed

Shenzhen
100.0

Hefei
77.5

Hanchuan
100.0

35.7
22.2
27.2
28.2
13.7

58.8
24.4
25.2
40.7
10.4

53.8
9.1
17.8
54.5
7.7

0.0
24.0
46.3
5.2

10.4
0.0

7.6
13.3

10.6
5.9
4.3
1.8

3.9
10.3
5.2
3.9

—

2.0

—

9.1

Zhenning
100.0
—

Source: Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China’s Social Classes, 36.
Note: ’. The group o f civil servants equals the sector of white-collar office workers in the
middle class.
2. The group o f self-employed laborers equals the sector o f medium and small-size
businessmen in the middle class.

CONCLUSION
The evolution o f the middle class in Western societies has experienced three
stages and its composition changed accordingly. During the period of capitalist
revolution (which is, from seventeenth to eighteenth century), free-farmers, artisans, and
urban bourgeoisie constituted the main components of the middle class in Western
societies.140 With economic development, the early trade capitalism has been replaced by
industrial capitalism, and the composition of the middle class has changed accordingly.
Starting from the industrial-capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
“a moderately prosperous middle class o f small business people and shopkeepers

140 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New
Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
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replaced the artisans as the middle class o f the industrial-capitalist system.” 141 During
this period, small businessmen, merchandized farmers, and some professionals
constituted the majority o f the middle class. Since World War II, high-tech industrial
capitalism replaced industrial capitalism, and a new type of middle class has emerged and
become the backbone o f the middle class: technocrats, professionals, managers,
bureaucrats, and white-collar office workers,142 and the old middle class o f industrial
capitalism (i.e., small businessmen and merchandized farmers) dramatically shrunk in the
composition o f the middle class. The evolution o f the middle class in Western societies
can be better demonstrated by Table 17.

Table 17. The Evolution of Western Middle Class

The
Composition
of Middle
Class

Trade-Capitalism
(seventeenth and
eighteenth century)

Industrial-Capitalism
(nineteenth and twentieth
century before WWII)

High-Tech
Industrial-Capitalism
(since WWII)

Artisans and Freefarmers

Small Businessmen,
Shopkeepers, Farmers
and Professionals

Old Middle Class,
Technocrats,
Professionals,
Managers,
Bureaucrats, and
White-Collar
Workers

Unlike the Western middle class, the development of China’s middle class was
extremely influenced by national politics and government policies. In the past one

141 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective, 158.
142 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New
Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Kahl, The American Class Structure', Mills, White
Collar, Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism', Wright, Class Counts.
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hundred years, the change o f state institutions and government policies dictated the
patterns o f social stratification in Chinese society. Until the early twentieth century,
China was still far away from the modern world in any sense. Industrial output
represented only a tiny part o f GDP; and most Chinese people were peasants. With
economic development and slow industrialization in the first part o f the twentieth
century, a middle class emerged in China, including managerial personnel, professionals,
small businessmen, and white-collar office workers. Before the establishment of
People’s Republic of China in 1949, managerial personnel, professionals, small
businessmen, and white-collar office workers constituted approximately 7% o f Chinese
population.
After 1949, China’s society has been characterized by a statist society which was
ruled by a strong Leninist Party, and private economy has been gradually eliminated, and
private entrepreneurs, small and medium-size businessmen, and independent
professionals had disappeared within Chinese society.143 During this period, the Party
successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent middle class into an obedient stratum.
However, since the onset o f post-Mao reform, Chinese society has become differentiated
and divided. Obvious patterns o f social stratification re-emerged within Chinese society.
The middle class has emerged and become an important social force and will increasingly
characterize China’s social stratification. The more independent managerial and

143 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism', Lu,
ed., Social M obility in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary
China.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
professional strata, the expanding civil servants, and the newly emerging small and
medium-size businessmen constitute the majority o f this newly emerging middle class.144
The composition o f China’s new middle class is different from its Western
counterparts. Free-farmers or merchanized farmers never became an important part of
China’s middle class. More importantly, the rise o f the middle class in China is a direct
consequence of rapid state-led economic development in the last two decades. The
activities o f the party-state have been the primary source of the formation o f the middle
class in China: those civil servants and managerial and professional strata from the
government and Party agencies, government-affiliated administrative units and stateowned enterprises constitute more than half o f China’s new middle class.145
Given this unique social context, I expect that the political orientations o f the
Chinese middle class are not unified but divided and I emphasize that the division o f the
middle class between the public sector and the private sector tends to produce different
views toward democracy. The middle class individuals employed in the public sector
have close relations with the Communist Party and government and enjoy many
privileges sanctioned by the Party and government, thus they have a vested interest to
maintain the status quo. As Luigui Tomba observed, members o f the Chinese middle
classes whose social status is dependent upon the Party-state (e.g., professionals in the
public sector) “are generally supportive of the present national leadership and feel that
their social status today is largely dependent on the reform policies and the present

144 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary
C hina’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social
Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f Social Stratification in Contemporary
China', So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
145 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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program to manage the economy.” 146 As a result, they may not demand a transparent,
democratic political system; instead they are concerned about that the dramatic change of
current political system may endanger their interests since they may lose those privileges
that they are currently enjoying from the Party-state.
On the other hand, the subgroup o f the middle class employed in the private
sector (i.e., the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in
the private sector, self-employed laborers, and white-collar office workers in the private
entities) can reasonably be expected to champion the cause o f democracy. These middle
class individuals employed in the private sector are much more independent from the
Communist Party and government, since the career successes o f this subgroup o f middle
class were dependent upon their market power rather than upon patron-client relations
with the Party-state.

146 Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing,” 24.
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CHAPTER IV
DOES CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT DEMOCRACY?

This chapter attempts to address the crucial question o f whether the middle class
in China thinks democratically by examining the attitudinal orientations o f the middle
class toward a variety o f political issues and compares the middle class’ political attitudes
toward these issues with the rest of the Chinese population. The individual-level theory
o f the middle class in the West suggests that middle class individuals do think
democratically; that is, they have attitudes in support o f democratic principles. This
argument is based on three explanations: rational choice theory, learning-generalization
theory, and social interaction theory.
This dissertation argues that the Chinese middle class has a divided view on
democracy. As documented in the previous chapter, due to the continued importance o f
the state institutions during the reform era, at least one half of the Chinese middle class is
employed in the public sector. The middle class individuals employed in the public
sector have close relations with the Party-state and enjoy many privileges sanctioned by
the Party-state; on the other hand, the middle class individuals in the private sector are
much more independent from the Party-state and generally they are not entitled to the
government benefits that are enjoyed by the group of the public-sector middle class. This
division within the Chinese middle class, of course, has important theoretical
implications: the two sub-groups o f the middle class may have different views on selfinterest and socio-political life. In this chapter, I will continue my discussion o f the
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differences between the two sub-groups o f the middle class and compare their attitudinal
orientations toward democracy.

WHY POLITICAL ATTITUDES MATTER?
When explaining the conditions that give rise to American democracy, Alexis de
Tocqueville emphasized the importance of egalitarian norms in American society,1 and
thereby ignited the research on the role o f political culture in democracy. Contemporary
democracy theorists have achieved a consensus that a set of pro-democratic values held at
the individual level is conducive to the establishment and consolidation o f democracy.
Democracy theorists identify certain distinctive clusters o f democratic attitudes that are
widely held among individuals, such as the belief in popular sovereignty, commitment to
• •

.

.

.

.

.

the equality o f citizens, and the principle o f majoritarian decision-making.

2

These

clusters o f democratic attitudes are durable and form subjective orientations that are seen
as the driving force for the emergence and maintenance of democracy.
Traditional Chinese political culture has always been regarded as an obstacle to
democratic transition.4 Confucian culture “emphasized the group over the individual,

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner, translated by
George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
2 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); J. Ronald Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979); and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The
University o f Chicago Press, 1956).
3 Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, “A Renaissance o f Political Culture?” American Journal o f
Political Science 40, no. 3 (1996): 632-59; and idem, “Social Capital and Politics,” Annual Review o f
Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 47-73; Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural,
Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and idem,
“The Renaissance o f Political Culture,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203-30.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, “D em ocracy’s Third W ave,” Journal o f Democracy 2 (1992): 12-35; Lucian W.
Pye, The M andarin and the Cadre: C hina’s Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the
University o f M ichigan, 1988); and idem, The Spirit o f Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992); Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f
Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights” and “lacked a tradition o f rights
against the state.” Within the Confucian society, “harmony and cooperation were
preferred over disagreement and competition” and “the maintenance o f order and respect
for hierarchy were central values.”5 Therefore, traditional Chinese political culture is
attributed as being non-democratic or anti-democratic. Moreover, the Chinese people
have often been characterized by political apathy, ignorance o f politics, fear o f politics,
and political intolerance.6
In addition, some China analysts suggest that the Chinese people will choose
socio-political stability over democracy because they are afraid that the transition to
democracy may cause socio-political chaos.7 Moreover, the CCP has used the example
o f socio-political chaos in former Soviet Republics and East European countries after the
fall of communist regimes to persuade the Chinese people that political stability is a
prerequisite for national economic health and the individual’s general well-being.

o

Furthermore, since 1990, nationalism has become increasingly popular within the
Chinese population; indeed some empirical studies report that the Chinese people have
demonstrated strong nationalist sentiment.9 It is argued that the Chinese government has
made efforts to promote nationalism in order to block Western influences and buttress its

5 Huntington, “D em ocracy’s Third W ave,” 24.
6 Andrew J. N athan and Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from A
Survey,” Daedalus 122, no. 2 (1993): 95-123.
7 Lijun Qiao and Tianze Chen, China Cannot Afford Chaos (Beijing: Chinese Party School Press, 1994).
8 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China', Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “Valuation o f Individual
Liberty vs. Social Order among Democratic Supporters: A Cross-Validation,” Political Research Quarterly
53, no. 2 (2000): 427-39.
9 For example, see Jie Chen, “Urban Chinese Perceptions o f Threats from the United States and Japan,”
Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (2001): 254-66; and idem, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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legitimacy in the 1990s.10 The direct result o f such strong nationalist sentiment is that
China’s state-led nationalism has triumphed over the appeal o f democracy.11
However, some recent field observations on contemporary Chinese political
culture suggest that there is evidence for the emergence of democratic values in China.

12

These studies based their conclusions on the results of public opinion surveys and suggest
that Chinese political culture is in transition. As summarized by Suzanne Ogden, China
•

shows some signs o f a democratic political culture.

IT

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND HYPOTHESES
What is the political orientation o f the Chinese middle class? Specifically, does
the Chinese middle class have the same democratic attitudes as its counterparts in the
developed countries?
The predominant view, within the individual-level studies o f the middle class in
the West, suggests that middle class individuals do think democratically: that is, they

10 Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences o f China’s Patriotic
Fervor,” in Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000, ed. Shiping Hua (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2001), 103-32;
Suisheng Zhao, “We are Patriots First and Democrats Second: The Rise o f Chinese Nationalism in the
1990s,” in What i f China doesn't Democratize? Implications fo r War and Peace, ed. Edward Friedman and
Barrett L. M cCormick (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 21-48.
11 Zhao, “We are Patriots First and Democrats Second.”
12 Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, “Culture Shift and Regime Legitimacy: Comparing Mainland China,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong,” in Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000, ed. Shiping Hua (Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, 2001), 320-47; Daniel V. Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, “The Prospects for
Democratization in China: Evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study,” in China and Democracy:
Reconsidering the Prospects fo r a Democratic China, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000),
189-206; Nathan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China;” Suzanne Ogden, Inklings o f
Democracy in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002); Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Values
and Democracy in the People’s Republic o f China,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 540-59; Jie Chen and
Yang Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China: Emerging Public Support for a
Democratic Political System,” Problems o f Post-Communism 45, no. 1 (1998): 30-42; Yanlai Wang,
Nicholas Rees, and Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan, “Economic Change and Political Development in
China: Findings from a Public Opinion Survey,” Journal o f Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (2004): 203-22.
13 Ogden, Inklings o f democracy in China.
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have attitudes in support o f democratic principles.14 This argument is based on three
explanations: rational choice theory, learning-generalization theory, and social interaction
theory. These general arguments form the theoretical basis for my assessment o f the
political attitudes o f the middle class people in urban China.

A. Rational Choice Theory
The fundamental assumption of rational choice theory is that political interaction
is basically an economic transaction that is guided in its course by the actor’s rational
choices among alternative outcomes.15 In the political realm, rational individuals pursue
“utility maximization, or under conditions o f uncertainty, expected utility
maximization.”16 Democracy theorists (e.g., Seymour Lipset, Ronald Glassman) employ
rational choice theory to argue that middle class individuals support democracy because
they perceive democracy to be the best form o f government to protect their interests.
Class theorists believe that social class status determines the interests o f the
people, that individuals have full knowledge o f their interests, and that they know which
form o f government will best help them to secure these interests. For example, according
to the radical Marxist thinkers, the working class’ interest is to liberate itself from the
fetters o f the political system implemented by the exploitative class and to form an equal
14 For example, see Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification
with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political
Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Milbrath, Political Participation; Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The
Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government;” Lipset, Political
Man.
15 Fore more on this point, see Mary Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1998); Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational
Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and
Structure, ed. M ark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 19-41; Donald Green and lan Shapiro, Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theory: A Critique o f
Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Anthony Downs, An
Economic Theory o f Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
16 Green and Shapiro, Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theory.
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and classless society, while the exploitative class’ interest is to perpetuate their ownership
of the means o f production and preserve their exploitative relations with the working
class. Accordingly, the working class is more supportive of a socialist government,
while the exploitative class is more supportive of a repressive state.
The quasi-Marxist scholar Barrington Moore has argued that the class o f large
landlords is the most implacable advocate o f a repressive state because they rely heavily
on state power to maintain their “labor repressive” production. He has also suggested
that the bourgeoisie class might be a democratic force.17 As owners o f large-size
business, the bourgeoisie has an interest in less state intervention in their market activities
and in a well-functioning and independent market for business. 18 However, the
democratic impulse o f the bourgeoisie can be overestimated. On many occasions, the
bourgeoisie has relied on the power o f a repressive state to acquire monopolies,
government subsidies, favorable market position and cheap labor.19
Unlike members o f other social classes, middle class individuals have strongly
supportive attitudes toward democracy because they realize that democracy thus far is the
best system to protect their individual rights and property. Unlike members o f the upper
classes who not only own much larger properties but usually enjoy formal or informal
clientelist ties with the state power that could be used to protect their properties and other
interests, those of the middle class generally lack these close connections with powerful

17 Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the M aking o f
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
18 Glassman, The M iddle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy.
19 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy', Ruth Berins Collier,
Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Guillermo O ’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute o f International Studies,
University o f California, 1973).
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political patrons.20 Without these political connections, middle class citizens have to rely
on such democratic institutions as the popular election o f leaders and the limitation of
state power to protect their own rights and property from the actions o f powerful
intruders (e.g., the government and its officials).21
According to the conceptualization employed in this dissertation, the middle class
in urban China includes mainly four occupational groups— self-employed laborers,
managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants. Like their counterparts in
Western societies, most members o f these groups own a relatively substantial amount of
property: all entrepreneurs own their businesses, while most managerial personnel,
professionals, and white-collar office workers possess at least their apartments.

22

Does

the Chinese middle class perceive democracy as the best form o f government to protect
its property?
Two sub-groups of the Chinese middle class have different opinions in regard to
this question. The middle class people employed in the public sector have close relations
with the Party-state and thus they may rely on those ties with the Party-state to assure the
protection o f their property. Moreover, the public-sector middle class enjoys many
privileges sanctioned by the Party-state; thus it has a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo. For example, my interview with Mr. B, a middle-level manager in a stateowned enterprise, reflects this orientation. Mr. B said:
“If my interest was impinged on, I have many ways to solve the problem. And I
believe that I am situated in a good position in this society to be able to protect

20 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
21 Ibid.
22 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in
Urban China;” Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing.”
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my own interest... .Democracy.. .No, I do not need democracy to protect my
interest... .1 do not think people like me need democracy.”
However, the middle class people employed in the private sector show a completely
different attitude toward democracy. This group of the middle class in the private sector
usually does not have close relations with the Party-state, and its material well-being
mainly derives from the market institutions; thus it does not have to be dependent on the
Party-state. On many occasions, when their interests are impinged on, the private-sector
middle class people lack any powerful political patron to help them and very often have
to rely on legal weapons; thus the private-sector middle class people have a fairly strong
demand for an institutionalized democracy. For example, my interview with Mr. D, an
owner o f small company which employed 6 people, reflects this orientation. Mr. D said:
“Government does not respect the interest of private enterprises, especially the
small ones. The policy-making process is not transparent, and the policies change
so fast....My company is very small, and I have many parents such as Bureau of
Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Tax and so on. To maintain good relations
with these parents, you have to bribe them ... .1 hate th at... .Democracy is good.
Under democracy, we can use our votes to express our interests, to make
government respect our interests.”
As mentioned before, all middle class individuals possess at least their apartments.
Prior to the period o f reform, urban residents did not have the ownership o f their
apartments. Legally, the ownership o f all apartments belonged to the Party-state. All
urban residents were assigned to different work units, which offered urban residents free
housing.23 Since 1978, the Chinese government took steps to privatize the housing and

23 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing-, Tang and Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform', Zhou, The
State and Life Chances in Urban China', Martin King Whyte, “The Politics o f Life Chances in the People’s
Republic o f China,” in Power and Policy in the PRC, ed. Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview
Press, 1985), 244-65.
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the Party-state no longer provided free housing.24 Therefore, all urban residents have to
purchase apartments either through the work units at subsidized rates or through the
market at higher market rates. As a result, the privatization o f housing created two types
o f home ownerships: commercial apartment (shangpingfang) ownership and work-unit
subsidized apartment (danwei fu li fang) ownership. Usually, the private-sector middle
class has the commercial apartment ownership; while the public-sector middle class has
the work-unit subsidized apartment ownership.

25

Just like their Western counterparts, the Chinese middle class may also be
inclined to take actions to deal with problems that affect their apartment property. But
the two sub-groups react to these problems differently. The public-sector middle class
tends to contact their work units to solve these problems if its apartment property is being
impinged on. Such behavior perhaps reflects the underlying fact that this group has close
ties with the Party-state and thus it has institutional channels to voice its concerns. On
the other hand, the private-sector middle class tends to organize itself to act collectively.
Many studies have documented lots o f collective acts by the private-sector middle class
in defending its property rights.26 For example, the private-sector middle class has
organized its own associations, such as home-owners’ associations, to bargain

24 Yaping W ang and Alan Murie, “The Process o f Commercialisation o f Urban Housing in China,” Urban
Studies 33, no. 6 (1996): 971-89; Rebecca L.H. Chiu, “Commodification o f Housing with Chinese
Characteristics,” Policy Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2001): 75-95.
25 For more on this point, see Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and HomeOwner Self-Organization in Urban China;” Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class;” Chiu,
“Commodification o f Housing with Chinese Characteristics.”
26 For example, see Cai, “China’s M oderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New
Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China;” “Yige mingxing shequ de liyi boyi”
(The Rights Struggle o f A Star Community), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang Weekend), 29 May 29 2003;
“Quan Beijing youchanzhe lianhe qilai” (All Home Owners in Beijing Unite), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang
Weekend), 14 August 14 2003.
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collectively with the government and the property developing companies.27 Such
collective act reflects the democratic aspirations o f the private-sector middle class. As
Mrs. H in her interview said:
“We spent our money buying our apartments. The government could not impinge
on our interests on its own will. If that happens, we have no other choices but to
organize ourselves and bargain with the government collectively.”
The Iron Tower {tie ta) Right Protection campaign of 2005 is a good example o f
the democratic impulse of the private-sector middle class. In this case, residents o f the
H u i’long’guan Community in Beijing’s Changping District launched a community rights
campaign— the so-called Right Protection. Local government wanted to construct a
telecom building close the Hui ’long ’guan Community. Residents o f the Ilid 'long ’guan
Community believed that the electromagnetic radiation of the antenna in the telecom
building may impair their health and thus they strongly opposed the construction of this
building. Most o f the residents are young intellectuals and business people from the
private sector, and they have a strong sense o f democratic values. In this case, the
residents’ awareness o f their rights has been awakened and they called for more
democratic and transparent community self-governance 28 In the last five years, incidents
relating to property-rights protection have increased in large and medium-sized cities.
Owners of commercial apartments, most o f whom are members o f the private-sector
middle class, have engaged in many activities to protect their property, such as collecting
signatures through Internet online forum, organizing home-owners’ associations, and

27 Cai, “China’s M oderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
28 Ren Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights: Organizations to Protect Homeowners’ Rights are an Indication
that Community Politics are on the Rise,” Beijing Review 48, no. 30 (2005): 34-35.
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calling for a more democratic decision-making process than currently prevails in the
management o f community affairs. 29
In the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction o f Urban Residential Communities,”
I asked Beijing residents the following question: “If your apartment property has been
impinged on, what will you do?” It is not surprising to see that 60 percent o f the publicsector middle class would choose to contact the leaders of the work units. On the other
hand, more than 70 percent o f the private-sector middle class would take one o f the
following actions: contacting the newspaper, going to court, and organizing associations
of property owners to act collectively (Table 18), all o f which may be regarded as more
democratic in nature than the act of contacting the leaders of the work units.

Table 18. Comparison of Measures of Rights Resistance between the Two Sub
groups of the Middle Class
If your apartment property
has been impinged on, what
will you do?
Contacting the leaders of
work units
Contacting government
officials at all levels
Organizing associations of
property owners to work
collectively
Suing in court
Contacting the newspaper or
other media

Public-Sector Middle
Class
(%)
60

Private-Sector Middle
Class
(%)
0

20

23

3

20

5
12

14
43

29 For example, see Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” “Yezhu weiquan shouduan jilie, guifan
shichang xuyao juexin” (Homeowners’ Rights Resistance Escalates and Determination is Needed to
Regulate the Market), Zhongguo jingying bao (China Business News), 18 August 2003; “Yezhu zai
xingdong” (Homeowners are Taking Action), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang Weekend), 14 August 2003; Ben
Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level,” Far Eastern Economic Review 166, no. 42 (2003): 35-37;
“Yezhu weiyuanhui— yezhu weiquan heyi cheng xianxiang” (Home-Owners’ Associations— Why is the
H om eowners’ Rights Resistance so Widespread)? Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 17 December 2004.
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B. Learning-Generalization Theory
According to learning-generalization theory, subjective attitudes and habits
cultivated in one social sphere will affect attitudes and behavior in other spheres as
well.30 Democracy theorists (e.g., Ronald Glassman) employ this theory to argue that the
democratic orientations o f middle class individuals are generated by the subjective
attitudes and habits that they have learned in their social lives. As small property owners,
the relation o f middle class individuals “was a relation not of command and obedience
but of man-to-man bargaining. Any one man’s decisions, with reference to every other
man, were decisions o f freedom and o f equality.”31 Middle class individuals are likely to
treat others as equals and accept bargaining as a normal way of dealing with people if
they want to achieve consensus in the market and their social life.32 This spirit of
equality and bargaining can be transferred to their political life.33 Thus, middle class
individuals who are accustomed to bargaining in their economic and social life tend to
emphasize the importance o f bargaining in their political life, which is one o f the most
important aspects o f the spirit o f democracy.34
Moreover, according to learning-generalization theory, the job conditions o f the
middle class will affect their subjective attitudes through a process o f learning from the
job and generalizing what has been learned to other social and political realms.35 For

30 Karl Marx, Early Writings, edited and translated by T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964);
and idem, The Grundrisse, edited and translated by David McLellan (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
31 Mills, White Collar, 8.
32 Ibid.
33 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990); Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective.
34 Ibid.
35 Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Im pact o f Social
Stratification (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1983); Melvin L. Kohn and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Social
Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis o f the United States and Poland (Cambridge: Basil
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example, white-collar professionals who do intellectually demanding work will exercise
•

.

.

.

their intellectual expertise not only on the job but also in their social and political lives.

35

Business owners managing small or medium-sized businesses will value the concept of
self-direction and independence more highly in all social and political spheres.37
Furthermore, the experience o f running a business and supervising others and/or
possessing intellectual expertise makes middle class people feel competent to run
•jo

political organizations.

Thus, middle class persons tend to regard political leaders as

colleagues rather than god or heroes 39 and consequently are inclined to regard the
performance o f political leaders as something to be evaluated, which, in turn, leads to
democratic aspirations and appeals.
Has the Chinese middle class learned these modern attitudes? Regarding this
question, two sub-groups o f the Chinese middle class show different attitudes: on the one
hand, the public-sector middle class carries less o f the spirit o f equality and compromise
and registers no support for the conception of self-direction and independence. However,
the private-sector middle class has a higher level o f both the spirit o f equality and
compromise and the conception o f self-direction and independence.

Blackwell, 1990); James S. House, “Social Structure and Personality,” in Social Psychology: Sociological
Perspectives, ed. Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 525-61.
36 Kohn and Slomczynski, Social Structure and Self-Direction; Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, “The
Reciprocal Effects o f the Substantive Complexity o f Work and Intellectual Flexibility: A Longitudinal
Assessment,” American Journal o f Sociology 84 (1978): 24-52; and idem, Work and Personality.
37 Kohn and Slomczynski, Social Structure and Self-Direction; Cobum and Edwards, “Job Control and
Child-Rearing Values;” Jeylan T. Mortimer and Jon Lorence, “Work Experience and Occupational Values
Socialization: A Longitudinal Study,” American Journal o f Sociology 84 (1979): 1361-85; and idem,
“Occupational Experience and the Self-Concept: A Longitudinal Study,” Social Psychology Quarterly 42
(1979): 307-23.
38 Lane, Political Life.
39 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical
Perspective.
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As documented in the previous chapter, the private-sector middle class mainly
includes the managers in the private and sanzi enterprises,40 professionals in the non
public sector, private entrepreneurs o f small and medium businesses and those whitecollar office workers in the non-public entities. The members o f the private-sector
middle class are actively involved in the market economy and their success and career are
determined by the market institutions.41
The everyday transactions with other people in the marketplace enable the
private-sector middle class to understand two o f the essential characteristics o f the market
economy: equality and negotiation. In the marketplace, all parties involved in the
transaction are equal: there is no relationship o f command and obedience but rather one
o f bargaining between peers. The completion o f any transaction depends on the
willingness of all involved parties. Moreover, during the transaction, all involved parties
will bargain with each other and achieve a desirable result that is acceptable for all parties.
For example, my interview with Mr. M, a middle-level manager o f a big private
enterprise, reflects this orientation. Mr. M said:
“The market means a free transaction between two people, one o f which has
something to sell; and the other has the money to buy... .The relationship between
them is equal. You can not force one party to sell, and you can not force the other
party to buy either. The transaction shall be based on the negotiation o f both
parties.”
In addition, the experiences of running business and supervising others and/or
possessing intellectual expertise in the marketplace enable the private-sector middle class
40 Sanzi enterprises refers to those foreign-related enterprises such as equity joint venture, contractual joint
venture, and solely foreign-owned enterprises.
41 For more on this point, please see, Bian and Logan, “M arket Transition and the Persistence o f Power;”
Nee and M atthews, “M arket Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Parish
and Michelson, “Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban
China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism;” Lu, ed., Social Mobility
in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China; Zhang,
Conflict and Uncertainty.
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to attain the values of self-direction and independence. Self-employed people in small or
medium-sized businesses usually make their own decisions in their daily management
and it is therefore natural for them to value highly the concepts o f self-direction and
independence in their social life.42 Managers in the non-public sector such as private and
sanzi enterprises are used to making their decisions without consultation with the
government and Party cadres. Furthermore, their promotions and career are not
determined by the Party-state, but rather by their job performance. Such independence in
their daily work activities and career choices will gradually be transferred to their sense
o f self-direction and independence in the non-work areas of life. Professionals in the
non-public sector possess intellectual expertise in their areas o f work and they seek their
own opportunities for upward mobility in the marketplace by using their intellectual
expertise. This authority in regard to their work life and personal development endows
those professionals with a sense o f self-direction and independence in their non-work
life.43
In regard to these qualities, special attention shall be given to the group of
managers in sanzi enterprises. They are the first group o f the Chinese people that
accepted training from these foreign-related enterprises and learned foreign management
practices, and in the course o f doing so brought the new idea o f Western market culture
to China, acting as a bridge linking the reforming China and the Western world. Because
42 For example, see Wentao Xiao, “Zhongguo zhongjian jieceng de xianzhuang he weilai fazhan” (The
Current Situation and Future Development o f China’s Middle Stratum), Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological
Research) 2001, no. 3: 93-98; Wei Zhang, “Zhongchan jieceng yu zhengzhi zhixu” (The Middle Class and
Political Order), Jianghan luntan (Jianghan Forum) 2004, no. 1: 5-9.
43 For example, as Wei Zhang documented, the professionals and managers in the private sector have
m odem attitudes such as independence and self-direction. Because unlike the professionals and managers
in the public sector who relied on the Party-state for employment, promotion, medical care, and housing,
the professionals and managers in the private sector had to rely on themselves. Please see his book,
Conflict and Uncertainty. And also, please see Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Zheng and
Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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they were exposed to the influences o f foreign culture, this group of managers in sanzi
enterprises gradually acquired modern values such as those of self-direction and
independence in their daily lives, and later on they spread these values to the rest o f the
Chinese population. Additionally, in their daily work in the foreign-related enterprises,
this group o f managers in sanzi enterprises became exposed to modern democratic ideas
such as those o f equality, individual freedom, and responsive government. As some
empirical studies show, managers in sanzi enterprises function as a transmission belt for
democratic ideas from the Western world to China.44
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class mainly includes the managers in
the state-owned enterprises, professionals in public organizations, and staff members in
the government and party agencies and public organizations. This group o f the publicsector middle class is still largely involved in the state power and their success and career
are determined by the state institutions.45
Unlike the marketplace, the relations within the state institution are not
characterized by equality and compromise, but by command and obedience. The
everyday transactions within the state institutions are not conducive to the cultivation of
modern values such as the spirit o f equality and negotiation. Instead, the daily practices

44 For more on this point, please see Doug Guthrie, Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: the Emergence o f
Capitalism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Michael A. Santoro, Profits and
Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Qiuzhi
Xue and Hui Zhuge, “Kuoguo gongsi yu zhongguo zhongchan jieceng de xingcheng yu fayu”
(Transnational Corporations and the Formation and Development o f the Chinese Middle Class), Guanli
shijie (M anagement World) 1999, no. 4: 171-81.
45 W alder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime;” Parish and Michelson,
“Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China;” Bian
and Logan, “M arket Transition and the Persistence o f Power.”
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within the state institutions tend to reinforce those values such as obedience and respect
for hierarchy.46
In addition, the experiences o f obeying orders from the Party-state make the
public-sector middle class less likely to be familiar with modern values such as selfdirection and self-independence. Moreover, unlike the private-sector middle class, the
public-sector middle class has less control over their upward mobility and career. Rather,
occupational advancement and mobility for the public-sector middle class are dictated by
the Party-state.47 The little control they have over their own life opportunities makes it
less likely for the public-sector middle class people to learn modem values such as those
o f self-direction and self-independence.
To compare the attitudinal differences between these two sub-groups o f the
middle class with regard to the values such as those o f equality and negotiation, as well
as the concepts o f self-direction and independence, I asked my respondents the following
questions in the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction o f Urban Residential
Communities” :
1. Do you think that the interpersonal relations (or interpersonal transactions)
shall be conducted in an equal way?
2. Shall we respect the idea that all people in modern society are entitled to have
their own particular interest?
3. Do you think that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to negotiate
with each other?

46 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
47 Walder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime;” Chunling Li, Duanlie
y u suipian: dangdai zhongguo shehui jieceng fenhua shizheng fen xi (Cleavage and Fragment: An Empirical
Analysis on the Social Stratification o f the Contemporary China) (Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian
chubanshe, 2005); Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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4. To what extent do you believe that you have control over the success in your
life?
As Table 19 clearly indicates, over 70 percent o f the public-sector middle class
does not support the idea o f equal relations in the social interactions, while over 80
percent o f the private-sector middle class does support this idea. With regard to the
matter o f their confidence in their control over their lives, more than 90 percent o f the
people in the private-sector middle class have this confidence, while only 30 percent o f
the people in the public-sector middle class register such confidence. W ith regard to the
value o f negotiation, 95 percent o f the private-sector middle class people agree that all
people in modem society are entitled to have their own particular interest, and 96 percent
o f them agree that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to negotiate with each
other. On the other hand, only 43 percent o f the public-sector middle class people agree
that all people in modern society are entitled to have their own particular interest, and
only 47 percent of them agree that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to
negotiate with each other.

C. Social Interaction Theory
According to social interaction theory, people tend to interact with members of
their own class and these intra-class interactions tend to strengthen the individuals’
existing political attitudes. So, because the other middle class individuals that they tend
to interact with typically support democracy, middle class individuals’ social interactions
tend to strengthen their support for democracy.
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Table 19. Comparison of Modern Spirit of Equality and Independence between the
Two Sub-groups of the Middle Class
Private-Sector Middle
Class

Do you think that the
interpersonal relations
(or interpersonal
transactions) shall be
conducted in an equal
way?
Shall we respect the
idea that all people in
modem society are
entitled to have their
own particular interest?
Do you think that the
best way to cooperate
in modern society is to
negotiate with each
other?
To what extent do you
believe that you have
control over the success
in your life?

Public-Sector Middle
Class

Positive
Response
(%)

Negative
Response
(%)

Positive
Response
(%)

Negative
Response
(%)

80

20

30

70

95

5

43

57

96

4

47

53

93

7

30

70
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Social interaction theory argues that members o f different social classes have
different social interaction networks, especially outside the workplace, and they will tend
to acquire ways o f thinking and behavior through interacting with others.48 As my
analysis unfolds in Chapter II, social interaction is a principal mediating mechanism by
which class positions affect individual political attitudes and action, because “people tend
to inter-act with each other in terms o f their objective class position, and such interaction
is a prerequisite for the capacity to perform successfully class-related political roles.”49
According to Heinz Eulau, class positions determine individuals’ social interaction
networks, and the social interaction per se influences the development o f individuals’
class-appropriate ways o f thinking and behavior.50 This is a mutually reinforcing process.
Once class-appropriate ways o f thinking and behavior have formed, they will guide
individuals’ social interaction in political realms.
In the Western societies, middle class individuals have strongly supportive
attitudes toward democracy because they realize that democracy is the best system to
protect their individual rights and property. Social interaction among middle class
individuals will tend to strengthen such attitudinal orientations. Moreover, social
interaction will help middle class individuals translate such attitudinal orientations into
the class-appropriate ways of political thinking: middle class individuals shall think
democratically. In sum, middle class individuals tend to interact with those who are also
members o f the middle class and are more likely to exhibit democratic thinking in their

48 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects
o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government;” M elvin L. Kohn, Class
and Conformity: A Study in Values (Homewoord, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1969).
49 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” 524.
50 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” and idem, “Identification with Class and
Political Perspective.”
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everyday lives. If this is true, class-appropriate ways o f political thinking would arise
“through mechanisms o f social learning and reinforcement.”51 Does this hold true for
China’s newly rising middle class?
The two sub-groups o f the Chinese middle class have distinctively different social
networks. First, the people in the private-sector middle class tend to interact with those
who are also from the private sector. For example, private entrepreneurs o f small and
medium-sized businesses tend to interact with each other, and they exchange information
regarding business opportunities through such networks. In the 2004 Beijing interview
on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” I asked my respondents the
following interview question: “In your social networks, who do you interact with most
often and closely?” Most private entrepreneurs o f small and medium businesses have
chosen “private entrepreneurs o f small and medium businesses” as the people with whom
they interact most often and closely.
And also, I observed that managers in the private sector tend to interact with other
managers in the private sector; and professionals in the private sector tend to interact with
other professionals in the private sector. The close interaction within the private-sector
middle class has created a class-appropriate culture, including lifestyles, attitudes and
behaviors. For example, my interview with Mrs. O, a middle-level manager o f a big
foreign enterprise, typically conveyed this pattern. Mrs. O said:
“We have different social networks (quanzi). And there are different cultures and
norms for different social networks. It is natural for middle class in the private
sector to gather around... .People usually call the middle class in the private sector
‘bourgeoisie (xiaozi) ', since we have very distinctive social lifestyles.”

51 Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations
towards Government,” 473.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135
Since the private-sector middle class tends to interact with each other, this close
interaction may reinforce these modern values such as those o f equality and negotiation,
as well as o f self-direction and independence, and may reinforce the perception o f
democracy as the best form o f governance.
Second, the people in the public-sector middle class tend to interact with those
who are also from the public sector. In my 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class and
its Political Attitudes and Behavior”, I observed that managers in the public sector tend to
interact with other managers in the public sector, professionals in the public sector tend to
interact with other professionals in the public sector, and white-collar office workers in
the public sector tend to interact with other white-collar office workers in the public
sector. Moreover, the people in the public-sector middle class clearly understand the
difference between them and those in the private sector. As Mrs. P, a university
professor, said:
“It is very clear that those middle class in the private sector are different from us.
And we have different social networks. I seldom make friends with those middle
class individuals from the private sector... .We still rely on the government, and
they rely on the market. Thus, it is so natural that they have their own networks
and form their own culture; and we have our own networks and form our own
culture.”
Since the public-sector middle class tends to interact with each other, this close
interaction may reinforce those traditional orientations such as the values o f respect for
hierarchy and the concepts o f reliance on the Party-state, and may also reinforce their
undemocratic orientations.
Based on these observations, I am positing the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis: The middle class in the private sector has strong democratic attitudes;
on the other hand, the middle class in the public sector has significantly weaker
democratic attitudes.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DEMOCRATIC VALUES
What is the best method to measure the degree o f democratic orientations among
the Chinese population and its middle class in particular? There is no consensus on this
question. Since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,52 the importance o f participant
political culture has been recognized in democracy literature. Accordingly, several
studies o f Chinese politics adopted political efficacy as an important dimension to
measure the degree o f democratic orientations among China’s general population.53
However, this measurement does not directly capture democratic orientations per se.
The concept o f democratic values that is central to this dissertation is based on the
following synopsis by James Gibson: a “democratic citizen [is] one who believes in
individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount o f distrust
o f political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient
but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as
constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes.”54
In accordance with this understanding o f what it means to be a democratic citizen, this
dissertation will measure the political orientations toward democracy among China’s

52 See their seminal work, The Civic Culture.
53 For example, see N athan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China;” Shi, “Cultural Values
and Democracy in the People’s Republic o f China;” Wang et al., “Economic Change and Political
Development in China.”
54 James Gibson, “The Resilience o f Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in Nascent
Russian and Ukrainian Democracies,” in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States
o f Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 55-56.
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general population and its middle class in particular through an assessment o f each o f the
following three sub-dimensions: support for competitive election, support for equal
protection and rights for all people, and support for sovereignty o f the people’s will.

SUPPORT FOR COMPETITIVE ELECTION
Competitive election is one o f the essential characteristics o f democracy.55
According to Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is a polity that is an “institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means o f a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”56 Schumpeter and
other democracy theorists have even gone so far as to equate democracy with competitive
elections.

cn

Therefore any assessment of the degree o f democratic attitudes held by the
c o

general population must include a measurement of the support for competitive election.
According to Chen and Zhong, “it is even more relevant to tap into the level of support
for competitive elections in China, since Chinese political culture has been deemed
inherently non-democratic.”59
To determine the extent o f Chinese citizens’ support for competitive elections, I
asked my respondents the following two questions in the 2000 Beijing survey on
“Election and Urban Local Self-governance” :

55 Dahl, Polyarchy.
56 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1947), 269.
57 For example, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, ed., The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 1978); Huntington, The Third Wave', Guillermo O ’Donnell, “Illusions
About Consolidation,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 40-57.
58 For example, see James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin. “Democratic Values and the
Transformation o f the Soviet Union,” Journal o f Politics 54, no.2 (1992): 329-71; Chen and Zhong,
“Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China;” Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
59 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China,” 32.
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1. Do you think that election is a better way to choose political leaders than Party
appointment?
2. Do you think that it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate elections to
choose government officials at the district level?
The respondents were asked to answer each of two questions on a 5-point scale,
with “ 1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not sure”,
“4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”. I believe that these two
questions are very relevant to measure the level o f support for competitive elections.
Because, according to Samuel Huntington, a competitive election involves at least two
components— that more than one candidate can compete for votes freely, and that the
electorate shall include all adults regardless o f gender, race, income, education and
class.60
The support for competitive elections is o f particular interest in the Chinese
society. Because, the direct and multi-candidate election of government officials has
been a rare practice in China, limited to the elections o f leaders in the urban and rural
local governments and the elections o f representatives to the People’s Congress at the
district-level in the urban areas and at the township-level in the rural areas.61 Moreover,
in the 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior”,

60 Huntington, The Third Wave.
61 According to the 1982 Chinese Constitution, the National People’s Congress has the highest power in
China. Chinese Premier and cabinet members are elected by the National People’s Congress. However,
the representatives to the National People’s Congress are not directly elected. Only those representatives to
the People’s Congress in the district-level in the urban areas and in the township-level in the rural areas are
directly elected by the electorate. Article 97 o f the 1982 Chinese Constitution provides that “deputies to
the People’s Congresses o f counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships,
nationality townships and towns are elected directly by their constituencies.” For more on this point, see
Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing; Tang and Parish,
Chinese Urban Life under Reform; Melanie Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese
Countryside,” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 736-48; M. Kent Jennings, “Political
Participation in the Chinese Countryside,” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 361-72.
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I observed that many middle class people in the private sector demanded the direct,
multi-candidate elections o f government officials, at least at the district level. For
example, my interview with Mrs. K, a middle-level manager o f a big private enterprise,
reflects this attitude. Mrs. K said:
“I agree that all government officials at all levels should be chosen by a process of
direct, multi-candidate elections. Even the Chinese Constitution gives us the right
to vote; but we can not elect representatives to the National People’s Congress, to
the Provincial-level People’s Congresses, to the City-level People’s Congresses.
Even though we do have the right to vote for the representatives to the Districtlevel People’s Congresses, the election itself does not make too much sense.
There are not enough candidates for us to choose from. And these candidates are
always designated by the Party.”
Table 20 shows the following findings: 1). The private-sector middle class
registered a higher level o f support for competitive election than the lower class, the
public-sector middle class and the upper class. Approximately 84 percent o f the people
in the private-sector middle class agreed that election is a better way to choose political
leaders than Party appointment, and about 88 percent o f them agreed that it is time to
promote direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government officials at the district
level. Furthermore, less than 10 percent o f the private-sector middle class disagreed with
both statements.
2). The public-sector middle class expressed a lower level o f support for
competitive elections than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 28 percent o f
the people in the public-sector middle class did not agree with the statement that election
is a better way to choose political leaders than Party appointment and only 49 percent of
them registered agreement with this statement. Still about 32 percent o f the public-sector
middle class people disagreed with the statement that it is time to promote direct, multi-
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candidate elections to choose government officials at the district level and only 44
percent o f them registered agreement with this statement.

Table 20. Support of Competitive Election by Class Identity
1. Do you think that election is
a better way to choose political
leaders than Party appointment?

Upper Class
Public-Sector
Middle Class
Private-Sector
Middle Class
Lower Class

2. Do you think that it is time to
promote direct, multi-candidate
elections to choose government
officials at the district level?
Negative
Positive
Not
Response
Response
Sure
(%)
(%)
(%)
35
28
37
32
44
24

Negative
Response
(%)
30
28

Positive
Response
(%)
44
49

Not
sure
(%)
26
23

8

84

8

6

88

6

14

60

26

10

65

25

Note: For Question 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 48.9; d f = 6; p = 0.00; for Question 2:
Pearson Chi-Square = 51.4; df = 4; p = 0.00.

3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support competitive elections
than those in the private-sector middle class, as indicated by their responses to both
questions. But they have a higher level o f support for competitive elections than the
people in the public-sector middle class and the upper class. About 60 percent of
respondents from the lower class registered agreement with the statement that election is
a better way to choose political leaders than Party appointment and 65 percent o f them
registered agreement with the statement that it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate
elections to choose government officials at the district level.
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4). The upper class people are the least democratic and they expressed the lowest
level o f support for competitive election. Approximately 30 percent o f the upper class
people disagreed with the statement that election is a better way to choose political
leaders than Party appointment and 35 percent o f them registered disagreement with the
statement it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government
officials at the district level.
Based on my analysis o f these survey results, I find that the group o f the Chinese
private-sector middle class is positively associated with support for competitive elections.
The Chinese private-sector middle class supports the idea that election is a better way to
choose political leaders than Party appointment and believes that it is time to promote
direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government officials at the district level. On
the other hand, the group of the public-sector middle class shows a strong negative
attitude towards the institution o f competitive elections. Such findings are consistent
with my theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.

SUPPORT FOR EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ALL PEOPLE
Democracy is the political system in which the rights o f all citizens are equally
protected under the rule of law regardless o f their origins, race, gender, income,
education, and class. According to John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, freedom
exists only when standing law protects all people. Therefore, any assessment o f the
degree o f democratic attitudes held by the general population must include a
measurement o f the support for equal protection of rights for all people.
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According to Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “in China, belief in equal protection and
rights is a critical indicator of democratic values, since its traditional culture still works
against such democratic norms.”

fcd)

As suggested by Lucian Pye, there are no equal

relations within the traditional Confucian culture. In Confucian culture, there is no
equality, only superiors and inferiors, and there is a sharp divide between friends and foes.
Moreover, the Confucian culture is extremely group-oriented. People tend to identify
with their group and discriminate against those who lie outside their group.63
After two decades o f economic reform, support for equal protection for all people
was growing in the Chinese society. For example, in 1995, around 85 percent o f Beijing
residents registered support for the norm of equal protection for all people.64 Another
example is the great popularity o f the newspaper— “Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang
Weekend) ”— in current China. “Nanfang Weekend” has been regarded by independent
intellectuals as the center o f liberal thoughts in current China, and it advertised its
missions as “even if we do not agree with your words, we will fight to the death for your
right o f free speech.” It argued that all people should have the equal rights o f free speech
regardless o f their wealth, educational attainment, and occupation. Such a concept of
equal rights for all people has attracted strong responses from the Chinese urban
population in the late 1990s.65 Moreover, my 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class
and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” has also provided evidence o f the rise o f the
demand for equal rights. Especially among the subgroup of the private-sector middle
class, there is a very strong demand for the equal protection of rights for all people. For

62 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China,” 32.
63 Pye, The Spirit o f Chinese Politics.
64 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China.”
65 For example, many readers wrote letters to the editors in “Nanfang Weekend' to support all the modern
democratic ideas that “N anfang W eekend' promoted, particularly the idea o f equal rights for all people.
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example, my interview with Mr. W, an independent scholar, reflects this attitude. Mr. W
said:
“Have you heard o f the ‘BMW case’ which occurred in 2003? The BMW case
began in October 2003 when a tractor pulling a load o f green onions through a
crowded market in the northern city of Harbin, in the province o f Hei ’longjiang,
scraped a BMW driven by Ms. Su Xiuwen. Ms. Su reportedly bit the peasant and
his wife who had got down from their tractor to apologize, then rammed her car
into the crowd, killing the peasant’s wife and injuring twelve others. Ms. Su was
given only a two-year suspended sentence for the so-called ‘accidental traffic
negligence’. This led to a great amount of disapproval, complaint, and even
protest among the Chinese internet citizens because Ms. Su was reportedly a
daughter-in-law of the chairman o f Hei ’longjiang Provincial Political
Consultative Conference... .1 was active in participating in the discussion o f the
BMW case in internet. And many o f our friends also actively participated in the
discussion of the BMW case. We all felt angry that there was no justice in this
case, and it became obvious that the current government only protected those
wealthy and powerful people. O f course, equal protection o f rights for all people
under the rule o f law is the most important issue in current China. In the BMW
case, it was very obvious that the current government discriminated against the
poor peasant family. Today, the victim was the poor peasant family; maybe
tomorrow, the victim will be my family.”
To determine the extent of Chinese citizens’ support for the equal protection of
rights, I asked my respondents the following question in the 2004 Beijing survey on
“Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” : “Do you agree with the following
two statements:
1. All people should be entitled to vote, regardless of his/her family origin,
occupation, education level, or income.
2. The judicial system should treat all people equally.
The respondents were asked to answer each of these two questions on a 5-point
scale, with “ 1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not
sure”, “4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”.
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Table 21 shows the following findings: 1). The people in the private-sector
middle class registered a higher level o f support for equal protection than those in the
lower class, public-sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 92 percent o f
the people in the private-sector middle class agreed that all people should be entitled to
vote, regardless o f his/her family origin, occupation, education level, or income, and 95
percent o f them registered agreement with the statement that the judicial system should
treat all people equally.

Table 21. Support for Equal Protection and Rights by Class Identity

Upper Class
Public-Sector
Middle Class
Private-Sector
Middle Class
Lower Class

1. All people should be entitled
to vote, regardless of his/her
family origin, occupation,
education level, or income
Negative
Positive
Not
Response Response
sure
(%)
(%)
(%)
33
54
13
27
59
14

2. The judicial system should
treat all people equally

Negative
Response
(%)
30
15

Positive
Response
(%)
55
60

Not
Sure
(%)
15
25

5

92

3

2

95

3

11

81

8

13

75

12

Note\ For Statement 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 53.9; df = 6; p = 0.00; for Statement 2:
Pearson Chi-Square = 61.0; d f = 6; p = 0.00.

2). The people in the public-sector middle class have a lower level o f support for
equal protection than those in the private-sector middle class. Approximately 27 percent
of public-sector middle class registered disagreement with the statement that all people
should be entitled to vote, regardless of his/her family origin, occupation, education level,
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or income. Only 59 percent o f the people in the public-sector middle class registered
agreement with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote and only 60
percent o f them registered agreement with the idea that the judicial system should treat all
people equally.
3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support the equal protection of
rights for all people than those in the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher
level of support for equal protection than the people in the public-sector middle class and
the upper class. Approximately 81 percent o f respondents from the lower class registered
agreement with the idea of equality o f voting rights, and 75 percent o f them registered
agreement with the idea that the judicial system should treat all people equally.
4). The people in the upper class are the least democratic, and they have the
lowest level of support for equal protection. Approximately 33 percent o f the upper class
disagreed with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote and 30 percent of
them registered disagreement with the statement that the judicial system should treat all
people equally. On the other hand, only 54 percent of respondents from the upper class
registered agreement with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote, and
only 55 percent o f them registered agreement with the idea that people should have equal
standing before the judicial system.
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the Chinese privatesector middle class is positively associated with support for equal protection. The
Chinese private-sector middle class does support the idea of equality o f voting rights and
equal standing before the judicial system. On the other hand, the group o f the public-
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sector middle class shows a strong negative attitude towards the idea o f equal protection.
Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.

SUPPORT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S WILL
As many democracy scholars point out, democracy is a system wherein the people
o f a society control the government. In a democratic society, sovereignty originates from
the people living in this society and is delegated to the government.66 In China
sovereignty o f the people’s will is an extremely critical indicator o f democratic values
because there is no tradition in China o f popular influence on government. It is often
argued that the political culture of China is rooted in Confucian absolutism, which was
without a liberal tradition. The traditional Confucian culture emphasized authority over
liberty, and lacked a tradition o f rights against the state, and granted a sage with
“mandate o f heaven” to rule the country.67
After two decades o f economic reform, support for sovereignty o f the people’s
will was on the rise in the Chinese population, especially in the private-sector middle
class. For example, my interview with Mrs. H, an independent lawyer who opened her
own law company, reflects this attitude. Mrs. H said:
“The government officials at all levels (from street level to city level, and up to
central government) never cared about the people’s will and voice. They made
policies just by their will, and never solicited our opinion, even though they
claimed themselves to be representative o f the people’s interest. O f course, we
need further reform. We need to reform the structure o f the current political
system, so that it is more attentive to the people’s will and voice.”

66 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, John Locke (1632-1704), Two Treatises o f Government (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1967); Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: M ovements and
Regimes (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).
67 Huntington, “D em ocracy’s Third W ave;” Pye, The Spirit o f Chinese Politics.
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In addition, a survey conducted by the Chinese Communist Youth League and the
National Student Federation clearly indicated that the younger generation tended to value
a set o f tangible individual interests (e.g., making money and personal development),
rather than national interest.68
To determine the extent o f Chinese citizens’ support for sovereignty o f the
people’s will, I asked my respondents to evaluate the following two statements in the
2004 Beijing survey on “Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” :
1. The government policies should be guided by the people’s will.
2. When individual interests are in conflict with state interests, we should sacrifice
our personal interests for the sake o f state interests.
The respondents were asked to answer each of these two questions on a 5-point
scale, with “ 1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not
sure”, “4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”.
Table 22 indicates the following findings: 1). The private-sector middle class
registered a higher level o f support for sovereignty o f the people’s will than the lower
class, the public-sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 95 percent of
the people in the private-sector middle class agreed that the government policies should
be guided by the people’s will, and 98 percent o f them registered disagreement with the
idea that individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake o f state interests.
2). The public-sector middle class has a lower level o f support for sovereignty of
the people’s will than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 47 percent o f the
people in the public-sector middle class did agree with the statement that when individual
interests are in conflict with state interests, the individual should sacrifice his/her
68 See the Hong Kong magazine Zhengming, no. 8 (August 2000), p. 27.
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personal interests for the sake o f state interests. Meanwhile, only 55 percent o f the
people in the public-sector middle class registered agreement with the statement that the
government policies should be guided by the people’s will.

Table 22. Support for Sovereignty of People’s Will by Class Identity
1. The government policies
should be guided by the people’s
will.

Upper Class
Public-Sector
Middle Class
Private-Sector
Middle Class
Lower Class

2. When individual interests are in
conflict with state interests, we
should sacrifice our personal
interests for the sake o f state
interests.
Negative
Positive
Not
Response
Response
Sure
(%)
(%)
(%)
50
15
35
47
13
40

Negative
Response
(%)
37
30

Positive
Response
(%)
44
55

Not sure
(%)

3

95

2

98

1

1

12

73

15

61

20

19

19
15

Note: For Statement 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 57.6; d f = 6; p = 0.00; for Statement 2:
Pearson Chi-Square = 63.0; df = 6; p = 0.00.

3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support sovereignty o f the
people’s will than those in the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher level
o f support for sovereignty o f the people’s will than those in the public-sector middle class
and the upper class. Approximately 73 percent o f respondents from the lower class
registered agreement with the statement that the government policies should be guided by
the people’s will, and 61 percent o f them registered disagreement with the statement that
individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake o f state interests.
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4). The people in the upper class are the least democratic, and they have the
lowest level o f support for sovereignty o f the people’s will. Approximately 37 percent o f
the people in the upper class disagreed with the statement that the government policies
should be guided by the people’s will and 50 percent o f them registered agreement with
the statement that individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake o f state
interests. On the other hand, only 44 percent of the people in the upper class registered
agreement with the statement that the government policies should be guided by the
people’s will and only 35 percent o f them registered disagreement with the statement that
individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake o f state interests.
Based on this examination o f the survey results, I find that the Chinese privatesector middle class is positively associated with support for the sovereignty o f the
people’s will. The Chinese private-sector middle class supports the idea that the
government policies should be guided by the people’s will and that personal interests are
more important than state interests. On the other hand, the group o f the public-sector
middle class shows a strong negative attitude towards the institution o f the sovereignty of
the people’s will. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and
support my hypothesis.

CONCLUSION
This chapter makes distinctions between two sub-groups o f the middle class:
public sector and private sector. The middle class individuals employed in the private
sector are much more independent from the Party-state. Much like their Western
counterparts, the middle class people in the private sector perceive democracy as the best
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form o f governance to protect their properties. And they strongly demand the legalinstitutional constraints upon the power o f Party-state to guarantee the proper functioning
o f the market, to reduce the widespread corruption, to protect their private property and
their bourgeois lifestyle. Moreover, the middle class people in the private sector have
acquired modern values such as those o f equality and negotiation, as well as o f self
independence in their daily lives and work. Such modem ideas are closely related to
democratic values and can be easily translated into democratic attitudes. In addition, the
close interaction within the private-sector middle class may reinforce such democratic
attitudes.
On the other hand, those middle class individuals employed in the public sector
have close relations with the Party-state and enjoy many privileges sanctioned by the
Party-state; thus they have a vested interest to maintain the status quo. They do not
demand a transparent, democratic political system; instead they worry that a dramatic
change from the current political system may endanger their interests since they may lose
those privileges that they are currently enjoying as a result of their relationship with the
Party-state. Moreover, the middle class people in the public sector did not learn those
modern ideas; rather they persisted in their traditional mentality, such as those of
obedience and respect for hierarchy, reflecting the culture of their daily lives and work.
The close interaction within the group o f the public-sector middle class tends to reinforce
such undemocratic attitudes.
Based on the 2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Selfgovernance”, I find that the middle class in the private sector registered a higher level o f
support for competitive election than the middle class in the public sector and other
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segments o f the Chinese population. Based on the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction
of Urban Residential Communities”, I find that the middle class in the private sector
registered a higher level o f support for equal protection for all people and support for
sovereignty o f the people’s will than the middle class in the public sector and other
segments of the Chinese population. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical
arguments that the middle class in the private sector has strong democratic attitudes and
that the middle class in the public sector has significantly weaker democratic attitudes.
The middle class in the private sector is the most democratic within Chinese society in
terms o f these three dimensions: support for competitive elections, support for equal
protection and rights for all people, and support for sovereignty o f the people’s will. On
the other hand, the middle class in the public sector shows a fairly strong negative
attitude towards democracy in terms of these three dimensions.
It is not surprising to see that the upper class is the least democratic since this
class is the greatest beneficiary o f current political institutions and has a vested interest in
maintaining those institutions. The lower class has shown a moderate support of
democratic values. It is less democratic than the middle class in the private sector, but it
is more democratic than the middle class in the public sector and the upper class. In the
2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance”, I find that the
lower class people registered a higher level of support for competitive elections than the
middle class in the public sector and the upper class. In the 2004 Beijing Survey on
“Construction o f Urban Residential Communities”, I find that the lower class registered a
higher level o f support for equal protection under the law and support for sovereignty of
the people’s will than the middle class in the public sector and the upper class.
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In the urban areas the lower class is mainly composed o f the working class. Since
1978, the social status o f China’s working class has changed fundamentally. The reform
o f state-owned and collective-owned enterprises has altered the pattern o f “organised
dependence” and paternalism characteristic o f state-labor relations in M ao’s era.69 In
M ao’s era, the Chinese working class benefited greatly from their relationship with the
Party-state; by contrast, in the reform era, China’s working class is emerging as the loser.
The Chinese working class has become the subordinate class and their discontent has
risen consequently. Many studies have observed different forms of labor struggles—
ranging from everyday workplace resistance, petitions, work stoppages and strikes to
public protest, violence, independent unionism and political movements that exemplify
the discontent of the Chinese working class.70
China’s current regime has lost the political support o f the working class. As
concluded by Martin King Whyte, “China’s political leaders no longer can take comfort
in their ability to turn to the workers for support in facing a crisis. Instead, they must
worry about whether they can maintain control over their increasingly unhappy and
fractious proletariat.”71 The result o f China’s economic reform is paradoxical: China’s
leaders’ purpose in initiating reform was to increase support for the regime; however,
economic reform gradually undercut this support.

79

The political support o f China’s

working class for the regime has gradually retreated in the period since 1978. Thus,
China’s working class has naturally shown a strong attraction to democracy.

69 Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency.”
70 Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency;” Whyte, “The Changing Role of W orkers;” Weston, “China’s
Labor W oes.”
71 Whyte, “The Changing Role o f W orkers,” 196.
72 Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency.”
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CHAPTER V
DOES CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS ACT IN WAYS THAT PROMOTES
DEMOCRACY?

As the previous chapter delineates, the two subgroups o f the middle class have
shown different attitudinal orientations toward democracy. The private-sector middle
class is the most democratic within the Chinese society, whereas the public-sector middle
class shares, though to a lesser degree, the negative attitudes toward democracy with the
upper class and is less democratic than the lower class. Does the private-sector middle
class, who supports democratic values, act in ways that will promote democracy? Does
the public-sector middle class, who holds negative attitudes toward democracy, act in
ways that will impede the transition to democracy? This chapter is intended to address
these two critical questions.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
According to the literature on the Western middle class, the middle class people,
who support democratic principles, do act in ways that promote democracy. Under a
democratic system, these middle class individuals, who have attitudes in support of
democratic principle, are more likely to participate in a variety o f conventional political
activities that have important consequences for the proper functioning o f democracy.
This argument is based on the following theories:
(1)

Political Efficacy Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the

social group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have a high
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level o f political efficacy: that is, they are more confident about their role in public affairs
and are more competent to participate in politics than members o f the lower class.1 Many
empirical studies have reported that, “political participation and subjective competence
are positively related. An increase in the level of one is accompanied by an increase in
the level o f the other.”2
Why do middle class individuals have a high level of political efficacy?
According to previous studies o f the middle class in the Western societies, this political
confidence and competence come mainly from three sources. One is the experience and
intellectual expertise related to the occupations and professions o f middle class
individuals. As Chapter IV has discussed, according to learning-generalization theory,
the job conditions o f the middle class affect their subjective attitudes through a process of
learning from the job and generalizing what has been learned to other social and political
realms. The experience o f running a business, supervising others, and/or possessing
intellectual expertise makes middle class people feel competent to participate in all types
o f actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise and/or maintenance o f a democratic system.3
A second source o f this political confidence and competence is the possession o f a
greater degree o f knowledge about public and political affairs. Due to the nature and
needs of their occupations, middle class people have a greater stake than the working
class in the acquisition o f information about public policies and politics in general. For
example, owners o f small/medium businesses, managers, and professionals need to have
1 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and
Political Role Behavior;” Lipset, Political Marc, Milbrath, Political Participation', Nie, Powell, and Prewitt,
“Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Glassman, The Middle Class and
Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global
Perspective', Verba and Nie, Participation in America.
2 Milbrath, Political Participation, 59.
3 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle
Class and D emocracy in Global Perspective', Lane, Political Life.
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timely information about changes in government policies and o f political leaders at
various levels, which could directly affect their immediate and long-term interests related
to their occupations and professions. As Robert Luskin argues, people in the middle class
have “more politically impinged occupations [that require] more political
information.. .about what the government is doing or is likely to d o .. .and what effects its
actions are likely to have.”4
A third source o f the middle class’s political confidence and competence is
psychological security, which to a significant extent derives from economic security. On
the other hand, the poorer class lacks economic security and, therefore, psychological
security as well. “The lower one goes on the socioeconomic ladder, the greater economic
uncertainty one finds. White-collar workers, even those who are not paid more than
skilled manual workers, are less likely to suffer the tensions created by fear o f loss of
incom e... .Such insecurity will of course affect the individual’s politics and attitudes.”5
Empirical studies have found that people who feel quite secure economically are also
likely to feel that they are politically effective and have an effective voice in political
affairs.6 Thus the middle class, which has more economic security, is expected to be
more confident about political participation and the effectiveness of political participation.
(2)

Political Interest Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the

social group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have a
greater degree o f interest in political and public affairs. At least some cross-national

4 Robert C. Luskin, “Explaining Political Sophistication,” Political Behavior 12, no. 4 (1990): 336.
5 Lipset, Political Man, 106.
6 Lane, Political Life, 224.
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empirical studies have shown that those people who are more interested in and concerned
about public affairs and political matters are more likely to be active participants.7
Why are middle class individuals more interested in politics? First, there is the
explanation offered by rational choice theory. Middle class individuals are small
property owners. The conventional wisdom of political scientists holds that property
owners have a greater stake in politics and thus they are more likely to be interested in
and concerned about political matters and public affairs. Driven by economic interest,
middle class individuals are more likely to be sensitive to government policies that
generate negative effects on their property.8
Second, social interaction matters. As I have discussed, members o f different
social classes have different social interaction networks. Since middle class individuals
tend to interact with members o f their own class, and since members o f the middle class
generally are more interested in politics and tend to be politically engaged, a middle class
member is more likely to encounter more political stimuli than members o f the other
social classes. And when this occurs, social interaction effects would arise through
mechanisms o f social reinforcement.9
(3)

Resources Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the social

group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have resources
(e.g., time, money and civic skills) to do so. In other words, I would rather argue that
7 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee,
Voting: A Study o f Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1954); Campbell et al., The American Voter; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political
Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Verba and Nie, Participation in America; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman
Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
8 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical
Perspective; and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
9 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects
o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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middle class individuals participate in all types o f actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise
and/or maintenance o f a democratic system since they have the resources o f time, money,
and civic skills to do so.10
The middle class is characterized as a class with leisure tim e.11 The middle class
has enough leisure time available for matters not closely related to the subsistence o f
daily life. Political activity “takes an amount o f leisure above the minimum to ring
doorbells, write letters, read magazine articles”; voting, political campaigning and
contacting government officials very often require a great amount o f leisure tim e.12
Therefore, a differential in leisure time can account for some o f the differential in
political activity.
Money is an important resource for all types o f political actions for the rise and/or
>

maintenance o f a democratic system,

IT

.

•

since it “is impossible to contribute to a campaign

or other political cause without some discretionary income.” 14 Obviously, middle class
people have more discretionary income than lower class people and so can more easily
afford to participate in political activities.
Civic skills are defined in this study as “communications and organizational
abilities.” 15 This definition allows us to make distinctions between civic skills and a
subjective feeling o f efficacy. Even though there is a strong positive correlation between

10 Glassman, The M iddle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; Milbrath, Political
Participation; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.
11 Mills, White Collar; Kahl, The American Class Structure.
12 Lane, Political Life, 223.
13 Milbrath, Political Participation; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality; Verba and Nie,
Participation in America; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political
Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Steven J.
Rosenstone and John M ark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993).
14 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, 289.
15 Ibid.
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civic skills and a subjective feeling o f efficacy, civic skills are different and relatively
objective. Those persons who “can speak or write well or who are comfortable
organizing and taking part in meetings” . . .“should find political activity less daunting and
costly and, therefore, should be more likely to take part.” Moreover, those civic skills
“allow participants to use inputs o f time and money more effectively, making them more
productive when they are active.” 16
The workplace is one o f the most important social institutions for the
development o f civic skills. Owners o f small/medium businesses, managers, and whitecollar professionals, for example, are more likely to possess civic skills since they have
more opportunities to practice managing, supervising and organizing skills and increase
their intellectual expertise in their work lives. As summarized by Sidney Verba and his
colleagues, “having a job is, o f course, a necessary first step toward acquiring civic skills
in the workplace, but the nature o f the occupation is also important. Teachers or lawyers
are more likely to have opportunities to enhance civic skills— to organize meetings, make
presentations, and the like— than are fast-food workers or meat cutters.” 17
These Western individual-level theories form the theoretical basis for my
assessment o f the political behaviors o f the middle class individuals in urban China.

A. Political Efficacy o f the Two Groups o f the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has a higher
level o f political efficacy than the public-sector middle class and other social groups.
This expectation is based on the following argument.

16 Ibid., 304.
17 Ibid., 314-315.
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As documented in Chapter III, the Chinese private-sector middle class includes
mainly the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the
private sector, private entrepreneurs who run small and medium businesses, and those
white-collar office workers in the private entities. Like their counterparts in Western
societies, their experiences running business, supervising others, and/or possessing
intellectual knowledge make the private-sector middle class feel competent to participate
in all types o f political activities. For example, self-employed individuals who run small
or medium businesses usually make their own decisions in the daily management o f those
businesses and therefore tend to see political leaders as colleagues engaged in the
management o f political organizations.18 Managers in the private sector such as those
who run private or foreign-related enterprises are accustomed to making decisions
without consulting the government and Party cadres, and thus acquire a strong sense of
self-direction and competence that is easily transferred to the political sphere.19 My
interview with Mr. F, a middle-level manager in a foreign-owned enterprise, has provided
evidence for this argument. Mr. F said:
“I am confident to participate in politics... .1 have managed quite a big part of
business in this company and supervised over 20 employees. Managing a
political organization shall be no more difficult than managing a company. Due
to the nature o f my occupation, I have to keep informed about public policies.
Thus I have accumulated enough political knowledge to take part in political
activities.”
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class, which mainly includes the
managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public organizations, and
staff members in the government and party agencies as well as public organizations, is
still controlled, in varying degrees, by the state power. As the previous chapter indicates,
18 Glassman, China in Transition.
19 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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the public-sector middle class has less control over its career and social mobility, since
the occupational advancement and mobility for the public-sector middle class is largely
determined by the Party-state. Moreover, the attitudes o f the public-sector middle class
are influenced by the values that prevail in the workplace, such as those o f obedience and
respect for hierarchy.

20

Therefore, this group o f the public-sector middle class is less

likely to acquire a sense o f social-political competence from their work experience.
To measure Chinese urban residents’ sense of political efficacy, I asked my
respondents to evaluate the following two statements in the 2004 Beijing survey on
“Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” :
1 .1 feel that I have a fairly good understanding o f local political and public affairs.
2 . 1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in the decision making process of
local political and public affairs.
Respondents were asked to answer each of the two questions on a 5-point scale,
with “ 1” indicating “strongly disagree” and “5” indicating “strongly agree” . The values
o f these two questions were combined to form an additive index to capture residents’
sense o f political efficacy, where “2” referred to the least level o f political efficacy, and
“ 10” stood for the highest level o f political efficacy. This political efficacy index is then
trichotomized into three categories: high, intermediate, and low levels.
Table 23 clearly indicates the following findings: 1) The middle class people in
the private sector have a higher sense o f political efficacy than the lower class, the publicsector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 95 percent o f the private-sector
middle class individuals indicate that they have a fairly good understanding o f local

20 For example, please see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary
China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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political and public affairs and they are well-qualified to participate in the decision
making process o f local political and public affairs. Additionally, only 5 percent o f them
disagree with these two statements.

Table 23. Political Efficacy by Class Identity
Political Efficacy
Index1
Low
Medium
High
Total

Upper Class
(%)
3
32
65
100

Public-sector
Middle Class
(%)
15
35
50
100

Private-sector
Middle Class
(%)
5
20
75
100

Lower Class
(%)
40
30
30
100

N ote: Pearson Chi-Square = 49.3; d f = 6; p = 0.00
\ The original political efficacy index is trichotomized into three categories: high,
intermediate, and low levels.

2) The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level o f political
efficacy than the private-sector middle class. Only 60 percent o f the public-sector middle
class individuals indicate that they have a fairly good understanding o f local political and
public affairs and they are well-qualified to participate in the decision making process of
local political and public affairs.
3) The lower class people are least likely to be politically efficacious.
Approximately 40 percent o f respondents from the lower class indicate that they have a
fairly good understanding o f local political and public affairs and they are well-qualified
to participate in the decision making process o f local political and public affairs. In
addition, 40 percent o f respondents from the lower class disagree with these two
statements.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162
4)

The upper class showed a fairly strong sense o f political efficacy.

Approximately 90 percent of respondents from the upper class agree with the statements
that they have a fairly good understanding o f local political and public affairs and that
they are well-qualified to participate in the decision making process o f local political and
public affairs. This finding could be explained by the fact that the majority o f the upper
class people have institutional channels that facilitate their involvement in the process of
government decision-making. As Chapter II indicates, the upper class is composed o f the
administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs, and private entrepreneurs. The
administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs are bureaucrats in government
agencies and are advantageously positioned at the heart o f the political system. Private
entrepreneurs possessed the large means o f production and were gradually co-opted by
•

.

9

1

the party-state, becoming a part o f the ruling class.

B. Political Interest o f the Two Groups o f the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has a greater
degree o f interest in political and public affairs than the public-sector middle class and
other social groups. This expectation is based on the following argument.
As the previous chapter indicates, most members of the Chinese middle class own
a relatively substantial amount o f property: all small entrepreneurs own their businesses,
whereas most managerial personnel, professionals, and white-collar office workers
possess at least their apartments. The conventional wisdom o f political scientists holds
that property owners have a greater stake in politics; and so they are more likely to be
interested in and concerned about political matters and public affairs.
21 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China.
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However, the middle class people in the public sector have close relations with
the Party-state and thus they may rely on those ties to assure the protection o f their
property. As a result, the public-sector middle class has little motivation to be interested
in political affairs. On the other hand, the private-sector middle class usually does not
have close relations with the Party-state; therefore, it has to rely on other methods to
protect its property, such as using legal weapons, contacting government officials, and
organizing associations o f property owners. In addition, unlike the public-sector middle
class people who buy the government-subsidized apartments through their work unit, the
private-sector middle class people buy their apartments from the market for a very high
market price and thus are very sensitive to those government policies that may have
negative effects on the value o f their apartment properties. Additionally, many empirical
studies have documented a variety o f actions taken by the private-sector middle class to
defend their apartment properties.

22

To measure Beijing residents’ interest in political and public affairs, I asked my
respondents two questions in the 2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Selfgovernance” :
1. When you get together with your friends, do you discuss political matters and
public affairs frequently?
2. How interested would you say you are in political matters and public affairs?
Respondents were asked to answer each o f the two questions on a 3-point scale,
with “ 1” indicating “not at all,” “2” indicating “somewhat,” and “3” indicating “very
often” (for Question 1) or “very much” (for Question 2). The values o f these two

22 Cai, “China’s M oderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
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questions were combined to form an additive index that captures residents’ interest in
public affairs, where “2” represented the least interest and “6” represented the highest
interest in public affairs. This political interest index is then trichotomized into three
categories: high, intermediate, and low levels.
Table 24 clearly indicates the following findings: 1) The middle class people in
the private sector have a higher level o f political interest than the lower class, the publicsector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 98 percent of the private-sector
middle class people indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters
and that they will discuss political matters with their friends. In addition, only 2 percent
o f them say “no” to both questions.

Table 24. Political Interest by Class Identity
Upper Class
Political Interest
Index1
Low
Medium
High
Total

(%)
12
50
38
100

Public-sector
Middle Class
(%)
16
41
43
100

Private-sector
Middle Class
(%)
2
38
60
100

Lower Class
(%)
32
38
30
100

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 55.0; d f = 6; p = 0.00
1. The original political interest index is trichotomized into three categories: high,
intermediate, and low levels.

2)

The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level o f political

interest than the private-sector middle class. Only 57 percent o f the public-sector middle
class individuals indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters
and that they will discuss political matters with their friends.
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3) The lower class people are least likely to be politically engaged.
Approximately 48 percent o f respondents from the lower class indicate that they are at
least somewhat interested in political matters and that they will discuss political matters
with their friends. In addition, about 30 percent o f respondents from the lower class say
“no” to both questions.
4) The upper class people are less likely to be politically engaged than the privatesector middle class, but they have a higher level o f political interest than the lower class
and the public-sector middle class. Approximately 88 percent o f respondents from the
upper class indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters and that
they will discuss political matters with their friends. Additionally, only 12 percent of
middle class persons say “no” to both questions.

C. Resources o f the Two Groups o f the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has more
resources (i.e., money and civic skills) than the public-sector middle class and other
social groups. This expectation is based on the following arguments.
Money is an important source o f all types o f political actions.23 The private-sector
middle class people, having more disposable income than the public-sector middle class
and the lower class, can more easily afford to participate in political activities. Quite a
few studies have documented that, as the major beneficiary of the post-Mao reform, the

23 Milbrath, Political Participation', Verba and Nie, Participation in America; Rosenstone and Hansen,
Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America', Verba,, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political
Equality', Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.
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private-sector middle class has become one o f the richest social groups in the Chinese
society. 24
As owners o f small or medium-sized businesses, managers, and white-collar
professionals, the private-sector middle class individuals are more likely to possess civic
skills, since they have plenty o f chance to practice managing, supervising and
organizational skills in their work life. For example, my interview with Mrs. T, a lowlevel manager in a foreign-related enterprise, has provided evidence for this argument.
Mrs. T said:
“I have been a professional manager since 1990. In my routine work, I have been
exposed to lots o f meetings and workshop. And I have organized meetings, and
made presentations for over 10 years. So, I am confident to say that I am well
equipped with communications and organizational abilities.”
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class has less control over its work.
In their work life, the public-sector middle class people must follow the government and
Party orders and thus have little chance to practice the above-mentioned civic skills.25
Based on the above discussions, it may be concluded that the private-sector
middle class people, like their Western counterparts, are also interested in political
matters, and are feel efficacious to participate in politics, and are endowed with resources
(i.e., money and civic skills) to do so. In addition, as the previous chapter indicates, the
private-sector middle class has strong pro-democratic orientations. Thus, I expect that
the private-sector middle class is very likely to participate in various forms o f political
activities that will promote democratization in contemporary China. On the other hand,
24 For more on this point see, Johnston “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs;”
Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China', David G. Goodman, “The People’s
Republic o f China: the Party-state, Capitalist Revolution and New Entrepreneurs,” in The New Rich in Asia:
Mobile Phones, M cDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution, ed. Richard Robison and David G. Goodman
(London: Routledge, 1996), 225-42; and idem, “The New Middle Class.”
25 For example, please see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary
China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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the public-sector middle class people, is less interested in political matters, and has a
lower level o f political efficacy, and are endowed with less resources to participate in
political affairs than the private-sector middle class. In addition, as the previous chapter
indicates, the public-sector middle class has negative attitudes toward democracy.
Therefore, I expect that the public-sector middle class will not participate in political
activities that may promote democracy in China, moreover, I expect that the public-sector
middle class will participate in political activities that will strengthen the rule o f the
current regime.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
To test my theoretical argument that the private-sector middle class will act in
ways that will promote democracy in China and that the public-sector middle class will
act in ways that will impede the transition to democracy, I selected two types of political
activities that explore the different political behavioral orientations o f the two sub-groups
of the middle class: participation in civic organizations and participation in the urban
self-government system.

A. Conventional Political Participation in Current China
In the democratic societies, the middle class is more likely to participate in
conventional political activities than other social groups. This participation is crucial for
the maintenance and functioning o f a democratic system.26 According to Sidney Verba
and his associates, conventional political activities are “legal acts by private citizens that
are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection o f governmental personnel
26 Dahl, Polyarchy, Lane, Political Life\ Milbrath, Political Participation.
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and the actions that they take”.27 Moreover, Verba and his associates identify four modes
o f conventional political participation: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and
particularized contact. From the outset o f the post-Mao economic and political reforms,
ordinary Chinese citizens have been participating in public affairs and politics at least at
the local level,

28

even though the Chinese political system is at most semi-democratic.

Studies of Chinese politics have identified several common modes o f conventional
political participation: voting, campaign behavior, particularized contact, and civic
•

•

•

participation.

29

What are the participatory orientations o f the two sub-groups o f the middle class
in regard to these conventional political activities? Will the two sub-groups o f the middle
class have different participatory orientations?
This dissertation is going to explore these two questions by examining (1) how
the two sub-groups o f the middle class act in the civic organizations, and (2) how the two
sub-groups of the middle class act in the urban self-government system. There were
several reasons to choose the civic organization and urban self-government system as the
case to study the participatory orientations o f the two sub-groups o f middle class people.
First, all Chinese middle class people are urban residents, thus it is necessary to study
political behavioral orientations o f the middle class people by examining how they act in

27 Verba,, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality, 46.
28 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing', Tang and Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform', Manion,
“The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside;” Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese
Countryside;” Hsin-Chi Kuan and Siu-Kai Lau, “Traditional Orientations and Political Participation in
Three Chinese Societies,” Journal o f Contemporary China 11, no. 31 (2002): 297-318; Jie Chen,
“Subjective M otivations for Mass Political Participation in Urban China,” Social Science Quarterly 81
(2000): 645-62; Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “Why Do People Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?”
Journal o f Politics 64 (2002): 178-97.
29 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing', Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside;”
Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside,” Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban
China.
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the public affairs and politics in the urban areas o f China. People’s participation in the
civic organizations and the urban self-government by no means exhaust their political
behaviors in urban China; nonetheless, they may serve as a good test o f the relationship
between people’s class identity and political behavioral orientations in urban China.
Second, people from all socio-economic classes o f the urban areas are familiar with the
civic organizations and the urban self-government system, and they tend to act in a more
sophisticated way in the civic organizations and the urban self-government system.
Therefore, people’s participation in the civic organizations and the urban self-government
may represent their fundamental political behavioral orientations. Third, in the reform
era, people are free to choose to participate or not to participate in the civic organizations
and the urban self-government.30 For this reason, survey questions about these acts were
“unlikely to make respondents give interviewers false answers.”31 Thus, people’s
behavioral orientations toward the civic organizations and the urban self-government
provide a good opportunity to study the impact o f class identity on their behavioral
orientations.

B. Testable Hypotheses
Civic organizations work in several ways to help people become active in support
of the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system.32 First, these civic organizations
may provide extensive exposure to political matters, in the form o f both informal political

30 In the Mao era, Chinese citizens were required by the party to participate in these political activities to
show their support for the regime. Non-participation was punished by the party.
31 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing, 27.
32 Lane, Political Life; Lipset, Political Man; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Robert Putnam, Robert
Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in M odern Italy (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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discussions and formal consideration o f political matters at meetings.33 As a result, these
civic organizations “would be acting as channel o f political communication or as a
potential means o f arousing political interest in citizens.”34 Second, leaders o f these civic
organizations “often make deliberate attempts to mobilize the ranks to political action.”35
Third, civic organizations will generate beneficial impacts on individuals’ democratic
orientations. Civic organizations “instill in their members habits o f cooperation,
solidarity, and public-spiritedness.”36
However, the nature o f Chinese civic associations is different from those in
Western societies. Most formal civic organizations in China are under the complete
control o f the party-state or dependent upon the party-state. On the other hand, most
private organizations and informal social networks have a certain level o f autonomy and
independence from the party-state.37 Thus, the private-sector middle class individuals’
democratic belief may lead them to participate in private organizations and informal
social networks and are less likely to take part in formal civic organizations that are
sponsored by the Party-state. Like their counterparts in Western societies, the privatesector middle class individuals have plenty o f resources, such as money and civic skills,
to afford them to be actively engaged in private civic organizations. Moreover, the
private-sector middle class people have motivations to participate in private civic
organizations, because they realize that by organizing and participating in private civic
organizations, they can act collectively to protect their property and interests. For
33 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, Milbrath, Political Participation; Verba and Nie,
Participation in America.
34 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, 177.
35 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, 309.
36 Putnam et al., M aking Democracy Work.
37 However, in the Chinese society, the distinction between “formal” and “private” civic organizations is
very fuzzy. In many cases, Chinese civic organizations may have combined characters: “formal” and
“private” .
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example, numerous studies have documented that the private-sector middle class people
have formed home-owners’ associations (yezhu weiyuanhni) to seek the protection of
their property interests and rights collectively.38 In addition, the private-sector middle
class has a high level o f social and political competence, which is a necessary condition
r
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.

.

.

.

.

. .

.

.

tor proactive participation in private civic organizations.

10

On the other hand, I expect that the public-sector middle class is more likely to
participate in the government-sponsored civic organizations and less likely to participate
in private civic organizations. The public-sector middle class people have close ties with
the Party-state, thus they are more likely to have affective attachments to current political
authority, which, in turn may lead them to participate in formal civic organizations.
Besides, the Party-state has taken steps to mobilize the public-sector middle class to
become members o f formal civic organization, aiming to strengthen the control o f the
public-sector middle class.40 On the other hand, the public-sector middle class people are
very wary about the development of private civic organizations since these organizations
do not fit with their undemocratic belief.41 In addition, the public-sector middle class
individuals do not have resources, such as money, civic skills, and socio-political
competence, to organize and participate in private civic organizations.
Based on the above discussion, I am positing the following hypothesis:
I I I : Chinese middle class individuals in the private sector are less likely to
participate in form al civic organizations and more likely to become involved in
38 For example, see Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” and Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood?
New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
39 For example, see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty. And also, please see Lu, ed., Social Mobility in
Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
40 For example, Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, and Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
41 For example, see Yingfang Chen, “X ing’dong’li yu zhidu xianzhi: dushi yundong zhong de zhongchan
jieceng” (Behavioral Capacity and Institutional Constraints: The Middle Class in Urban Social Movements),
Shehuixueyanjiu (Sociological Studies) 2006, no.4: 1-20; Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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autonomous private organizations, whereas Chinese middle class individuals in the
public sector are more likely to participate in form al civic organizations and less likely to
become involved in autonomous private organizations.
As this chapter will discuss later, the self-government system in urban China was
still semi-democratic, if not non-democratic, since it was in general dominated and
controlled by the party-state. As a result, the system itself may not be consistent with the
expectations o f those who strongly believe in democratic principles, such as the free
popular elections o f leaders and equal protection for all people. Thus, the private-sector
middle class people who believe that a political system should be democratically formed
through competitive election may have a negative evaluation o f the current forms of
conventional political participation; in turn, this negative evaluation may cause the
private-sector middle class to engage in non-participatory action as protest against the
current system.
Based on this discussion, I am positing the following two hypotheses with regard
to the participatory orientations o f the private-sector middle class:
H2: The private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic b elief that a political
system should be democratically form ed leads to their negative evaluation o f the
currently-implemented urban self-government system.
H3: In turn, this negative evaluation causes the private-sector middle class
individuals to engage in non-participatory action.
On the other hand, since the middle class people in the public sector enjoy some
formal (i.e., corporatist institutions) and informal channels (i.e., personal ties) to the
party-state power, they are more likely to identify themselves with the current semi-
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democratic regime and possess affective attachments to current political authority.
Moreover, the public-sector middle class has strong negative attitudes toward democracy.
And this undemocratic belief may lead to their positive evaluation o f the current forms of
conventional political participation. In turn, this positive identification with the current
regime and affective attachments to current political authority will cause middle class
individuals in the public sector to engage in the participatory action as support for the
current system.42
Based on this discussion, I am posting the following two hypotheses with regard
to the participatory orientations of the public-sector middle class:
H4: The public-sector middle class individuals ’ undemocratic b elief may lead to
their positive evaluation o f the currently-implemented urban self-government
system;
H5: In turn, this positive evaluation causes the public-sector middle class
individuals engage in participatory action.
Overall, this chapter argues that the private-sector middle class people, who have
democratic orientations, will act in a democratic way; that is, they are more likely to
participate in private civic organization, and less likely to participate in the urban selfgovernment system. On the other hand, this chapter argues that, the public-sector middle
class people, who have undemocratic belief, will act in an undemocratic way; that is, they
are more likely to participate in the government-sponsored civic organization and urban
self-government system.

42 Chen, “Subjective M otivations for Mass Political Participation in Urban China;” and idem, Popular
Political Support in Urban China.
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CIVIC PARTICIPATION OF THE TWO SUB-GROUPS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
In this section, I will compare the participatory orientations in civic organizations
between the two sub-groups o f the middle class. Before doing that, however, it is
necessary to provide an overview o f the nature o f Chinese civic organizations.

A. The Nature o f Chinese Civic Organizations
Since the 1978 reform, the number o f China’s civic organizations has increased.
In the years between 1979 and 1992, the number o f national civic organizations has risen
sevenfold (averaging 48% a year), and the average increase o f provincial civic
organizations has developed even faster.43 By the end of 2002, there were 133,340 civic
organizations in China.
Current studies o f Chinese politics question the autonomy o f these civic
organizations 44 As He Baogang has suggested, the assumption that these organizations
are autonomous and independent is not warranted.45 The expectation that China’s civil
organizations will perform the same democratic functions as their Western counterparts is
far from being a reality. According to He, “Chinese autonomous organizations are
neither completely autonomous from the state nor completely dependent on the state ....
It is the feature o f partial autonomy and overlapping with the state that makes Chinese
social associations a semi- or quasi-civil society.”46 Moreover, as Chapter III has
discussed, these civic organizations are licensed by the Party-state and under the

43 Minxin Pei, “Chinese Civic Associations: An Empirical Analysis,” Modern China 24, no. 3 (1998): 285318.
44 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China', Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Unger and Chan, “China,
Corporatism, and the East Asian Model.”
45 Baogang He, The Democratic Implications o f Civil Society in China (New York: St. M artin’s Press,
1997).
46 Ibid., 7-8.
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directives o f the Party-state. According to Bruce Dickson, the civic organizations in
China have a dual function: they are designed to give the Party-state a means by which to
control organized interests in society and also to represent their members’ interests.47
On the other hand, many Chinese scholars and watchers have observed the
development o f private organizations and even unofficial organizations in the Chinese
society, which are more independent from the government’s control.48 For example, as
suggested by Ian Johnson, China’s citizens “have started to demand more from their
government,” and “these sorts of demands have given rise to numerous unofficial— and
in many cases illegal— groups outside the government’s control: hence, civil society.”
Such civic groups are “pushing for change” and “China is in a transition from a society of
strong governmental control to one where civil society controls more.”49
This dissertation makes distinctions between two types o f civic organizations:
state-controlled civic organizations and autonomous private organizations. The statecontrolled civic organizations include most formal civic organization such as trade unions,
associations of private entrepreneurs, and trade associations (hangye xiehui). Political
and economic civic organizations are typical state-controlled organizations.50 The
autonomous private organizations include sport or recreation organizations, art, music or
educational organizations, academic organizations and public interest organizations.
Most o f these organizations have a certain level o f autonomy and independence from the

47 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China.
48 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in
Urban China;” Luigi Tomba, “Residential Space and Collective Interest Formation in Beijing’s Housing
Disputes,” The China Quarterly 184 (2005): 934-51; Ian Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil
Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 551-54.
49 Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil Society,” 553.
50 For a detailed discussion, please see He, The Democratic Implications o f Civil Society in China', Dickson,
R ed Capitalists in China', Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and
the East Asian M odel.”
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Party-state.51 Public interest organizations refer to those autonomous organizations
seeking to promote the public interest, and they are the active and robust part o f civil
society and play a direct role in promoting public interest.52

B. The Comparison between the Two Types o f Civic Organizations
In contemporary China, all civic associations have to register with government
agencies and conform to regulations issued by the Ministry o f Civil Affairs. According
to the “Regulations on the Management of the Registration of Societal Organizations”
which was issued by the State Council in 1989, all new civic organizations have to be
approved by government agencies, which have authority over the applicants’ proposed
domains o f activities, before they can register with the offices o f the Ministry o f Civil
Affairs.53 In this respect, there is no significant difference between state-controlled civic
organizations and private organizations. However, some public interest organizations do
not register with government agencies at all. For example, some internet-based public
interest networks organize most o f their activities on the Internet and they do not have
formal organizational structures or staff; therefore, they are completely outside the
government’s control.54

51 For a detailed discussion, please see He, The Democratic Implications o f Civil Society in China; Gordon
White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study o f Xiaoshan City,” The Australian Journal o f
Chinese Affairs 29 (1993): 63-87; B. Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” in Civil society in China,
ed. Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 46-67.
52 Johnson, “The Death and Life of China’s Civil Society.”
53 Pei, “Chinese Civic Associations.”
54 Tamara Renee Shie, “The Tangled Web: Does the Internet Offer Promise or Peril for the Chinese
Communist Party?” Journal o f Contemporary China 13, no. 40 (2004): 523-30; Guobin Yang, “The
Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment,” Journal o f Contemporary China 12, no.
36 (2003), 453-75; N ina Hachigian, “The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States,” The
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 41-58; Guobin Yang, “Weaving a Green Web: The Internet and
Environmental Activism in China,” China Environment Series 6 (2003): 89-93.
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For the state-controlled civic organizations, the leaders o f these civic
organizations are elected or nominated by the Chinese government, and the funding of
these civic organizations come mainly from the Chinese government. Moreover, on
many occasions, these civic organizations are created or initiated by the government. As
a consequence, these civic organizations are highly dependent on the government and the
Chinese government can institute strict control over the activities o f these civic
organizations.55 On the other hand, the private organizations can choose their own
leaders, and the funding o f these private organizations comes mainly from social
donations and constituencies’ fees. Moreover, under most circumstances, these private
organizations are created or initiated by individual Chinese citizens. As a consequence,
these private organizations are very independent, even though the Chinese government
can still put some limits on their activities.
The state-controlled civic organizations are designed to give the government a
means o f controlling the organized interests in society by regulating the activities o f their
members.56 On the other hand, the private organizations genuinely assume the function
of representing their members’ interests. Unlike the state-controlled civic organizations,
the private organizations do not necessarily follow the directives from the government
and they are more responsive to the demands from their members.
Within the state-controlled civic organizations, there exists a hierarchical structure
that guarantees that directives are effectively transferred from the top down to the local

55 Christopher Earle Nevitt, “Private Business Associations in China: Evidence o f Civil Society or Local
State Power?” The China Journal 36 (1996): 25-43; Jonathan Unger, “Bridges: Private Business, the
Chinese Government and the Rise o f New Associations,” The China Quarterly 147 (1996): 795-819; Anita
Chan, “Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China,” The Australian
Journal o f Chinese Affairs 29 (1993): 31-61; Pearson, “The Janus Face o f Business Associations in China;”
Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian M odel.”
56 Dickson, R ed Capitalists in China.
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level.57 The local branch associations must submit to the direction of the top-level
associations. Moreover, the relations between the state-controlled civic organizations and
their members are neither horizontal nor voluntary.58 Most state-controlled organizations
stipulate that membership is obligatory. For example, the Self-Employed Labourers’
Association (SELA) and Private Enterprises Association (PEA) clearly state that the selfemployed businessmen automatically become members when they register for the
licenses from the government agencies.59
Unlike the state-controlled civic organizations, most private organizations do not
have local branch offices or affiliations since the government has put limits on their
memberships and scope o f activity.60 And the relations between the private organizations
and their members are more horizontal and voluntary. Within the private organizations,
the membership of the constituency is voluntary, and the constituencies can decide
whether or not to join the organizations freely.61
The comparison between the state-controlled civic organizations and private
organizations can be best summarized by Table 25.

57 Pearson, “The Janus Face o f Business Associations in China.”
58 According to Putnam and his associates, the qualities o f being “horizontal” and “voluntary” are essential
for an organization to be a genuine civic organization. Please see their book, M aking Democracy Work.
59 Nevitt, “Private Business Associations in China;” and Unger, “Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese
Government and the Rise o f New Associations.”
60 Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (2004):
28-49.
61 Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil Society.”
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Table 25. The Comparison between the State-Controlled Organizations and Private
Organizations

Autonomy
The Funding and Staff
Source
Organization Leaders

Role o f Civic
Organizations

The Relations between
Organizations and their
Members

Private Civic
State-controlled Civic
Organizations
Organizations
Medium or High
Partial or None
Partially dependent on the
Completely dependent on the
government or independent government
Independent or partially
Completely decided by the
influence by the
government
government
Interest accumulation and Implementation o f
representation
government policies and
limited function o f interest
representation
Equal and voluntary
Completely Hierarchical

C. Empirical Findings and Discussions
The 2004 Beijing Survey contains a standard survey question that is designed to
assess Chinese citizens’ level o f participation in a variety of civic organizations. The
standard survey question is as follows: “Now I am going to read off a list o f voluntary
organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are a member or not a
member o f that type of organization? 1) private social welfare groups, 2) state-initiated
religious or church organizations, 3) private education and cultural groups, 4) stateinitiated unions, 5) state-initiated political groups, 6) private local community
organizations, 7) private rights-resistance organizations, 8) private environment groups, 9)
state-initiated industry associations, 10) private sports and recreation organizations.”
Among these 10 types o f organizations, I define state-initiated unions, political groups,
religious organizations, and industry associations as the state-controlled civic
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organization, and define private social welfare groups, education and cultural groups,
local community organizations, rights-resistance organizations, environment groups, as
well as sports and recreation organizations as the private organizations.
Table 26 shows the participatory pattern of different class groups in the two types
o f civic organizations. Based on the data presented in this table, we see that the middle
class people in the private sector are more likely to participate in the private organizations
than are other social segments. Approximately 30 percent o f the people in the privatesector middle class indicate that they have participated in at least one private organization.
The middle class people in the private sector are less likely to participate in the statesponsored civic organizations than the public-sector middle class and the upper class.
Only 13 percent o f the people in the private-sector middle class participated in one or
more state-controlled civic organizations.

Table 26. The Participation in Two Types of Civic Organizations be Class Identity

Upper Class
Public-sector Middle
Class
Private-sector Middle
Class
Lower Class

State-controlled Civic
Organizations
31
32

Private Civic Organizations

13

30

10

5

11
9

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 20.2; d f = 3; p = 0.00

2)

The middle class people in the public sector are more likely to participate in the

state-controlled civic organizations than the private-sector middle class and the lower
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class. Approximately 32 percent o f the people in the public-sector middle class indicate
that they have participated in at least one state-controlled civic organization. On the
other hand, only 9 percent of the people in the public-sector middle class participated in
one or more private organizations.
3) The lower class people are least likely to participate in both state-controlled
and private organizations. Such finding can be explained by the following two facts: first,
the lower class people do not possess resources such as time, money, and civic skills to
enable them to spontaneously participate in the private organizations; second, the lower
class people generally do not have close relations with the Party-state thus they are less
likely to be mobilized by the Party-state to be engaged in the state-controlled civic
organizations.
4) The upper class is most likely to participate in the state-controlled civic
organizations. Approximately 35 percent o f the upper class participated in one or more
state-controlled organizations. Such finding simply reflects the fact that the upper class
people have the strongest ties with the Party-state.
Based on this examination o f the survey results, I conclude that the Chinese
private-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the private civic organizations.
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the statecontrolled civic organizations. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical
discussion and support my hypothesis.
The different participatory behaviors by the two sub-groups o f the middle class in
civic organizations have significant implications for China’s political development. The
participation in the state-controlled organizations will lead the public-sector middle class
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to identify with the current semi-democratic regime and form affective attachments to
current political authority.

62

Furthermore, the undemocratic nature o f the state-controlled

organizations may strengthen the undemocratic belief among the public-sector middle
class. In addition, the participation in the state-controlled organizations will lead the
public-sector middle class to be engaged in other forms o f conventional political
activities that support the current system.
On the other hand, the private organizations, like their Western counterparts, are
voluntarily and horizontally organized; thus they are more democratic than the statecontrolled civic organizations. As a consequence, involvement in the private
organizations will instill democratic attitudes in their members and cause their members
to become critical o f the current political authority, which, in turn, may lead to their
negative evaluation o f the current forms o f mass political participation. Finally, this
negative evaluation may cause the private-sector middle class to adopt a nonparticipatory strategy in regard to other forms o f conventional political activity as a
protest against the current system.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE URBAN SELF-GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
In this section, I will explore the different political behavioral orientations o f the
two sub-groups o f the middle class by examining how they act in the urban selfgovernment system. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to provide an
overview o f the nature o f the system first.

62 Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil Society.”
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A. The Nature o f the Urban Self-Government System
From the outset of the post-Mao reform, the central government has made
genuine efforts to adapt the grassroots government system in the urban areas to social
changes brought about by the reform in the urban neighborhoods, such as the drastic
decline of the role of work units and the rapid increase in private ownership o f residential
properties.

63

This system was anchored by its self-governing body, Residents’

Committee (RCs, jum in weiyuanhui). Residents’ Committees were first established by
the government in the 1950s. Before the post-Mao reform, the central government used
RCs to assist work units at the grassroots level in implementing Party and government
policies, monitoring and controlling the population, and providing residents with some
basic social welfare services. Moreover, the central government treated the RCs as its
administrative extensions, in conjunction with work units, at the local level.
Before reform, urban residents relied more on their work units than on the RCs
for their basic life needs.64 Therefore, the RCs “were seen to be performing trivial and
routine tasks.”65 However, since the outset o f the Post-Mao reform, the importance o f the
work units in meeting the residents’ basic life needs declined. More importantly, most
work units no longer provided the social services, such as housing, childcare, medical

63 Allen C. Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II: An Assessment o f Urban Residents Committees
Municipal Community Development,” Asian Foundation Working Paper 1998, no. 10; Benjamin L. Read,
“Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’,” The China Quarterly 163 (2000): 806-20.
64 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve T ips’;”
Zhirong Zhang and Haijiao Yang, ed., Jiceng m inzhuyu shehui fazhan (Grass-Roots Democracy and Social
Development) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2001); Bangzuo Wang, ed., Juw eihuiyu shequzhili
(Residents’ Committee and Community Governance) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003);
Robert Benewick, Irene Tong, and Jude Howell, “Self-Governance and Community: A Preliminary
Comparison between Villagers’ Committees and Urban Community Councils,” China Information: A
Journal on Contemporary China Studies 18, no. 1 (2004): 11-28; James Derleth and Daniel R. Koldyk,
“The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban China,” Journal o f Contemporary China 13,
no. 41 (2004), 747-77.
65 Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self-Governance and Community,” 14.
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care and other social welfare services, which they did in the pre-reform era.66 And many
urban residents do not belong to any work unit at all (e.g., those who are laid off from the
work units and those who are employed in the private or foreign or joint-venture
enterprises). It is in this larger context that the Chinese government initiated the
revitalization of RCs.
According to the 1982 Chinese Constitutions, the RCs established among urban
residents on the basis o f their residence are mass organizations of self-management at the
grassroots level. The Chairman, vice Chairman and members of each RC are elected by
the residents. In November 1989, the Chinese National People’s Congress promulgated
the “Organic Law on Organization o f Residents Committees of Cities”, which became
effective m January 1990.

According to the Organic Law, these RCs are supposed to be

elected and regularly held to account by the residents o f urban neighborhoods, and are
responsible for administering local socioeconomic and political affairs.68 The central
government’s underlying rationale is that, under this system, the RCs should be more
effective and efficient in settling these issues, because the RCs, which are supposed to be
popularly elected, tend to enjoy greater support from residents.
However, the 1990 “Organic Law” did not stipulate clearly how the RC members
(including chairman and vice-chairman) should be elected. In practice, there are three
kinds o f elections for RC members: direct election by all residents, election by an
electorate consisting o f representatives from each household, or election by an electorate

66 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self-Governance and
Community;” Wang, ed., R esidents’ Committee and Community Governance.
67 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II.”
68 Wang, ed., R esidents’ Committee and Community Governance', Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban
‘Nerve T ips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots
Democracy and Social Development.
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consisting o f representatives from each o f the Residents’ Small Groups. In reality, the
“all residents direct election” has been a rare practice, whereas the “indirect election by
an electorate consisting o f RC small groups representatives” has been most widely
practiced.69 It is much easier for the local Party leaders to control indirect rather than all
residents’ direct election, since most “representatives” who voted in indirect elections
were actually chosen by the incumbent RC itself “from among its activists and
supporters,” or designated by the local Party leaders.
As for the nomination o f candidates for RC members, the 1990 “Organic Law”
did not stipulate clearly how the candidates for RC members (including chairman and
vice-chairman) should be nominated. In practice, there are five kinds o f nominations for
RC members: first, the local government/Party leaders selects the candidates; second, the
RC itself selects the candidates; third, the local government/Party leaders and RC itself
jointly select the candidates; fourth, the local government/Party leaders and RC itself
jointly select the candidates with consultation with residents; fifth, residents jointly
nominate the candidates. In reality, the nomination o f candidates for RC members was
also closely monitored and controlled by the local government and Party leaders, and
residents almost had no influence in the nomination process.
In 2000, the Ministry o f Civil Affairs issued its decree, “Views for Advancing the
Construction o f Urban Residential Communities,” which marked the beginning o f the
central government’s push for more autonomy o f grassroots governing bodies in urban
China. The decree called for the establishment o f new grassroots governing bodies,
Community Residents’ Committees (CRCs), which are supposed to be different from old
69 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community
Governance', Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “SelfGovernance and Community;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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RCs. The CRCs tend to have more residents and more autonomy than old RCs. In 2004
when my survey on “Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” was conducted,
most o f Beijing’s RCs had already been transformed into the CRCs. According to the
same decree, the CRCs should operate based on the four democratic principles:
“democratic election, democratic decision making, democratic management, and
70

democratic oversight” .

However, this decree does not state clearly the procedure o f

selection o f the leadership in the newly-established CRCs. Rather, the selection rules of
the leadership in the new CRCs are also governed by the 1990 “Organic Law” for RCs,
and therefore these rules remain the same as those for RCs.71
In recent years, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and its local branches have
taken measures to promote the direct election of the leadership in the newly-established
CRCs. For example, in 2004, 182 o f 2242 (approximately 8.1 percent) o f Beijing’s
newly-established CRCs had adopted direct elections. In practice, these directly-elected
CRCs shared the following major characteristics:72 (1) the expansion o f the electorate to
include all residents living in the communities; (2) the residents' right to nominate
candidates for leaders in the CRCs; (3) the requirement that there be multiple candidates
for any contested position in the CRCs; and (4) first-time candidates' right to run their
election campaign in public. However, the majority o f the CRCs still followed the old
procedure for selection o f the leadership.
It may be concluded that this self-government system in the urban areas was only
70 M inistry o f Civil Affairs, “M inzhengbu guanyu zai quanguo tuijin chengshi shequ jianshe de yijian”
(Views for Advancing the Construction o f Urban Residential Communities), (2000). Available [Online]:
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/content/W JYL_SQJS/200491101216.tml> [11 October 11 2005],
71 Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment.”
72 Xiaoling He, Shequ jianshe m oshiyu ge ’an (Community Construction: Models and Cases) (Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 2004); Chao Chen, “Democratic Electoral Reform for Communities in
China,” (2003). Available [Online]: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Apr/62725.htm> [14
November 2005].
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semi-democratic, if not non-democratic, since it was in general dominated and controlled
by the Party-state. As one Chinese scholar has summarized the situation: “to date,
however, the great majority of elections have been limited to voting by ‘representatives’
who are often chosen by the RC itself from among its activists and supporters. Moreover,
government street officers tend to be heavily involved in the selection o f RC staff; often
they hire new RC members to work for a trial period o f a few months, and then hold an
election to confirm their choice.”73

B. Participation in the Urban Self-Government System
In order to ascertain the major trends o f mass political participation in the selfgovernment system, I designed four questions that would measure four types o f political
behavior: (1) voting in the election o f RC members, (2) participating in activities
sponsored by the RC, (3) contacting RC members, and 4) serving in any position
assigned by the RC. There are two theoretical justifications to choose these four
categories o f political participation in the urban self-government. First, even though
these forms o f political participation did not exhaust all types o f political behaviors, they
represent the dominant conventional political acts in the framework o f self-government.74
Thus, they are most likely to represent the fundamental trends of mass political
participation in the urban self-government system. Second, these forms o f political
behavior are legitimate in the urban self-government. As a result, the survey questions
about these acts are unlikely to make respondents give interviewers false answers due to

73 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’,” 819.
74 For more on this topic see, Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community Governance; Read,
“Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and
Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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the fear o f government sanctions against “illegitimate” acts. Thus, the responses to these
questions are expected to be reliable. Specifically, these four kinds o f political
participation in urban self-government were measured by the following four questions:
1. Have you served in any position assigned by the RC in the past year?
2. Have you ever contacted RC members in the past year?
3. Have you voted in the last election of RC members?
4. Have you participated in any activities sponsored by the RC in the past year?
Respondents were asked to answer each o f these four questions on a dummy scale,
where “ 1” indicated respondents’ participation, and “0” referred to their non-participation.
These four items were then combined to form an additive index to capture a collective
profile o f a respondent’s political participation in the self-government, ranging from “0”,
indicating non-participation in any kind o f activities, to “4” indicating full participation in
all kinds o f activities listed in the questions. This index is used in the recursive path
analysis that follows.
A factor analysis is used to test whether these four forms o f political acts can be
formed together to capture the trends of mass political participation in the urban selfgovernance system. Table 27 indicates that the factor analysis strikingly bears out my
expectation. The pattern that I have discussed in theory is clearly there. The four forms
o f political acts form a solid base to describe the mass political participation in the urban
self-governance system. Furthermore, the reliability analysis for these four items shows
that the inter-item correlations are moderate, ranging from 0.29 to 0.44. This set o f four
items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) o f 0.70.
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Table 27. Factor Analysis: Political Participation in the Urban Self-Government

Have you served in any position assigned by the
RC in the past year?
Have you ever contacted RC members in the
past year?
Have you voted in the last election o f RC
members?
Have you participated in any activities
sponsored by the RC in the past year?

Political Participation in the Urban
Self-Government
0.693
0.668
0.794
0.720

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
\ 1 component extracted.
2. Initial E ig en v alu es^.075; % of Variance=51.9

It is my expectation that the middle class people in the private sector are less
likely than other social segments to participate in the self-government system
implemented in their neighborhoods. Since the middle-class individuals in the private
sector are here considered to be likely to have negative attitudes toward the currentlyimplemented self-government, as hypothesized above, they may engage in nonparticipatory action to register their discontent with this system. On the other hand, I
expect that the middle class people in the public sector are more likely to participate in
the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods than the private-sector
middle class. To explore this hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between
social class and participation in the self-government system against the data from the
2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance” .
Table 28 shows the participatory pattern o f different class groups in the selfgovernment system implemented in their neighborhoods. Based on the data presented in
Table 28, we see that the middle class people in the private sector are least likely to
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participate in the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods.
Approximately 52 percent o f the private-sector middle class did not participate in any
kind o f activities, whereas only 17 percent o f the upper class, 22 percent o f the publicsector middle class, and 29 percent o f the lower class engaged in non-participation.
2) The middle class individuals in the public sector are more likely to participate
in the self-government system than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 78
percent o f the middle class people in the public sector indicate that they have participated
in at least one o f the four types o f political acts.
3) The lower class people are more likely to participate in the self-government
system than all other social groups. Such finding can be explained by the fact that the
lower class people have the closest ties with the urban self-government system. Since the
reform, the urban grassroots government (RCs) has been encouraged to develop social
welfare facilities and other social services which the work units used to provide before
the reform.

75

In particular, the Party-state expected this grassroots government to become

the basic social welfare providers to those disadvantaged segments o f the urban
population that are living under the poverty line, retired, unemployed, and handicapped.
In addition, some earlier observations o f urban self-government have found that the
active participants in the urban self-government system are mainly from the segment o f
retired or unemployed people.

7 f\

75 Kaifeng Yang, “From Danwei Society to New Community Buildings: Opportunities and Challenges for
Citizen Participation in Chinese Cities,” Chinese Public Administration Review 1, no. 1 (2002): 65-82;
Agnes Yeung, Kwok Kin Fung, and Kim Ming Lee, “Implementation Problems in the Development o f
Urban Community Services in the People’s Republic o f China: The Case o f Beijing,” Journal o f Sociology
and Social Welfare 26, no.3 (1999): 151-171; Wang, ed., Residents’ Committee and Community
Governance', Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
76 Wang, ed., R esidents’ Committee and Community Governance; Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban
‘Nerve T ips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots
Democracy and Social Development.
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4)

The upper class is more likely to participate in the urban self-government

system than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 71 percent o f the upper class
people participated in at least one of the four types of political acts. Such finding simply
reflects the fact that the upper class individuals have strong ties with the Party-state.

Table 28. Political Participation by Class Identity
Engaging in none o f the four
activities
Upper Class
Public-sector Middle
Class
Private-sector Middle
Class
Lower Class______________________

Engaging in at least one of
the four activities

29
22

71
78

52

48

17_________________________ 83___________

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 23.3; d f = 3; p = 0.00

Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the private-sector
middle class is less likely to participate in the self-government system implemented in
their neighborhoods than other social segments in Chinese society. On the other hand,
the public-sector middle class has a strong orientation to participate in this selfgovernment system. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and
support my hypothesis.

C. Attitudinal Orientations toward the Urban Self-Government System
To substantially explore the reason o f why the two groups o f the middle class
have different participatory orientations toward the urban self-government, this section
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examines how the two groups of the middle class view the current self-government
system. It is my expectation that the middle class people in the private sector are more
likely than other social segments to expect direct election of the self-government system
because direct election is more competitive and democratic than indirect election
(controlled by the Party-state), and direct election is more consistent with the general,
democratic orientations that the private-sector middle class people have. On the other
hand, I expect that the middle class people in the public sector are less likely to have the
expectation for direct election o f the self-government system that the private-sector
middle class because the currently implemented indirect election is more consistent with
the undemocratic belief which the public-sector middle class people have. To explore
this hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between social class and support for
direct election o f the self-government system against the data from the 2000 Beijing
Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance”.
In order to assess the urban citizens’ support for direct election o f the selfgovernment system, I asked my respondents two questions, as follows:
1. Do you agree that the direct election by residents is the best way to select
members of the Residents’ Committee?
2. Do you agree that the Residents’ Committee should be elected by
representatives selected by the Party and government?
These two questions asked respondents if the RC should be directly elected by all
residents in the neighborhood or by representatives picked by the Party and government.
It should be noted that direct election by the residents without the Party’s intervention
here is considered a democratic principle. Respondents were asked to answer each o f the
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two questions on a 5-point scale. For the first question, “ 1” and “5” indicated,
respectively, “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; for the second question, “ 1” and
“5” stood for, respectively, “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” The values o f these
two questions were added together to form an additive index to capture residents’ support
for direct election o f the self-government system. This index is used in the recursive path
analysis that follows.
Table 29 shows the bivariate correlation between social class and support for
direct election o f the self-government system. Based on the data presented in Table 29,
we see that the middle class people in the private sector registered a higher level of
support for direct election than the lower class, the public-sector middle class, and the
upper class. Approximately 73 percent o f the private-sector middle class people agree
that the direct election by residents is the best way to select members o f the Residents’
Committee.
2) The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level of support for
direct election than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 58 percent o f the
public-sector middle class people agree with the indirect election. In addition, only 27
percent of the public-sector middle class registered agreement with the statement that the
direct election by residents is the best way to select members of the Residents’
Committee.
3) The lower class people are less likely to support the direct election o f
leadership in the RCs than the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher level
of support for direct election than the public-sector middle class and the upper class.
Approximately 40 percent o f respondents from the lower class registered agreement with
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the statement that the direct election by residents is the best way to select members o f the
Residents’ Committee.
4)

The upper class people are the least democratic, and they have the lowest level

o f support for direct election. Approximately 62 percent of the upper class individuals
agree with the indirect election. In addition, only 25 percent o f respondents from the
upper class registered agreement with the statement that the direct election by residents is
the best way to select members o f the Residents’ Committee.

Table 29. Support for Direct Elections of Residential Committees by Class Identity

Upper Class
Public-sector Middle
Class
Private-sector Middle
Class
Lower Class

Support for the direct
election1

Support for the indirect
election2

25
27

62
58

73

21

40

48

N ote: All percentages represent positive (“agree” and “strongly agree”) responses.
1. The original question is “Do you agree that the direct election by residents is the best
way to select members o f the Residents’ Committee?”
2. The original question is “Do you agree that the Residents’ Committee should be elected
by representatives selected by the Party and government?”

Based on this examination o f the survey results, I find that the Chinese
private-sector middle class is positively associated with support for the direct
election o f leadership in the self-government system. On the other hand, the
public-sector middle class shows a strong negative feeling toward support for the
direct election of leadership in the self-government system.
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As for the evaluation o f the self-government system, I expect that middle-class
people in the private sector are more likely to negatively evaluate the currently
implemented self-government system in their neighborhoods than other social segments,
because the currently-implemented system is still dominated by the CCP, this system
goes against the private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic expectations
mentioned above. Thus, the private-sector middle class people are more likely to have
negative evaluation o f the current system.
As this chapter has discussed, the currently-implemented urban self-government
system is still dominated by the Party-state rather than being democratically organized by
all residents. Even though the RCs are officially defined as a body through which all
residents engage in “self-administration, self-education, and self-service”, their task is
“not self-administration but rather the fusing o f government administration with local
social networks.”

77

In sum, the major task o f the RCs is not to serve the interests o f their

residents but rather to serve the directives from the upper-level government. When any
demands from residents do arise, the RCs will not be truly responsive to such demands
but rather use persuasion and pressure to defuse them.
Moreover, the procedure for election o f the leadership in the RCs is still un
democratic. First, the “all residents direct election” has been a rare practice; whereas the
“indirect election by an electorate consisting of RC small groups representatives” has
been most widely practiced; second, the nomination o f candidates for RC members was
also closely monitored and controlled by the local government and Party leaders. As a
result, despite much talk o f democratic balloting and scattered experimentation with

77 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in
Urban China,” 38.
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reform, elections of the leaderships in the RCs generally remain a thin facade covering
7 0

appointments that are controlled by the local government and Party leaders.
On the other hand, I expect that middle-class individuals in the public sector are
more likely to positively evaluate the currently implemented self-government system than
the private-sector middle class, because: first, the public-sector middle class people are
more likely to identify themselves with the current semi-democratic regime and thus they
are more likely to possess affective attachments to this semi-democratic self-government
system; second, this semi-democratic self-government system is more consistent with the
undemocratic belief which the public-sector middle class people have. To explore this
hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between social class and evaluation o f the
self-government system against the data from the 2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and
Urban Local Self-governance”.
In order to detect Chinese urban citizens’ evaluations o f the currently
implemented self-government system in their neighborhoods, I asked my respondents
two questions, as follows:
1. Do you agree that the current election o f the members o f Resident’ Committee
is fair?
2. Do you agree that the current election o f the members o f Residents’ Committee
is basically dictated by the Party and government?
These two questions in essence asked respondents whether the currentlyimplemented system was democratic. Respondents were asked to answer each o f the two
questions on a 5-point scale. For the first question, “ 1” and “5” indicated, respectively,
78 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community
Governance', Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “SelfGovernance and Community;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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“strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; for the second question, “ 1” and “5” stood for,
respectively, “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” The scores o f these two questions
were combined to form an additive index to reflect residents’ evaluations o f the selfgovernment system as implemented in their neighborhoods. This index is used in the
recursive path analysis that follows.
Table 30 shows the bivariate correlation between social class and evaluation of
the self-government system. Based on the data presented in Table 30, we see that the
middle class people in the private sector are more likely to negatively evaluate the
currently-implemented self-government system than the lower class, the public-sector
middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 42 percent o f the private-sector middle
class had a negative evaluation o f the currently-implemented self-government system,
whereas only 8 percent o f the upper class and 12 percent of the public-sector middle class
registered this negative evaluation.
2) The public-sector middle class and the upper class are most likely to positively
evaluate the currently-implemented self-government system. Approximately 56 percent
o f the upper class and 46 percent o f the public-sector middle class had a positive
evaluation of the currently-implemented self-government system, whereas only 23
percent o f the private-sector middle class people registered this positive evaluation. This
finding simply reflects the fact that the public-sector middle class and the upper class
have close ties with the semi-democratic regime and thus are more likely to identify
themselves with the currently-implemented political system.
3) The lower class people are less likely to negatively evaluate the currentlyimplemented self-government system than the private-sector middle class. But they are
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more critical o f the current self-government system than the public-sector middle class
and the upper class. Approximately 24 percent of the lower class negatively evaluated
the currently-implemented self-government system, and only 35 percent o f them
positively evaluated this system.

Table 30. Evaluation of Self-Government by Class Identity

Evaluation of
Self-Government
Index1
Low
Medium
High
Total

Upper Class

Public-sector
Middle Class

Private-sector
Middle Class

Lower Class

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

8
36
56
100

12
42
46
100

42
35
23
100

24
41
35
100

N ote: Pearson Chi-Square = 68.5; d f = 6; p = 0.00
x. The original evaluation index is trichotomized into three categories: high, intermediate,
and low levels.

Based on this examination o f the survey results, I find that the Chinese privatesector middle class is more likely to negatively evaluate the currently implemented selfgovernment system. On the other hand, the public-sector middle class is more likely to
have a positive evaluation of this system. Such findings are consistent with my
theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.

D. Relationships among Support, Evaluation, and Participation
Based on the above observations and analysis, I have found that the Chinese
private-sector middle class is less likely to participate in the self-government system
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implemented in their neighborhoods, more likely to support the direct election of
leadership in the self-government system, and more likely to have a negative evaluation
o f this system; whereas, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the
urban self-government system, less likely to support the direct election o f leaderships in
the self-government system, and more likely to have a positive evaluation o f this system.
The three Cross-Tab analyses have shown the results o f the three separate
bivariate relationships between the objective indicators o f social class and three
dependent variables. However, these three Cross-Tab analyses did not explain the
relationships among the three dependent variables (i.e., support for direct election,
evaluation o f self-government, and participation in self-government). An analysis of
such relationships will explain how the two sub-groups of the middle class internalize
their attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward the current self-government.
As my hypotheses (H2, H3, H4, and H5) imply, it is my supposition that the
objective middle class identity is very likely to work through the two attitudinal
orientations (i.e., support for direct election, and evaluation o f self-government) to
influence participation in the current self-government system. That is, the private-sector
middle class people’s democratic belief that a political system should be democratically
formed leads to their negative evaluation o f the currently-implemented urban selfgovernment system (since under the current system the RC is not directly elected by the
residents); in turn, this negative evaluation causes the private-sector middle class people
to engage in non-participatory action to express their discontent with the current system
that is considered by them as non-democratic; on the other hand, the public-sector middle
class people’s undemocratic belief may lead to their positive evaluation o f the Currently-
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implemented urban self-government system; in turn, this positive evaluation causes the
public-sector middle class people to engage in participatory action to express their
support for the current system.
To test this proposition, I ran a recursive path analysis o f the structural
relationship among the three dependent variables (i.e., support for direct election,
evaluation o f self-government, and participation in self-government) within the group of
the middle class (objectively defined) respondents.79 In order to verify whether this
proposed relationship can prevail across key demographic divisions, I include in this
analysis such control variables as sex, education, and income. The results o f this analysis
are illustrated in Figure 3.
Overall, the findings from the recursive path analysis are consistent with my
proposition regarding the relationships among the attitudinal and behavioral orientations
toward self-government. Such expected relationships prevailed across major socio
demographic groupings (i.e., sex, education, and income). Specifically, and first o f all,
among the middle class individuals, the support for direct election significantly and
negatively affected the evaluation o f the current self-government system. Second, among
the middle class respondents, there was a positive relationship between the evaluation of
the current system and participation in the system. These findings suggest that the
middle class individuals who believed in the democratic formation o f the grassroots
governing body (RC) tended to be critical o f the current system that was still dominated
by the Party and thus did not engage in various activities within the current system.

79 To test the structural relationship among the three dependent variables, we employ the analytical moment
structures (AMOS) model-fitting program. For an introduction to AMOS and Structural Equation
Modeling, please see Rex B. Kline, Principle and Practice o f Structural Equation Modeling (New York:
Guilford Press, 1998); Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With AMOS: Basic Concepts,
Applications, and Programming (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2001).
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Figure 3. Recursive Path Model of Participation in Self-Government within the Group o f the Middle Class
Note: Chi-square= 5.4; df= 10; p= 0.86; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.00; Chi-square/df ratio = 0.54. * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01.
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Whereas, the middle class individuals who did not believe in the democratic formation of
the grassroots governing system tended to be supportive o f this system and thus engaged
in participatory action to express their support for the system.
Based on the above discussion, I can draw the following conclusions: (1) because
the private-sector middle class is more democratic, its democratic belief leads to the
negative evaluation o f the currently-implemented urban self-government system; (2) this
negative evaluation in turn causes the private-sector middle class people to engage in
non-participatory action; (3) on the other hand, because the public-sector middle class is
undemocratic, its undemocratic belief leads to the positive evaluation o f the currentlyimplemented urban self-government system; (4) this positive evaluation in turn causes
the public-sector middle class individuals to engage in participatory action.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has assessed the political behavioral orientations o f the Chinese
middle class people based on their engagement in the civic organizations and the urban
self-government system. The findings o f this chapter indicate that the Chinese private
sector middle class is less likely to participate in the state-sponsored civic organizations
and the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods; whereas, the
public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the state-sponsored civic
organizations and the self-government system.
Like their Western counterparts, the Chinese private-sector middle class people
are also interested in political matters, feel efficacious in regard to participation in
political and public affairs, and are endowed with the resources (i.e., money and civic
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skills) to do so. As a result, the private-sector middle class is very likely to participate in
various forms o f political activities that are consistent with its democratic belief. The
democratic behaviors o f the private-sector middle class can be measured by the following
two aspects:
First, the private-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the private
civic organizations. The private civic organizations, like their Western counterparts, are
voluntarily and horizontally organized; thus they are more democratic than the statecontrolled civic organizations, and they are more consistent with the democratic
principles specified in the previous chapter.
Second, since the private-sector middle class is more democratic, its democratic
belief leads to the negative evaluation of the currently-implemented urban selfgovernment system, which is still dominated by the Party-state; in turn, this negative
evaluation causes the private-sector middle class people to engage in non-participatory
action to express their discontent with the current system, which is not consistent with
their democratic belief.
The democratic demands of the private-sector middle class have posed serious
threats to the current authoritarian regime. Those politically competent and
knowledgeable middle class people in the private sector have taken non-conventional
actions such as forming home-owners’ associations and organizing protest to defend their
property interests and rights.80 For example, not a few empirical studies and reports have
documented the role o f newly emerging home-owners’ associations in helping the

80 Cai, “C hina’s Moderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China;” Tomba, “Residential Space and Collective Interest
Formation in Beijing’s Housing Disputes.”
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private-sector middle class individuals protect their interests.81 It should be noted here
that the home-owners’ associations are more democratic, and are, on many occasions,
initiated and self-managed by the residents. However, in many urban areas, the local
governments have not legally recognized the existence of the home-owners’ associations
•

•

and have restricted their activities.

82

Furthermore, when their demands cannot be met,

those competent private-sector middle class individuals may even go forward to organize
protests and demonstrations.83
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class people are less interested in
political matters, have a lower level o f political efficacy, and are endowed with fewer
resources to participate in political affairs than the private-sector middle class. In
addition, the public-sector middle class has negative attitudes toward democracy and
close ties with the Party-state, all o f which will lead the public-sector middle class to act
in an undemocratic way. The undemocratic behaviors of the public-sector middle class
can be measured by the following two aspects:
First, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the statecontrolled civic organizations. The participation in the state-controlled organizations will

81 Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level;” Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights;” Read, “Democratizing
the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
82 It is until July 2005 that the Chinese National People’s Congress issued the “Law o f Property Rights in
the People’s Republic o f China” . According to the “Law o f Property Rights”, homeowners may establish
the Hom e-Owners’ Associations in their neighborhoods and it does endow ordinary homeowners with the
right to organize the Hom e-Owners’ Associations. However, in practice, local governments put many
limits on the organization o f the Home-Owners’ Associations by ordinary homeowners. As a result, the
Hom e-Owners’ Associations almost did not exist in many neighborhoods, and for those existed HomeOwners’ Associations, their autonomy is severely impacted by the local government. For more on this
point, please see “Yezhu beida pingliang chanchu, yezhu weiyuanhui gan’ga qiusheng” (More
Homeowners Were Beaten and the Home-owners’ Association was in a dilemma), Zhongguo jin g ji shibao
(China Economic Times), 19 June 2002; Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
83 Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level;” Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights.”
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cause the public-sector middle class to identify with the current semi-democratic regime
and form affective attachments to current political authority.
Second, since the public-sector middle class people are undemocratic, their
undemocratic belief and their close ties with the Party-state contribute to their positive
evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self-government system; in turn, this
positive evaluation causes the public-sector middle class people to engage in
participatory action to express their support for the current system.
Based on these observations, I can address the questions put forward in the
beginning o f this chapter: the private-sector middle class, who have democratic values,
act in democratic ways that will promote democracy in China; whereas, the public-sector
middle class, who hold negative attitudes toward democracy, act in undemocratic ways
that will impede the transition to democracy.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Using data from the two Beijing surveys 2000, 2004, and the World Values
Survey 2 0 0 1 ,1 have sought to answer three fundamental questions in this study: (1) Who
are the people who constitute the middle class in today’s China? (2) Does the Chinese
middle class support democracy as the best form o f government? And (3) what impacts
does attitudinal support o f democracy have on the middle class people’s political
behaviors? On the one hand, since the findings from the World Values Survey are based
on a national sample, I believe that these findings may be directly applied to the general
population o f urban China. On the other hand, since the findings from the two Beijing
surveys are based only on the Beijing urban areas, I do not intend to generalize these
findings to the areas of urban China outside of Beijing. Nonetheless, I believe that the
findings from the two Beijing surveys and the implications o f these findings can
contribute to a better understanding o f these important questions concerning the middle
class people’s attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward democracy. In this chapter, I
will summarize the empirical findings from the previous chapters concerning these three
questions and then elucidate the key political and theoretical implications o f these
findings.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In order to determine the identity o f the people who constitute the current Chinese
middle class, I have examined the validity o f three types of measurement (i.e., the
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subjective measurement, the income- and education-based quantitative measurement, and
the occupation-based qualitative measurement) o f the middle class that are commonly
used in the Western literature for the purpose of assessing their applicability to Chinese
society. The results o f this examination indicate that the occupation-based qualitative
measurement is the type that is applicable to the study o f the middle class in today’s
China.
First, in regard to the subjective measurement, I have found that the Chinese
people’s subjective perception o f class identification is still far from coming into being,
even though objective bases o f class difference have formed since the post-Mao reform.
The findings from the World Values Survey 2001 indicate that approximately 7 % o f the
Chinese respondents could not recognize their social class position. Moreover, over 50%
o f the Chinese respondents subjectively identified themselves with the middle class,
while only 13% o f them were objectively qualified for the middle class. This finding
may imply that most people in a developing, transitional society such as China are
longing to become members of the middle class and therefore may subjectively (or
wishfully) identify themselves with the middle class.1
Second, in regard to the income- and education-based quantitative measurement, I
have found that neither the level o f income nor the level of education is a good indicator
for the purpose o f identifying the middle class in Chinese society. Regarding the incomebased quantitative measurement, it is very hard to achieve a consensus on the criterion of
income when defining the middle class, since, an accurate account o f personal income is

1 Several earlier empirical studies o f social classes in China indicated that over 60% o f respondents
subjectively identified themselves with the middle class. These findings are consistent with my findings in
this study. See, for example, Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Li, “The Composition and
Size o f C hina’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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hard to obtain; moreover, income varies dramatically across the different regions of
China. More importantly, as Jie Chen pointed out, income does not necessarily indicate a
person’s true socioeconomic status in the Chinese society.

On the other hand, the

education-based quantitative measurement fails to correctly identify certain people— such
as self-employed individuals who have not necessarily received a post-secondary
education— as being middle class.
Third, in regard to the occupation-based measurement, I have found that this
measurement is promising in overcoming all the drawbacks that the above-mentioned
two types o f measurement have suffered. Therefore, such an occupation-based
measurement is a more reliable and practical indicator o f the middle class in the Chinese
society. Based on this occupation-based measurement, I operationalize the middle class
in China by combining four occupational groups typically used in the Western societies:
self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur of small or medium-sized business in
the Chinese context), managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., whitecollar office workers in the Chinese context). The findings from the 2000 Beijing Survey
indicate that currently the middle class (defined by this occupation-based measurement)
in China constitutes no more than 15% o f the country’s urban population.
To gain a thorough understanding o f the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of
the middle class, I have examined the unique socio-political background o f the
emergence o f the Chinese middle class. The rise of the Chinese middle class is a
relatively new phenomenon and a direct consequence of the rapid state-led economic
development o f the past two decades. Therefore, the current middle class represents a
first-generation middle class in the Chinese society. This finding may imply that a
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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unified and distinctive middle class identity has not formed in Chinese society, since it
often takes two or more generations for a clear pattern of middle class identity to emerge.
Moreover, the activities o f the party-state have been the primary source o f the
formation o f the middle class in China, and almost half o f the Chinese middle class is
employed in the public sector, which is controlled by the state. The middle class in the
public sector is primarily composed o f the managers in the state-owned enterprises,
professionals in the public organizations, and staff members in the government and party
agencies and public organizations. On the other hand, a group o f the middle class which
is employed in the private sector is emerging in the Chinese society. This group o f the
middle class in the private sector is independent from the state power and it mainly
includes the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the
private sector, private entrepreneurs of small and medium businesses as well as the whitecollar office workers in the private entities.
In order to ascertain the extent o f the middle class’ support for a democratic
government, I have examined the middle class people’s attitudinal orientations in regard
to three selected democratic values: (1) support for competitive election, (2) support for
equal protection and rights for all people, as well as (3) support for the sovereignty o f the
people’s will. The two Beijing surveys clearly indicate a higher level o f support for (1)
competitive election, (2) equal protection and rights for all people, as well as (3)
sovereignty o f people’s will among the private-sector middle class than the public-sector
middle class and other segments o f the Chinese population. Overall, these findings
suggest that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic social group in the
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Chinese society; on the other hand, the public-sector middle class has a fairly negative
attitude toward democracy.
In order to assess the impact o f attitudinal support for democracy on the middle
class’ political behavior, I have investigated the middle class people’s participation in
two of the most common kinds o f political act in urban China: (1) participation in the
civic organizations, and (2) participation in the urban self-government system. The
findings from the two Beijing surveys indicate that the people in the private-sector
middle class are more likely to participate in the private civic organizations, which are
democratically organized, and are less likely to participate in the state-controlled civic
organizations than those in the public-sector middle class. The findings from the two
Beijing surveys also indicate that the people in the private-sector middle class are more
likely to be critical o f the currently-implemented urban self-government system (since it
was not organized as democratically as they expected), and therefore less likely to
participate in the system; on the other hand, the people in the public-sector middle class
have a positive evaluation o f the currently-implemented self-government system, and
therefore are more likely to participate in the system to express their support for the
current authoritarian regime. Overall, these findings may imply that the private-sector
middle class, which holds democratic values, acts in ways that will promote democracy
in China; while, the public-sector middle class, which holds negative attitudes toward
democracy, acts in an undemocratic fashion.
In sum, the findings from this study have provided us with a multifaceted picture
of the Chinese middle class. What does this multifaceted picture imply for CCP rule as
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well as China’s political development in general? I will now address this important
question.

THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN CHINA’S DEMOCRATIZATION
The empirical findings detailed in this study have important implications for CCP
rule as well as the future o f democracy in China. Both modernization theorists and
Western policymakers have expressed the hope that the emergence o f a prosperous and
strong middle class in Chinese society will lead to political change and ultimately
democratization in that country. However, the findings from this study provide a mixed
picture about the role of the Chinese middle class in promoting democracy in China. On
the one hand, the current Party-state can still draw substantial political legitimacy from
the public-sector middle class; on the other hand, the Party-state has to face the rising
democratic demands and challenges from the private-sector middle class.

Implication 1: The Public-Sector Middle Class and C hina’s Democracy
The empirical findings from this study imply that the current Party-state can still
draw political support from the public-sector middle class to sustain its authoritarian rule.
First, it is clear that the Chinese public-sector middle class has a negative attitude toward
democracy. The public-sector middle class, in general, appears to be more concerned
about issues o f material well-being than democratic change, because this class has a
vested interest in the continuation o f the current regime. As An Chen points out, the
public-sector middle class may “expect a system o f checks and balances that could
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effectively.. .hold a tight rein over corruption,” but this class is skeptical o f democratic
change and it hardly accepts the complete overthrow of the current regime.3
Second, the findings o f the relationship between the attitudinal support of
democracy and political behavior imply that undemocratic belief could translate into
overt or behavioral support for (as opposed to overt alienation from) CCP rule. As
demonstrated in Chapter V, the public-sector middle class people who have strong
negative attitudes toward democracy are more likely to participate in the state-controlled
civic organizations and the currently-implemented urban self-government system.
Participation in the state-controlled civic organizations and the urban self-government
system can best be understood as an expression o f support for CCP rule, since the statecontrolled civic organizations and the urban self-government system— in which people
are no longer coerced to participate— are dominated by the CCP politically and
ideologically.
Finally, the CCP still enjoys political legitimacy in the minds o f the public-sector
middle class. As documented in Chapter V, an overwhelming majority o f the publicsector middle class people, who have strong negative attitudes toward democracy, tend to
have a positive evaluation o f the currently-implemented urban self-government system.
Since the urban self-government system can be characterized as a proxy for the whole
political system, support of the urban self-government system can be interpreted as
support for the current regime. Therefore, this finding suggests that the majority o f the
public-sector middle class people still support the current political regime.

3 Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 416.
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Implication 2: The Private-Sector Middle Class and C hina’s Democracy
The empirical findings from this study also indicate that the private-sector middle
class poses a serious challenge to the current regime. First, the findings have indicated
that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic group in Chinese society. The
private-sector middle class people have shown a strong demand for such democratic
principles as (1) competitive election, (2) equal protection and rights for all people, and
(3) sovereignty o f people’s will. This rising demand for democracy will, o f course,
constitute a major challenge to the current political regime, since the current regime can
at best be characterized as semi-democratic, which is not consistent with the expectations
of those who strongly believe in democratic principles.
Second, the findings of the relationship between an attitudinal support of
democracy and political behavior imply that democratic belief could translate into
behavioral alienation from CCP rule. As demonstrated in Chapter V, the private-sector
middle class people, who are strongly supportive o f democracy, are less likely to
participate in the state-controlled civic organizations and the urban self-government
system. This non-participation is a strategy to express discontent with the current
political system.
Finally, the CCP can not derive political legitimacy from the private-sector
middle class. As documented in Chapter V, an overwhelming majority o f the privatesector middle class people, who are strongly supportive o f democracy, tend to have a
negative evaluation o f the urban self-government system. Moreover, the private-sector
middle class individuals’ dissatisfaction with the urban self-government system is
directed at CCP rule. In my 2004 Beijing interview, quite a few private-sector middle
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class people alleged that the semi-democratic nature o f the urban self-government system
is attributable to the rule o f CCP. Mr. M, a middle-level manager o f a large private
enterprise said:
“The CCP set the tone for the currently-implemented urban self-government
system. As long as the CCP holds power, the urban self-government can not
become really democratic.”
If the above findings about the private-sector middle-class individuals’ attitudinal
and behavioral orientations can be repeated in future studies based on national or
multiple-locality samples, then it can be more assertively argued that the private-sector
middle class is the harbinger o f democratization in China. According to the findings of
this study, approximately one half of the Chinese middle class is currently employed in
the private sector, which means that the private-sector middle class constitutes
approximately 7% of the country’s population. As modernization continues to deepen
and extend to more socioeconomic sectors as well as geographic areas in China, however,
the size of the private-sector middle class will grow accordingly. When the private-sector
middle class gains size, it will play a more important role in promoting democracy at both
the local and national levels.
When initiating socioeconomic reform in 1978, the Communist Party leadership
expected to regain political legitimacy through the reform. However, this economic
reform has brought about unexpected consequences. Market reform has created a sizable
middle class that is employed in the private sector. This private-sector middle class has
called for further political reform, including a democratic political system, and this class
tends to be very critical o f the current authoritarian regime. As Jie Chen and Peng Deng
have observed, economic reform, by which the Party intends to maintain their political
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legitimacy, has changed the public attitude toward politics in Chinese society, and this, in
turn, will become a catalyst for political transformation 4

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
This study might seem to be overly ambitious, given my initial statement o f the
main goal o f this dissertation: to determine whether the Chinese middle class thinks and
acts democratically and hence serves as the harbinger o f democratic change in China. In
this final section, I will discuss several implications o f the findings.

Implication 1: Supplementing the Modernization and Contextual Approaches
The modernization approach seems to be helpful in identifying the pro-democratic
influence o f the middle class on democratization, although it fails to consider the
different social and historical contexts of the middle classes in the transitional societies.
This approach is well-suited to tracing the structural linkage between the rise o f the
middle class and democratization in a society over a long period. Via this linkage,
modernization theorists using this approach have been able to identify the pro-democratic
influence o f the middle class on democratization in the developing world.
The contextual approach seems more correct by recognizing the different social
and historical contexts of the middle classes in the transitional societies, although it
incorrectly treats the role o f the middle class as an “arbitrary” or “dependent” variable
that can be predicted by the overall social context. This approach sensibly takes into
account the unique social, political, historical and cultural context o f the middle class.

4 Jie Chen and Peng Deng, China since Culture Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism
(W estport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995).
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Moreover, both the modernization and contextual approaches tend to be
structural-oriented. This study offers a new analytical approach to study the role o f the
middle class in democratization by engaging in an individual-level analysis o f the
attitudinal and behavioral orientations o f the middle class. Thus, on one hand, I avoid an
overly simple expectation of the pro-democratic role o f the middle class in the
transitional societies. On the other hand, I am well prepared to answer the question of
why a large sector o f the middle classes in the transitional societies are illiberal or anti
democratic— a question that has always frustrated modernization believers who assume
that the middle class is a consistent agent for democracy.

Implication 2: Inheriting and Modifying the Western Individual-Level Theoretical
Framework
The predominant view, within the individual-level studies o f the middle class in
the West, suggests that middle-class individuals do think and act democratically: that is,
they have attitudes in support o f democratic principles, and engage in actions (or “non
actions”) for the rise and/or maintenance o f a democratic system and against a nondemocratic system.5
This study inherits and applies this Western individual-level theoretical
framework: it uses objective factors— owning small properties (specifically referring to
the apartment properties), supervising others, possessing professional expertise— as the

5 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and
Political Role Behavior;” Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o f Democracy;” and idem, Political Man\
Milbrath, Political Participation; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation,
Part I,” and “Part II;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and
idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective; Walsh, Jennings, and Stoke, “The
Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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initial and dynamic factors in influencing the middle class people’s political attitudes and
behaviors. In addition, this study has added a new objective factor— the socioeconomic
ties with the state— to modify the application o f this Western individual-level theory to
transitional societies such as China.
All members o f the Chinese middle class own a relatively substantial amount of
property: all small entrepreneurs own their businesses, while most managerial personnel,
professionals, and white-collar office workers possess at least their apartments.
According to the Western individual-level theory, one would expect that the Chinese
middle class would perceive democracy to be the best form o f government to protect its
property. However, the middle class people who have close ties with the Party-state do
not think this way. As the previous chapters document, the public-sector middle class
people who are employed either in the state bureaucracy, in state-owned enterprises, or in
public organizations have close ties with the CCP and very often use these ties with the
CCP to assure the protection o f their property. Moreover, some o f the property owned by
the public-sector middle class came from the Party-state. For example, the public-sector
middle class people purchased their apartments through their work units at a very low
subsidized price. Therefore, the public-sector middle class has a vested interest in
maintaining the rule o f the current authoritarian regime and will not support democratic
change.
On the other hand, the private-sector middle class people who are employed in
either the private enterprises or organizations often do not have close ties the Party-state;
thus they are independent from the CCP. Moreover, the material benefits enjoyed by the
private-sector middle class were mainly acquired through the market. For example, the
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private-sector middle class people purchased their apartments through the market with no
government subsidy. Since the private-sector middle class people lack powerful political
patrons to protect their property, they have to rely on legal weapons and have a fairly
strong demand for an institutionalized democracy. Overall, the private-sector middle
class is very critical of the current authoritarian regime and demands democratic change
in China.
In short, the implication o f this study in regard to the application o f the Western
individual-level theory is that objective factors, such as owning small properties,
supervising others, and possessing professional expertise, are the important factors in
assessing the political orientations o f the middle class. In regard to the modification of
this Western individual-level framework, however, this study adds a new objective
factor— the socioeconomic ties with the state— in assessing the political orientations of
the middle class in China. The findings o f this study imply that the political orientations
o f the Chinese middle class are not unified, but divided. The middle class people who are
employed in the private sector have close ties with the Party-state, and thus are less likely
to support democracy, while the middle class people who are employed in the private
sector often have no ties with the Party-state and thus are supportive o f democratic values.

Implication 3: Explaining and Predicting the Role o f the Middle Class in the NonDemocratic, Transitional Societies
Since the explanatory capability of this new analytical approach has been strongly
supported by the empirical observations on the Chinese middle class detailed in the
previous chapters, one might further ask: Can this analytical approach explain and predict
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the role o f the middle class in other non-democratic, transitional societies? The answer to
this question will be explored in the following tentative discussions o f two salient issues.
The first issue concerns the role o f the state in the formation and development of
the middle class in the non-democratic, transitional societies. For example, quite a few
empirical observations o f Pacific Asian societies suggest that the rise o f the middle class
in these countries is a direct consequence o f rapid state-led economic development in the
past several decades.6 A large sector o f the newly-emerged middle class in Pacific Asian
societies is “dependent upon the state for their employment, either as public servants, or
as employees o f state-supported companies.”7
The direct result o f this active state intervention in the formation o f the middle
class in Pacific Asian societies is that this class is highly dependent upon state
patronage.8 This unique relationship between the state and the newly-emerged middle
class in Pacific Asian societies makes this class quite different from its counterparts in the
Western democratic societies. Therefore, when analyzing the political attitudes and
behaviors o f the middle class in the developing world, researchers have to bear this fact
in mind.
The second issue concerns the variations within the group o f the middle class,
especially along the line of the relationship with the state. Many empirical studies have
found that since the state often played a very active role in creating and shaping the
6 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal
Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia;” Koo, “The Middle Class in the East Asian Newly Industrialized
Societies.”
7 David Brown and David M artin Jones, “Democratization and the Myth o f the Liberalizing Middle
Classes,” in Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Basingstoke, Hampshire:
M acmillan, 1995), 92.
8 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Brown and Jones, “Democratization and the Myth o f
the Liberalizing Middle Classes;” Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class
Culture in Pacific Asia;” Takashi Torii, “The Mechanism for State-Led Creation o f M alaysia’s Middle
Classes,” The D eveloping Economies 41, no. 2 (2003): 221-42.
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formation of the middle class in the developing world, the emergence o f a unified and
distinctive middle class identity was nearly impossible. As a result, these studies suggest
that the political orientations of the middle classes in the developing world are not unified
but divided along the lines o f the relationship with the state. As U lf Sundhaussen
concluded, inquiry in the political orientations of the middle classes in the developing
world “would have to begin with distinguishing between the different kinds o f Middle
Classes.”9 Furthermore, he observed that:
“the salaried professionals, often in state employ, are usually too dependent on
their employer, especially if the state has been organized along patrimonial
lines....Only, the intellectuals, academics, lawyers and journalists, can reasonably
be expected in Third World countries to champion the cause o f democracy.” 10
For example, some empirical observations of Pacific Asian societies have found
that the political orientations of the middle classes in the Pacific Asia are not unified but
divided.11 In Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea, a large sector
o f the upper middle classes, which are employed either in the state bureaucracy or in
businesses with links to the ruling political party, have generally supported the
consolidation o f authoritarian rule,12 since these upper middle classes were the main
beneficiaries o f the state activities in the past decades; thus they have a vested interest in
the continuity and stability o f authoritarian rule.13 On the other hand, in these countries, a
majority o f the new middle classes, which consist o f professional and technical workers,

9 Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle Classes,” 112.
10 Ibid., 113.
11 Tamio Hattori and Tsuruyo Funatsu, “The Emergence o f the Asian Middle Classes and Their
Characteristics,” The D eveloping Economies 41, no. 2 (2003): 140-60; Koo, “The Middle Class in the East
Asian Newly Industrialized Societies.”
12 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Brown and Jones, “Democratization and the Myth of
the Liberalizing Middle Classes;” Neil A. Englehart, “Democracy and the Thai Middle class,” Asian Survey
43, no. 2 (2003): 253-79; Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in
Pacific Asia;” Shin, “Social Change, Political Elections, and the Middle Class in Korea.”
13 Bell, “A fter the Tsunami.”
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as well as managers, tends to be more progressive and is more likely to demand
democracy than the upper middle classes which have close ties with the state. Therefore
it would be difficult to summarize the general orientation of the middle classes due to
such intra-class variation in these countries.
These examples tend to confirm my analytical model: rather than treating the
newly emerged middle class as a monolithic class, researchers have to divide this class
into different subgroups, especially along the line o f the relationship with the state,
because these different subgroups o f the middle class may have different political
orientations toward democracy.

FINAL WORDS
The issue o f the role o f the middle class in promoting democracy in the nondemocratic, transitional societies has always been complicated. Many scholars, however,
have persisted in their inquiries into this issue, because it is too important to be neglected.
Understanding the role o f the middle class in democratization can help us to more
properly and accurately explain and predict the path o f democratization in the nondemocratic, transitional societies. This study has been devoted to finding a better
analytical approach to this issue. Although this study does not exhaust this issue, it has
provided an alternative direction for further inquiry into the role o f the middle class in
democratization in the developing world.
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APPENDIX A
Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance” in 2000

This data on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance” comes from a public
opinion survey conducted in Beijing in fall 2000 in cooperation with Renmin University
o f China (also known as People’s University o f China).1 The survey was based on a
probability sample o f Beijing residents, aged 18 years and older. This probability sample
was derived from a multistage sampling strategy. Four urban districts (qu) were
randomly chosen at the first sampling stage. At the second sampling stage, 9 streets
(jiedao) were randomly selected from the four districts with a probability proportionate to
size (pps), with one large-size district having four streets, two medium-size districts
having two streets each, and one small-size district having one street. At the third stage
o f sampling, four neighborhoods were randomly chosen from each o f the nine streets
(since all streets are similar in size). This process yielded 36 residents’ neighborhoods.
Then 986 households were randomly chosen from 36 residents’ neighborhoods by using
pps, with large-size neighborhoods having over 30 households, and small-size
neighborhoods having only about 10 households. At the final stage, one individual was
chosen randomly from each of the 986 households as the interviewee. The adjusted
response rate o f this survey was 96 percent (946), which is very high by Western
standards, though quite similar to the response rates from other surveys conducted in
Beijing.2

1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the survey, its name must remain
confidential.
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
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College students o f sociology were employed as field interviewers, and they were
trained by project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey was
carried out. Respondents were assured o f the confidential nature o f their responses and
encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. Circumstantial
evidence and evidence from other Beijing surveys3 suggest that Beijing residents feel free
to express their views in public opinion surveys such as ours.

3 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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APPENDIX B
Beijing Survey on “Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” in 2004

This data on “Construction o f Urban Residential Communities” comes from a
public opinion survey conducted in Beijing in July 2004. The design o f the questionnaire
and sample, as well as the implementation of the actual survey, was done in cooperation
with Renmin University o f China (also known as People’s University o f China).1 The
survey was based on a probability sample o f the Beijing urban residents, aged 18 years
and older. This probability sample was derived from a multistage sampling strategy.
Four urban districts (qu) were randomly chosen at the first sampling stage. At the second
sampling stage, 6 streets (jiedao) were randomly selected from the four districts with a
probability proportionate to size (pps), with two large-size districts having two streets and
two small-size districts having one street each. At the third stage o f sampling, four
residents’ communities were randomly chosen from each of the six streets (since all
streets are similar in size). This process yielded 24 residents’ communities. Then 623
households were randomly chosen from the 24 residents’ communities by using pps, with
large-size communities having over 30 households and small-size communities having
only about 10 households. At the final stage, one individual was chosen randomly from
each o f the 623 households as the interviewee. The adjusted response rate o f this survey
was 95 percent (592), which was very high by Western standards, though quite similar to
the response rates from other surveys conducted in Beijing.2

1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the survey, its name must remain
confidential.
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
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College students o f sociology were employed as field interviewers, and they were
trained by project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey was
carried out. Respondents were assured o f the confidential nature o f their responses and
encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. Circumstantial
evidence and evidence from other Beijing surveys3 suggest that Beijing residents feel free
to express their views in public opinion surveys such as ours.

3 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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APPENDIX C
The National Survey o f Public Opinion in China, the World Values Survey (WVS)
2001

This data on “The National Survey o f Public Opinion in China” comes from the
WVS 2001 China Survey.1 The WVS 2001 China Survey was implemented by the
Research Center for Contemporary China at Beijing University on June 2001. The
sample consists of 1,000 respondents distributed proportionately throughout China so as
to be representative o f the adult population o f China (18 years old and over). The WVS
2001 China Survey replicates the core questionnaire o f the international WVS project and
provides the feasibility o f a cross-national comparison.

1 The data used in this dissertation is from Ronald Inglehart. World Values Surveys and European Values
Surveys, 1999-2001 [Computer file], 1CPSR Version (Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research [distributor], 2004).
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APPPENDIX D
Beijing Interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” in 2004

The interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” was
conducted in Beijing in cooperation with Renmin University o f China (also known as
People’s University o f China).1 The interview sample was designed to reflect the
variations within the group o f the middle class. Thus, our sample included middle class
individuals from different occupational backgrounds, age groups, and levels o f
educational attainment. In fall 2004, we contacted 40 interviewees, and successfully
completed 25 interviews. Detailed background information on the interviewees is
included in the Table below. For reasons o f confidentiality, we do not use their real name,
but instead use one o f 25 letters to indicate their identities.

1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the interview, its name m ust remain
confidential.
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Table 31. The Detailed Background Information of Middle Class Interviewees
Name
A
B

Sex
Female
Male

Age
48
41

C
D
E
F

Female
Male
Male
Male

32
28
27
35

College
Graduate
College
College

G
H
I
J
K

Female
Female
Male
Female
Female

25
34
37
28
37

College level
Graduate level
High school
Graduate level
College level

L
M

Male
Male

32
34

College level
Graduate level

N
0

Female
Female

34
44

College level
College level

Female
Q Female

41
23

Graduate level
College level

R
S

Male
Male

24
44

College level
Graduate level

T

Female

27

College level

U
V

Male
Male
Male
Female
Female

37
47
32
42
32

College level
High school
Graduate level
High school
Graduate level

P

w
X
Y

Education
Graduate level
College level
level
level
level
level

Occupational Background
Doctor in a public hospital
Middle-level manager in a
state-owned enterprise
Accountant
Owner o f small company
Computer Technologist
Middle-level manager in a
foreign-owned enterprise
Actress
Lawyer
Owner o f small business
Teacher
Middle-level manager o f a
big private enterprise
Journal editor
Middle-level manager o f a
big private enterprise
Journalist
Middle-level manager o f a
big foreign enterprise
University Professor
Staff member in public
organization
Staff member in government
Researcher in public
organization
Low-level manager in a
foreign-related enterprise
Artist
Owner of small business
Independent scholar
Owner o f small company
Accountant

Sector
Public sector
Public sector
Public sector
Private Sector
Private sector
Private sector
Private
Private
Private
Public
Private

sector
sector
sector
sector
sector

Public sector
Private sector
Public sector
Private sector
Public sector
Public sector
Public sector
Public sector
Private sector
Private
Private
Private
Private
Public
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